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Background: By 2010 English health policy-makers had concluded that the main NHS commissioners
[primary care trusts (PCTs)] did not sufficiently control provider costs and performance. After the 2010
general election, they decided to replace PCTs with general practitioner (GP)-controlled Clinical
Commissioning Groups (CCGs). Health-care commissioners have six main media of power for exercising
control over providers, which can be used in different combinations (‘modes of commissioning’).
Objectives: To: elicit the programme theory of NHS commissioning policy and empirically test its
assumptions; explain what shaped NHS commissioning structures; examine how far current commissioning
practice allowed commissioners to exercise governance over providers; examine how commissioning
practices differ in different types of commissioning organisation and for specific care groups; and explain
what factors influenced commissioning practice and the relationships between commissioners
and providers.
Design: Mixed-methods realistic evaluation, comprising: Leximancer and cognitive frame analyses of policy
statements to elicit the programme theory of NHS commissioning policy; exploratory cross-sectional
analysis of publicly available managerial data about PCTs; systematic comparison of case studies of
commissioning in four English sites – including commissioning for older people at risk of unplanned
hospital admission; mental health; public health; and planned orthopaedic surgery – and of English NHS
commissioning practice with that of a German sick-fund and an Italian region (Lombardy); action learning
sets, to validate the findings and draw out practical implications; and two framework analyses synthesising
the findings and testing the programme theory empirically.
Results: In the four English case study sites, CCGs were formed by recycling former commissioning
structures, relying on and maintaining the existing GP commissioning leaderships. The stability of
distributed commissioning depended on the convergence of commissioners’ interests. Joint NHS and local
government commissioning was more co-ordinated at strategic than operational level. NHS providers’
responsiveness to commissioners reflected how far their interests converged, but also providers’ own
internal ability to implement agreements. Commissioning for mental health services and to prevent
recurrent unplanned hospital readmissions relied more on local ‘micro-commissioning’ (collaborative care
pathway design) than on competition. Service commissioning was irrelevant to intersectoral health
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promotion, but not clinical prevention work. On balance, the possibility of competition did not affect
service outcomes in the ways that English NHS commissioning policies assumed. ‘Commodified’ planned
orthopaedic surgery most lent itself to provider competition. In all three countries, tariff payments
increased provider activity and commissioners’ costs. To contain costs, commissioners bundled tariff
payments into blocks, agreed prospective case loads with providers and paid below-tariff rates for
additional cases. Managerial performance, negotiated order and discursive control were the predominant
media of power used by English, German and Italian commissioners.
Conclusions: Commissioning practice worked in certain respects differently from what NHS
commissioning policy assumed. It was often laborious and uncertain. In the four English case study sites
financial and ‘real-side’ contract negotiations were partly decoupled, clinician involvement being least
on the financial side. Tariff systems weakened commissioners’ capacity to choose providers and control
costs. Commissioners adapted the systems to solve this problem. Our findings suggest a need for further
research into whether or not differently owned providers (corporate, third sector, public, professional
partnership, etc.) respond differently to health-care commissioners and, if so, what specific implications
for commissioning practice follow. They also suggest that further work is needed to assess how
commissioning practices impact on health system integration when care pathways have to be constructed
across multiple providers that must tender competitively for work, perhaps against each other.
Funding: The National Institute for Health Research Health Services and Delivery Research programme.
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Plain English summary
The NHS will continue to provide patients with state-funded, free health services but now generalpractitioner (GP)-led organisations (‘Clinical Commissioning Groups’) will buy – ‘commission’ – these
services from NHS bodies, charities, voluntary organisations, local government and private firms. We found
that in certain ways this system was not yet working as policy documents assumed. Commissioning work was
often laborious and uncertain. Doctors played little part in financial negotiations with hospitals. There was
little competition between hospitals, and what competition there was affected only a few aspects of hospital
services. Instead, NHS commissioners influenced hospitals and other services by reviewing information about
their activity; through negotiation and informal discussions; by sharing scientific evidence about best forms of
treatment; and by adjusting payments to them. Legal controls were rarely used. Comparing the English NHS
with health systems in Germany and Italy, we found in all three countries that, when hospitals had the right to
be paid a fixed tariff for every patient they treated, more patients were treated but health-care costs also rose.
Patients and individual GPs, not commissioners, chose which hospitals were used. For different kinds of
services, different ways of influencing hospitals and other service providers were needed. Financial incentives
were most relevant to patients, such as orthopaedics patients, who needed a single, well-defined treatment.
For patients with more complex conditions, for instance mental health problems or older people with several
long-term health problems, ongoing negotiation between the many services involved was needed.
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Scientific summary
Background
Since 1991 three main health-care commissioning structures have developed in England:
1. population-based commissioning, for geographically defined populations
2. general practice-based commissioning, under which general practices commission (other) health services
for their registered patients
3. client-based commissioning, in which the patient [or her general practitioner (GP)] selects a care
provider, which a commissioning organisation then pays, per episode of care.
By 2010, English health policy-makers had concluded that the main NHS commissioners [primary care
trusts (PCTs)] did not sufficiently control provider costs and performance, and replaced them with
GP-controlled Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs).
International comparisons of health systems suggest that health-care commissioners have six main media
of power for exercising control over providers:
1. the managerial performance of commissioning (specifying services; procuring providers; monitoring
provider performance)
2. establishing a negotiated order with providers
3. discursive control (evidence basing and ideological persuasion above all)
4. resource dependency (including financial incentives)
5. provider competition
6. juridical controls (law, regulation, contracts).
Different combinations of these media – different ‘modes of commissioning’ – appear to help explain
health system variation in provider development, cost control, managerial development of commissioning,
and medical involvement in commissioning (including extent of evidence-based practice).
Objectives
The research questions were:
1. How do English health policy-makers and NHS commissioners understand the policy aims of
commissioning, and how can governance be exercised over providers through commissioning?
2. How will the reconfiguration of commissioning structures occur in practice and what shapes
this reconfiguration?
3. How far does current commissioning practice allow commissioners to exercise governance over their
local NHS health economies?
i. How much room for manoeuvre do NHS commissioners have?
ii. What are the consequences, and how do health-care commissioners try to manage them, when
commissioning is distributed across different organisations and when it shifts to being client based?
iii. How do provider managers respond to commissioning activity?
4. How do provider managers respond to commissioning activity?
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xxi
5. How do commissioning practices differ in different types of commissioning organisations and for
specific care groups? On which aspects of service provision do different commissioning organisations
tend to focus?
6. What factors, including the local health system context, appear to influence commissioning practice and
the relationships between commissioners and providers?
Methods
A mixed-methods realistic evaluation was carried out to elicit and test empirically the programme theories
underlying English NHS commissioning practice, comprising:
1. Leximancer and cognitive frame analyses of policy documents, speeches and interviews with
policy-makers and managers to elicit their programme theories of NHS commissioning
2. exploratory cross-sectional analysis of publicly available managerial data to test for associations between
commissioners’ characteristics and certain service outcomes
3. systematic comparison of case studies of commissioning in four English case study sites, inducting
common patterns and exploring the contrasts, including the commissioning of services for older people
at risk of unplanned hospital admission; mental health; public health (focusing on coronary heart
disease and diabetes prevention); and planned orthopaedic surgery
4. systematic comparison of modes of commissioning patterns across the English case studies with those
of a German sick-fund and an Italian National Health Service region (Lombardy)
5. action learning sets for managers and GPs from the English case study sites, and German and
Italian commissioners.
Inclusion criteria
1. For English case study sites, maximum variety of pre-2012 commissioning organisations.
2. For individual informants, first-hand knowledge from the commissioner side, provider side or both of
current commissioning practice or, for policy-makers, co-authorship of NHS commissioning policy.
3. For policy documents, being identified as seminal policy statements by policy-makers.
Respective data sources
1. Database of published managerial data about NHS commissioner characteristics and service outcomes.
2. Key informant interviews, grey managerial documents, action learning set meetings.
3. Department of Health (DH) and NHS websites.
Data validity was assessed by triangulation (case studies, discourse analyses), checking the internal
consistency of the database and comparison with other published studies. Data were synthesised using
two framework analyses (both based on the media-of-power framework mentioned above), one at
cross-site level (England) and one at cross-country level. The programme theory was then compared with
the synthesised empirical findings.
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Results
How policy-makers and managers understood commissioning policy
Commissioning policy was understood to have a few agreed, broad aims, such as raising primary and
secondary care quality and enabling patient choice of providers. Implicitly, commissioners would control
providers mainly by means of commissioners’ managerial performance (e.g. respecifying care pathways);
discursive control (using research, monitoring provider performance); establishing negotiated orders among
NHS commissioners, local government, GPs and hospital representatives; and competitive financial
incentives. We combined the findings from the two discourse analyses as a set of causal propositions
(stating assumed context–mechanism–outcome relationships) amenable to empirical testing and
summarised in Figure 1. The most empirically problematic propositions were that GP commissioners would
link clinical and financial decisions, that provider competition would influence provider performance, and
that tariff-based incentives would reduce service costs.
The transition from PCTs to CCGs in our four case study sites was an evolution from existing organisational
arrangements for GP involvement in commissioning, for example professional executive committees, referral
management bodies, practice-based commissioners or a polyclinic. CCG formation depended on the degree
to which GPs were already active participants in commissioning, their willingness to participate, their trust in
NHS commissioning management, and their commissioning skills and knowledge. GPs gradually became
more involved in commissioning and developed relationships with secondary care providers, so that
commissioning work shifted to the shadow CCGs. Joint commissioning similarly evolved from existing joint
health and local authority commissioning arrangements. This organisational continuity maintained
continuity of local GP commissioning leaderships.
English NHS commissioning practice
English commissioners in our four case study sites deployed all six media of power but predominantly
managerial performance, negotiated order and discursive control.
Management performance: Service specifications were becoming more evidence based, but existing
providers still played a large part in formulating them. Commissioners relied on nationally mandated
monitoring measures and on the providers to supply and interpret monitoring data. Tariff payment systems,
the Quality and Outcomes Framework for paying general practices, and GP involvement in monitoring
other providers made provider activity more transparent to commissioners. To cope with work overload,
commissioners became more selective about prioritising their reviews of services. Cross-sectional analysis of
published managerial data found that commissioners’ self-assessed managerial performance was not
associated with hospital performance, PCT financial performance and the other policy outcomes for which
published data were available.
Negotiated order: We observed three overlapping negotiated orders in our four case study sites: contract
negotiations; negotiations among GPs and between GPs and consultants; and ‘micro-commissioning’.
Contract negotiations were conducted at senior managerial level with little input from clinicians.
National policy priorities and local historical activity patterns usually framed these negotiations. Financial
negotiations were often separate from, and prior to, ‘real-side’ negotiations about service provision.
The most important negotiated order was the ‘micro-commissioning’ of care pathways, mainly for
non-commodified activities such as unscheduled care and mental health. These negotiations typically
involved several providers, NHS and local authority commissioners, and patient representatives. They
shaped service specifications, monitoring arrangements and contract specifications. They usually become
more relational as trust and goodwill between the participants accumulated, with mutual recognition that
they would need each other’s co-operation in future.
Discursive control: The evidential discourse that commissioners used to frame contract negotiations,
micro-commissioning and provider monitoring was mainly that of nationally promulgated evidence-based
guidelines (National Institute for Health and Care Excellence guidelines, the mental health recovery model,
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National Service Frameworks, etc.). Where such evidence was absent or ambiguous, normative discourse
was used, above all appealing to national policy mandates but also to local cultures of joint responsibility
for the welfare of the NHS.
Financial incentives: Tariffs were generally recognised to give providers an incentive to increase case load.
They weakened commissioners’ power to control case load, case mix and who provided which services,
and therefore to control costs. Commissioners responded by ‘bundling’ tariffs so that, above an agreed
volume of activity, the marginal tariffs would be reduced by an agreed amount. The incentive effects of
block payments depended on how the conditions of payment and the supply of monitoring information
were specified.
Provider competition: Provider contestability was sometimes used as a means of controlling providers in
our four case study sites, but its applicability was limited because existing providers were often the only
credible bidders. Patient reluctance to travel and difficulty in influencing GP referral behaviour meant that
commissioners did not regard hospital competition as feasible or desirable. Commissioners avoided
financially destabilising their main local providers even when those providers did not comply with contracts.
Our cross-sectional analysis found that the associations between competition and performance and
service outcomes were more often weak, absent or in the opposite direction from that predicted by the
programme theory of NHS commissioning than consistent with the programme theory (although some
were consistent with the theory). These patterns were found even in PCTs with the lowest provider
concentration, hence more scope for competition. Our control variables of PCT size, per capita PCT income
and deprivation were generally more strongly associated with the measures of service outcome, and PCT
income with PCT financial performance. The balance of evidence was against the assumption that provider
competition had beneficial effects on the service outcomes studied, or that commissioners were able to
use provider competition as a means of influencing providers.
Juridical controls: Standard DH contracts were used in all four case study sites, although they
accommodated local variations. The more complete the contract, the less flexible was service provision.
Distributed commissioning
In our four case study sites, most commissioning was centralised through one commissioner, but two
exceptions were a ‘lead commissioner’ (one commissioner commissioning a provider on behalf of several
commissioners) and joint NHS–local authority commissioning. The stability of lead commissioning
depended on how convergent the commissioners’ interests were. Commissioners who withdrew from
these arrangements did not necessarily weaken their bargaining position with providers. Joint
commissioning was co-ordinated more at senior management levels than at the interface with providers,
at which commissioners sometimes resorted to using informal, network-like working arrangements.
The cross-sectional and case studies suggested that personal health budget pilots had not yet had
discernible effects.
Commissioners’ room for manoeuvre
Commissioners’ scope for discretion in our four case study sites was constrained by vertical managerial
controls and having to accommodate local government and GP requirements. The introduction of new
providers and micro-commissioning tended to widen commissioners’ room for manoeuvre.
Providers’ responses to commissioners
National Health Service trusts’ responses to commissioners in our four case study sites were never purely
protectionist, and often constructive. Providers were not always able to implement their side of agreements
made with commissioners, and sometimes were also unwilling. Then, negotiations would stagnate for long
periods. The threat to remove resources sometimes made providers more helpful to commissioners, as did
a credible threat that higher management would intervene if agreement were not reached.
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Commissioning for care groups
In mental health, there was limited use of service specifications, monitoring, evidence basing and
competition in our four case study sites. Micro-commissioning and block payments predominated.
For planned orthopaedic surgery, standardised, well-developed evidence-based practice and outcome
measures predominated; payment was by tariffs; and provider substitution was more straightforward.
There was little micro-commissioning. The commissioning of services was largely irrelevant to intersectoral
prevention work. Clinical prevention was commissioned from primary care health services much as any
other service was. Little use was made of provider competition. Commissioning for the purpose of
managing recurrent unplanned admissions was hampered by lack of predictive knowledge. Little use was
made of provider competition; micro-commissioning was more practically relevant.
Different commissioning organisations’ foci
Reflecting their organisational structure, and consequently whom they were accountable to, commissioning
organisations in the three countries studied pursued different kinds of objective. Social health insurers
needed to maintain solvency. Publicly owned commissioners pursued the goals set by government, whether
at national, provincial or local level. All commissioners were interested in influencing referrals, overall service
costs and (although each used different criteria) service quality. They differed more in which care groups,
care pathways and aspects of provider development they gave most attention to, and their scope for
selecting providers.
Factors influencing commissioning practice and
commissioner–provider relationships
Three main modes of commissioning were most evident: case mix commissioning, micro-commissioning
and surrogate planning. Each commissioning organisation that we studied combined elements of
other modes of commissioning, but one predominated. Commissioning practice appeared to reflect four
main groups of factors: the character of the commissioners’ health system environment; two sets of
technical factors (the service technologies at model of care level; the inherited physical infrastructure
of services); the commissioners’ organisational structure; and the commissioners’ own actions in selecting
and using the media of power.
Conclusions
In our four case study sites, commissioning practice worked in certain respects differently from the ways
that current NHS commissioning policy assumes. It was often laborious and uncertain. In England,
financial and ‘real-side’ contract negotiations were partly decoupled, clinician involvement being least on
the financial side. Commissioners influenced providers (including fellow GPs) more through a negotiated
order and discussions about evidence than through competitive (including patient choice) mechanisms.
Commissioners routinely compared providers against national and regional benchmarks, but seldom
deselected providers for that (or any other) reason. Where multiple hospitals coexisted, analysis of
cross-England data suggested that a minority of their service outcomes (including some proxy clinical
outcomes) improved, although more did not. Personal health budget pilots had not yet had
discernible effects.
Evidence from the three countries studied suggests that each commissioning structure engenders a
corresponding characteristic mode of commissioning (with variations of detail between sites). Insofar as patient
choice involves the tariff system of paying providers, it weakens or removes commissioners’ capacity to choose
providers, whether to improve clinical outcomes or for any other reason. Commissioners influenced providers
through managerial performance (transparency of provider activity data was important); by sustaining a
negotiated order (in England especially, including micro-commissioning) whose disciplinary basis was evidence
basing and shared ideological assumptions (whose content varied considerably between countries); and by
adjusting incentives. Provider competition gave commissioners power only insofar as they could select providers.
Juridical controls were marginal to day-to-day commissioning practice. Commissioners faced trade-offs between
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different media of power, because these media interacted. These findings suggest a contingency theory
explanation of modes of health-care commissioning, in terms of the commissioners’ quasi-market and
socioeconomic environment, technical factors and how commissioners exercise their managerial discretion,
adapting commissioning practice in the light of providers’ responses. Future research is therefore needed
to examine in greater depth how these contingencies influence commissioning practice, in particular the
contingencies of provider ownership (differences between corporate, social enterprise and NHS-owned
providers), care settings (starting from the differences between inpatient, outpatient, intermediate, primary
and social care), and how commissioning itself is organised (comparing competitive tendering for 'market'
share with competition for patient referrals within quasi-markets).
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Chapter 1 NHS commissioning practice and health
system governance
Background
Few questions are more important to the NHS than how its commissioners exercise governance over local
health economies. Commissioners pay for health care on behalf of patients who cannot do so themselves and
on the state’s behalf; in the absence of public ownership and direct managerial control by the state, they also
exercise governance over the service providers. This study aims to examine the means, contexts and effects of
commissioning practice that was current in 2010–12, that is the activities of assessing health needs, selecting
and contracting providers to meet them, monitoring the outcomes and then repeating the cycle.1,2 We focus
on the ways in which health-care commissioners can influence health-care providers within a quasi-market
health system.
NHS commissioning: the policy context
Policy initiatives related to commissioning since 1991 have set the basis for current NHS commissioning
policy and the system introduced in April 2013. Since 1991, three distinct main commissioning structures
have evolved:
1. Population-based commissioning. A single body commissions health services for the entire resident
population within its geographical boundaries. This structure includes public health activity, for
evaluating population health-care needs and initiating preventative activities. In England, District Health
Authorities began commissioning services for populations of 200,000–500,000 people in 1991.
2. General practice-based commissioning. General practices, or another gatekeeper and budget holder,
individually or collectively commission services, the general practitioners (GPs) acting as proxies or
advocates for their registered patients when making referral decisions. These commissioners tend to
serve perhaps 5000–100,000 patients. GP fundholding was the best-known English variant.
3. Client-based commissioning. Patients themselves choose a health provider, which a commissioning
organisation then pays on their behalf. Consequently the provider has to be paid per episode of care;
in most health systems, through a diagnosis-related group (DRG)-based tariff system. Another variant is
to give patients a voucher or budget to pay for care. Client-based commissioning is still an emergent
structure in England, represented by the Patient Choice policy, personal health budgets and the
‘payment by results’ (PbR) system (see section Phase 5: 2006–10 – client-based commissioning).
Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs), introduced in April 2013, are essentially a variant of
population-based commissioning, but also resemble general practice-based commissioning in that GPs play
a pivotal role in their governance. One can distinguish six phases of the evolution of NHS commissioning
in England.
Phase 1: unitary system (before 1991) and the impetus behind the
1991 reforms
Until the late 1980s, contiguous health authorities (HAs) planned and managed NHS hospital and
community health services for a geographically defined population. Services could be organised across the
district and integrated, since just one body managed them. Transaction costs were low because decisions
were enacted through line management. However, HAs were subject to provider capture, becoming
beholden to clinicians (especially doctors) both for technical reasons (to help inform their decision-making)
and in consequence of the 1947 settlement between the state and the medical profession, through which
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the NHS was established.3 There was also an efficiency trap: ‘good’ providers who attracted more patients
incurred greater costs and their service ‘quality’ (especially waiting times) deteriorated.
The NHS financial ‘crisis’ of the late 1980s prompted the Conservative government to announce a
widespread review. Though financial in origin, the crisis was to be solved by organisational restructuring.
The Working for Patients White Paper4 heralded the end of the unitary system. Enthoven, whose work5
anticipated it, had proposed contracts with individual consultants, but the White Paper was less radical and
proposed a market-style relationship between commissioners (‘purchasers’, i.e. HAs) and service providers,
albeit with a heavy dose of management intervention and regulation. At varying speeds, NHS providers
became self-governing trusts. A late addition to the proposals was GP fundholding, seen as a way of
introducing competition between purchasers. Hence the NHS quasi-market was born in April 1991.
Phase 2: 1991–7 – the ‘plurality of purchasing’
Although allegedly incompatible,6 population-based commissioning and GP fundholding coexisted for
several years.
Although HAs had sufficient financial clout to engender improvements in provision, they were not so
responsive to local needs. Some HAs sought to introduce locality purchasing initiatives, not only to be
responsive to local need but also to stem the flow of GPs electing to become fundholders.7 GP fundholders
had relatively little financial power (given the size of their budget compared with a provider’s), but were
more agile in securing improvements in certain services for particular groups of patients. The analogy
between HA ‘supertankers’ and GP fundholder ‘speedboats’ was apt.
Much concern about GP fundholding centred on fears of ‘cream skimming’ (GPs might avoid ‘unhealthy’
patients in case they cost the GP’s budget more), a two-tier service (some patients might enjoy ‘better’
access to services), higher transaction costs (of negotiating and monitoring contracts) and possible adverse
effects on the doctor–patient relationship. In the event there were few cases of cream skimming and
few patients were aware whether their GP was a fundholder or not,8 although transaction costs were
approximately twice those of HAs. Over time, GP fundholding schemes became smaller and their remit
expanded, which complicated the evaluation of them.9 Some GP fundholders also sought to leverage their
financial power by combining in networks (‘multi-funds’), which evolved into more formal total purchasing
pilots (TPPs),10 the nearest equivalent commissioning organisation so far to CCGs. Each served about
300,000 people, similar to an HA. By 1997, the variants of GP fundholding covered 53% of the English
population,11 equivalent to 10% of the hospital and community health services budget.12
At this stage client-based commissioning barely existed. Although patients were given some
encouragement to move between practices, few did.8,13 Policy talk about ‘choice for patients’ was thus
largely rhetoric.
Phase 3: 1997–2001 – the fall and rise of the practice commissioner
Labour’s 1997 election manifesto declared that it would replace GP fundholding with more collaborative
commissioning,11 in language that symbolised a shift away from explicitly market-style relations towards a
system of service ‘delivery agreements’ of longer duration than existing contracts. Whereas GP fundholders
had real budgets, the replacement system would give general practices ‘indicative’ budgets. Crucially, all
GPs in an area would belong to a primary care group (PCG). The 481 English PCG boards were mandated
to include nurse and local authority representatives,14 but GPs were in the majority, albeit ‘not very
effective’15 in wielding influence. Although the ‘ghost of GP fundholding’ lived on,15 the tension between
general practice-based commissioning and population-based commissioning was resolved in favour of the
latter, attenuated with strong GP input.
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Primary care groups evolved into primary care trusts (PCTs), taking on the former HA role to
become the lead NHS organisation in assessing need, planning and securing all health services and
improving health. They will forge new partnerships with local communities and lead the NHS
contribution to joint work with local government and other partners.16
Health authorities were abolished, while NHS performance management regimes and the authority of the
Secretary of State were significantly reinforced.17
Phase 4: 2001–6 – shifting the balance of power?
In 2005, practice-based commissioning (PBC) was introduced to give GPs greater influence over
commissioning. PCTs gave general practices ‘virtual’ budgets for health services for their practice patients,
but retained the ‘real’ money;18 a system similar to the TPPs. Since PBC budgets were not held at practice
level but collectively, PBC represented another variant of the population commissioner model, with
stronger GP input than hitherto. PBC practices tended to collaborate to share expertise and resources,
designed care pathways jointly19 and encouraged GP engagement with commissioning. However,
on balance:
Progress to date has been slow in all sites: very few PBC-led initiatives have been established and
there seems to have been little impact in terms of better services for patients or more efficient use
of resources.18
See also Coleman et al. (p. viii).20
By 2012, ‘David Colin-Thomé, the health department’s lead doctor in primary care, declared it [PBC] to be
a “corpse”. A corpse which he judged was “not for resuscitation” ’.15
Phase 5: 2006–10 – client-based commissioning
In 2006, PCTs were amalgamated, reducing their number from 303 to 152. The number of Strategic Health
Authorities (SHAs) was reduced to eight, in ‘what looked remarkably like the reinvention of the regional
offices that had been abolished earlier’ (pp. 241–2).21 Ministers were starting to consider PCTs underpowered
in controlling healthcare providers and began considering ‘demand side’ (p. 11)22 reforms. World-class
commissioning (WCC) was an attempt to upgrade PCTs’ managerial performance of their commissioning
role, and to strengthen PCT commissioning by developing, and evaluating PCT performance against, a set of
10 competencies (www.hsj.co.uk/resource-centre/world-class-commissioning-nhs-sets-out-to-lead-the-world/
211288.article) – a development that also illustrated population-based commissioners’ ongoing search for
legitimacy. Under the Commissioning for Quality and Innovation (CQUIN) scheme, up to 2.5% of the value
of provider contracts was linked to compliance with quality standards; the selection of quality standards
changed from year to year, and within limits could be varied at regional level.
Client-based commissioning thus emerged. Hitherto, NHS providers (except GPs) had been paid through
block or cost-and-volume contracts. The PbR policy introduced a prospective payment system of paying
providers a tariff for each episode of care. These ‘Healthcare Resource Group’ (HRG) tariffs were a variant
of the DRG system originally developed in New York. PbR was intended to encourage providers to reduce
their costs (to below tariff level) and increase patient throughput (hence reducing waiting times for
treatment). Concurrently, the ‘Patient Choice’ policy obliged GPs to offer patients a choice of provider for
planned secondary care,23 and the chosen provider was guaranteed the corresponding tariff payment.
Following similar schemes for social care,24 a pilot scheme to develop and evaluate personal health budgets
was launched. In 2009, a policy that NHS organisations would be ‘preferred providers’ was announced.
Nevertheless, the policy of promoting provider competition (including competition between NHS providers)
continued during and after 2009.
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr03100 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2015 VOL. 3 NO. 10
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2015. This work was produced by Sheaff et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for
Health. This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals
provided that suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be
addressed to: NIHR Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science
Park, Southampton SO16 7NS, UK.
3
Phase 6: coalition government
Originally billed as ‘GP commissioning groups’, CCGs are membership organisations of all the GPs serving
a geographically defined resident population. Although the nature of this membership role is still
emerging, it means that individual practices will not hold commissioning budgets; only the CCG will do so
collectively. Thus CCGs represent yet another variant of population-based commissioning, but with still
stronger GP input. This time, GPs are ‘required to assume the driving seat of commissioning’ (p. 12).15
CCGs will also have greater leverage over individual general practices’ performance than did earlier
commissioners. CCGs were intended to become responsible for 80% of NHS spending (their 2014 share is
almost certainly lower) compared with the initial 30% budget responsibility for GP fundholding in 1991.
It remains to be seen whether CCGs will become more like large-scale GP fundholders or more like PCTs.
The Any Willing (later, Qualified) Provider policy widened the range of providers from which patients or
GPs could choose, with the aim of adding private providers. The Transforming Community Services (TCS)
policy (2011) transferred community health services from PCT ownership and management into separate
organisations, most often NHS trusts. The monitor’s role became one of fostering ‘level playing field’
competition between public and private providers. Private firms were permitted to participate in NHS
commissioning, through selling data analysis services that model patient demand (as two US health
maintenance organisations (HMOs) have done), helping commissioners manage programme budgets, or
selling more general commissioning support to NHS commissioners. Further commissioning support work
could, according to some, be tendered for private-sector provision.
So, at the time of writing (June 2013), the NHS mainly uses two commissioning structures: a
population-based (but GP-controlled) structure and a client-based structure [PbR plus Any Qualified Provider
(AQP)]. Traces of general practice-based commissioning are more rhetoric than reality.
Continuities
Certain structural continuities have persisted since 1991. Competing governance structures coexist.25
Health policy rhetoric about competition has often been accompanied by a strong undercurrent of control
and market management, such as brokering individual organisations’ losses at the end of the financial
year.26 Concomitantly, the level of competition has waxed and waned. Throughout the past 20 years,
commissioners have preferred to spend their budget on local providers – ‘localism’.27 While commissioning
structures have varied over time, whether NHS funding was expanding or being retrenched, commissioners
have retained a rationing role and a function in ensuring equitable allocation of NHS spending.
There has been constant tension regarding the scale of population at which commissioning should take
place.28 The range goes from personal budgets (n= 1) to CCGs and, for rare or specialised treatments,
millions. The Secretary of State did not prescribe how many CCGs there should be, but the number
authorised (n= 211) is smaller than the original number of PCTs (n= 303), larger than the last generation
of PCTs (n= 152) and similar to the number of HAs in 1992 (n= 192). General practice, specialised services
and health visiting are commissioned at national level by NHS England.
There has also been a clear shift away from letting general practices decide if they want to commission
other services. GP fundholders were volunteers. All practices had to be members of their local PCT, and
now CCG. The GPs managing CCGs will have to take responsibility for, and intervene to influence, any
apparently poorly performing GPs or general practices in their territory. They will hold individual practices
to account for the practice’s commissioning expenditure. In some areas general practices are already being
performance managed on this responsibility. General practice itself has been gradually drawn into the orbit
of NHS management, partly but not only through successive changes to GP contracts, especially the new
general medical services (NGMS) contract introduced in 2004.29
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Contracting methods have also become more sophisticated, block contracts being gradually replaced
by cost and volume contracts (sometimes with caps and/or cost-per-case variations at the margin).
Starting with a small range of planned acute treatments, PbR tariffs now cover most planned acute care
and are being extended into mental and community health services.
Overview
Although the commissioning–provision split is generally accepted, the precise roles that either side plays
are not. Given the alleged ‘failures’ of commissioning (and commissioners) over the past 20 years,30 it
might appear that the balance of power within the NHS remains weighted towards the providers, in
primary31 and secondary care. Equally, commissioners have not always been willing to exercise their powers
fully, often ‘colluding’ with providers in support of local services.27 Their limited data and expertise also put
NHS commissioning organisations at a further disadvantage compared with providers. Managerial careers
in commissioning, for example, might be short compared with those in NHS trusts. Mean salaries for
commissioner chief executives were about £10,000 less than their acute-sector counterparts.32 Throughout
there has been an ongoing tension between the need for a publicly funded service to be answerable to
Parliament and the neo-liberal desire for markets and competition, which policy-makers think deliver locally
responsive services.
Attributing impacts to commissioning and commissioning practice is a complex and contested activity.
Because evaluation was not built into the early periods of commissioning, the evidence for improved
outcomes is equivocal. Two reviews8,13 point to some positive outcomes, although other commentators33
are less convinced. This brings us to the question of what existing research shows about the mechanisms
by which commissioning works and their effects.
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Chapter 2 The research context: commissioning
as governance
Governments introducing quasi-markets in health care still wish to avoid uncontrolled ‘market forces’damaging such politically salient services. An apparent solution is to construct governance structures34
that retain a degree of state control, hence exercise power, over the increasingly independent health-care
providers. Someone must also be ‘payer’ on behalf of patients who cannot pay providers directly.
Commissioning serves both purposes.
‘Commissioning’ is a very English concept. Elsewhere, diverse organisations fulfil these roles to varying
extents: social health insurers [social health insurers (SHIs), e.g. Krankenkassen (Germany), Siekenfonds
(the Netherlands)], state bodies [e.g. Medicare (USA)], corporate insurers, charities or mutuals [e.g. Group
Health (USA)]. To develop an initial theory of how commissioning works, we therefore drew on research
about this range of organisations (and for brevity call them all ‘commissioners’).
International comparisons of health systems35–37 report that commissioners use diverse and multiple
means of exercising governance over providers. Many quasi-market health systems hybridise contractual
with hierarchical38,39 and networked governance structures. To explain and analyse such complexes
therefore required a theoretical framework which accommodated, and related, these diverse governance
mechanisms, one capable of combining and integrating more specific theories (e.g. of contract) within
a wider, more complex framework. Consequently, and because governance is an exercise of power,
we selected the theory of (the multiple) ‘technologies of power’40–42 as an overarching analytic framework.
Within it, we applied (a) more specific analytic framework(s) for each of the main media of power
(enumerated below), choosing a framework relevant to, and used in, preceding research into commissioning,
but with two exclusions. When incompatible alternative theories were available (e.g. negotiated-order versus
institutionalist explanations of organisational value-systems), we selected the one most consistent with the
overall framework and complementary to the other elements in it. We also excluded essentially normative
frameworks, such as neo-classical theories of perfect competition43 or normative managerial accounts of
governance. The resulting framework supplements the markets–hierarchy–networks trichotomy of governance
structures44 with a more nuanced, specific account of the media of power through which, in different
combinations, commissioners might exercise governance over providers.
Many commissioners are also, even mainly, agents of employers, subscribers (consumers),45 shareholders
and other interests besides the state. In some health systems, commissioners compete, which in Germany
and the Netherlands has led to market concentration on the commissioner side of the market.46,47
Commissioner competition may accentuate adverse selection, requiring a risk-equalisation system to make
risk selection unprofitable.46 Even competing commissioners often negotiate collectively with providers,
attempting to wield power through a de facto monopsony35 (one buyer confronting many sellers), which in
a health system with flexible prices would help reduce those prices.48
Media of power
The ‘therapeutic state’ (p. 254)40 co-opts and adapts the ‘technologies of power’ that it believes will
reinforce its control over the population, promote and implement policies (e.g. regarding population
health, reproduction, the control of deviancy) and discipline the medical profession accordingly. Foucault
argued41 that control within and between organisations occurs through a dispositif: a structured complex
of diverse, coexisting technologies of power42 including professional disciplines, surveillance, task
sequencing, task distribution, coercion and panoptical control.49,50 Commissioners generally try to exercise
governance over health-care providers by combining several methods in parallel.51 We call each such
method a ‘medium of power’, because each embodies a collection of ‘technologies of power’.52 These
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complexes of technologies of power are historical ‘positivities’ that can be identified only empirically, case
by concrete case.53 International overviews35–37 suggest that health-care commissioners generally use one or
more of six media of power: managerial performance of commissioning; negotiated order; discursive
control; resource dependency and financial incentives; provider competition; juridical control.
Managerial performance of commissioning
Strong management systems are necessary to ensure provider compliance.54 Some English GPs see
commissioning as a substantial ‘job’, others as a supplementary task. They often lack time and skill
(e.g. in data analysis) to participate intensively in commissioning; PCTs also lacked the necessary resources.55
Delegating those tasks to other staff may be cheaper, but can also send an adverse message about the
relative importance of these tasks and problems.56 Although GP fundholding may have fragmented strategic
planning,13 their small size and organisational independence enabled fundholding practices to make small
local service changes more easily than PCTs.57
As noted, the managerial performance of commissioning is often regarded as a cycle involving evaluating
the health needs of the population that the commissioner serves and then specifying the corresponding
services, which requires epidemiological and public health expertise. Few recent studies examine how
needs assessment relates to commissioning, although cf. Pickin and St. Leger58 and Milne.59
A second step is procurement. There are again few studies of NHS procedures for recruiting and selecting
providers, letting the contract and negotiating its terms and conditions. At times these procedures have
been erratic. PCTs have been known to change their requirements for procuring alternative provider
medical services less than 24 hours before the competitors were due to present bids.60 Furthermore, the
choice of provider inherently has a value-laden ‘political’ aspect.61 Outside the health sector, Cousins and
Lawson62 among others describe how corporations normally manage procurement through a supply
portfolio approach, relationship management and performance measurement. Socialisation mechanisms,
incorporating relational aspects such as supplier conferences and on-site visits, help establish effective
communication and information sharing. These in turn support the integration of suppliers and providers
into product development. Managerial attention becomes focused on specific aspects of procurement
and product development, such as innovation and communication, through performance management
processes. Competitive procurement for military equipment produced substantial savings even when the
provider did not change,63 for instance. One difficulty, though, is co-ordinating different providers in
parallel, especially under conditions of organisational instability.64,65
Thirdly, commissioners have to audit and monitor provider performance and compliance with commissioners’
aims, and prevent provider ‘opportunism’.66,67 Transparency of provider activities and costs assists commissioners
in these activities,35,68 as does professional expertise in the services concerned.54 PCT scrutiny of out-of-hours
services was least rigorous when the PCT itself supplied them69 and most rigorous when social enterprises did.
Bevan and Hood,70 Bevan71 and Gray72 describe how performance targets encouraged upcoding or ‘gaming’ of
data returns by both NHS hospitals and general practices, although other studies39,73,74 report the opposite.
Bevan71 attributed the weakness of PCT monitoring and control of providers partly to the removal of a regional
level mediating between PCTs and the Department of Health (DH),75 and recommended introducing more
uncertainty into how NHS provider managers are assessed in order to impede gaming. English GPs valued
monitoring data only when they had selected information that would be meaningful and useful to them.56
‘Hard’ (measurable) outcomes make it easier for commissioners to monitor providers’ activity,76 even
independently of the provider.77 US local government commissioners self-report more active monitoring than
providers perceive.76 Where only soft outcomes apply, US practice is often to monitor multiple stakeholders’
satisfaction levels with providers.76 Providers who perceive that their commissioner lacks monitoring expertise,
and those who are highly resource dependent on one commissioner, are likely to try to negotiate monitoring
methods with their commissioner.77 US studies also report that commissioning managers often lack the skill
and understanding to obtain monitoring data and interpret it in non-simplistic ways.78–80 To address this point,
the NHS introduced the WCC assurance framework, requiring PCTs to evaluate their competencies in
procurement and ‘managing the local health system’, among others.
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A second-order managerial task is to minimise the transaction costs of the above activities. Divergence
between commissioner and provider goals, and hence the cost of monitoring services, is likely to be
greater when publicly owned commissioners face corporate rather than ‘third-sector’ providers.81
Transaction cost theories imply that contractual negotiations demand more resources for infrequently
commissioned services that display asset specificity, uncertainty and immeasurability.82–84 Thus the
negotiation of, say, residential care contracts is simpler, cheaper and better adapted to quasi-market
institutions than is the negotiation of contracts for mental health services.85 In services with
hard-to-measure outcomes, negotiative monitoring becomes necessary, with raised transaction costs;65
which may partly explain why US non-profit providers are over three times more likely to negotiate
outcome monitoring than are for-profit providers.77 Increased contracting out (of US social care) may come
at the price of reducing commissioners’ own capacity ‘to be a smart buyer of contracted goods and
services’,86(p. 296),87 although a study of US municipal contracts suggested that including contract
management activities in the services bought can offset this problem.54 However, some US commissioners
doubt the probity of contracting out service-monitoring work.76 In some US states, Medicare has
subcontracted health-care commissioning entirely to managed care ‘plans’ (insurers) but how far this
arrangement improves health outcomes to compensate for the additional managerial complexity is not
well understood.
Economies of scale in commissioning management may be exhausted at quite small population sizes
(< 200,000), although the threshold varies by care group (e.g. > 1,000,000 for organ transplants).88
Qualitative studies83,89 suggest that moving from block to tariff payments (see subsection Resource
dependency and financial incentives) raised NHS transaction costs. Longer-term contracts spread the initial
transaction costs over a longer period, and flexible, relational working saves the cost of contract revisions.83
Negotiating with an ‘umbrella group’ for numerous, similar small providers (e.g. general practices) also
makes contract negotiation simpler and cheaper.83 In theory, cheaper or more effective service provision
might outweigh higher commissioning transaction costs, although an early New Zealand study cast doubt
on this claim.83 Greaves et al.90 found no empirical basis for defining an optimal PCT size.
Negotiated order
Commissioners can also influence providers by agreeing with them a division of labour, rights of
non-interference91–93 and arbitration procedures should disputes occur,35 establishing an explicit or tacit
‘negotiated order’.91(p. 147),84,94 Although it might include contract negotiations as a special case, a
negotiated order is wider than that. The parties exchange mainly non-monetary benefits: promises of
action (or restraint), help in kind, authorisations, material resources, public support and so on. The
negotiation may be multilateral and is highly ‘relational’,95,96 reflecting social capital already accumulated,
local organisational cultures, micro-politics and personal antagonisms or affinities. The character of a
negotiated order is determined by the selection of participants and by agenda control,97–99 that is what is
not discussed and how the issues that are discussed are framed. The weaker a commissioner’s bargaining
position, the more prudent it may be for them to negotiate about one variable (e.g. price or quality or
volume), not several,100 letting other ‘sleeping dogs lie’ (p. 1).101 English NHS structures at all levels reflect a
negotiated order with the medical profession.3 Bate et al.102 describe ‘backroom commissioning’ in six PCTs
where the chief executives of the largest local NHS organisations struck local deals about resource
allocation. With few commissioners and providers, community health services also support negotiative
rather than contractual relationships.27,103 In contrast, commissioner–provider relationships in English social
care, with its numerous small providers, ‘barely go beyond the mere business of contracting’ (p. 560).104
Negotiated order is often criticised for allowing provider ‘capture’ of commissioning because of
information asymmetry, because details of providers’ working practices and cost become negotiable only
insofar as they are transparent and intelligible to the commissioner;105 professional loyalties and career
paths transcend the commissioner–provider split; and commissioners assume that providers always behave
in ‘knightly’, not ‘knavish’, ways (p. 67).106 Such conditions may inhibit commissioners from radically
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changing existing patterns of provision.107 Strong relationships between providers and government can also
undermine commissioners:
contracting out presumes that the . . . contractor’s job is to act as agent of the government’s policy.
The relationship is fractured, however, if contractors create independent political ties with
policymakers and thus outflank their administrative overseers. In such cases contractors are less agents
than partners, helping to shape the very design of the program, free from any significant oversight,
and beneficiary of state and local governments’ dependence on their performance (p. 176).107
As instances of negotiated order, in the early 2000s PCTs negotiated away financial control in return for
providers realising other targets, rapidly increasing PCT deficits.71 A New Zealand study found that
non-governmental organisations were discouraged from participating in commissioning activities that they
thought existing providers had already captured.108
Nevertheless, some health policies encourage primary care doctors to ‘capture’ commissioning.
Fundholding and TPPs appeared on balance to reduce elective referral and admission rates,
emergency-related occupied bed-days (TPPs only), waiting times for non-emergency treatment109–111 and
growth in prescribing costs. They appeared to improve the coordination of primary, intermediate and
community support services, financial risk management (TPPs only) and clinicians’ engagement in
commissioning.112,113 However, they also reduced patient satisfaction (fundholding only) and equity of
access, increased management and transaction costs and had little impact on how hospital care was
delivered. Fundholding furthermore gave commissioning GPs an incentive to refer conservatively,111 despite
GPs being insensitive to provider prices.114
Discursive control
Where the parties trust each other, a stewardship model of governance115,116 applies and the negotiated
order rests on discursive control. For persuading providers, commissioners can apply two main types of
discursive ‘orders’.117
Emic discourse is intelligible and morally persuasive to those who inhabit a particular culture, though not
necessarily to others. It invokes what are regarded as legitimate normative claims on others’ behaviour,
such as the demands of ‘policy’, ‘public opinion’, wider social ideologies (religion, economics, ethics, etc.)
and professional ‘discipline’.52 Thus, strong professional norms of treatment standards prevented Danish
hospital ownership making much difference to the clinical quality of orthopaedic care;118 for England, see
Waring and Bishop.119 In the English NHS, managerial targets and their role as agents of central policy120
appear to have the strongest emic influence on NHS trusts, although less upon GPs.31 A study of three
English PCTs found that they regarded central government authority as more influential on providers than
contractual mechanisms.57 Similarly, ‘targets and terror’ were the main influence on providers’ waiting
times.71 Most variants of New Public Management ideas and practices are ‘aimed at “normalising” public
sector employment on private sector models’ (p. 1).121 As a special case of emic discourse, ‘soft coercion’ is
the technique of threatening that, if one’s demands are not satisfied, a third party – for instance, a
government – will impose a worse solution.122 Thus, ambulatory care cost control occurred in Germany
because SHIs could allude to government threats to control ambulatory doctors’ professional autonomy,
which the doctors valued above marginal income gains.46
Etic discourse (evidential, technical or scientific knowledge) nowadays means, above all, evidence-based
medicine (EBM) and epidemiology, whose persuasive power lies in its objectivity and putatively scientific
basis, which clinicians regard as authoritative. For commissioning purposes, EBM has the advantage of
making increasingly explicit what health impacts and outcomes commissioners can expect from each
service they commission, or expect to lose when rationing health care, facilitating commissioners’
monitoring of services provided. By tending to standardise descriptions of treatments and their
outcomes – ‘commodification’123 – EBM facilitates the comparison of providers, hence provider
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competition. In practice, though, evidence is often used as post facto justification of decisions made for
other reasons:102 ‘policy-based evidence’. The choice of performance measure itself reflects managers’ and
other parties’ interests.124 Its availability also varies by care group.
Discursive control can also be applied where trust is weak, but then negotiators rely more on other
mechanisms to align provider and commissioner interests artificially.125
Resource dependency and financial incentives
By threatening to reduce or remove resources, a commissioner can exercise power over providers who
depend on the commissioner for their resources.77,126,127 How much power depends upon whether the
provider depends heavily or only slightly upon the commissioner for resources;128 on the unit of payment
(whether the provider is paid, say, for each episode of care or by large block contracts);35,108 on whether
the commissioner pays the provider directly or through an intermediary; on whether the payment is made
before or after treatment occurs;1,35 and on whether or not the commissioner’s threat to withdraw
resources is credible (the ‘credibility’ of an incentive).
There is strong evidence that using fee for service (FFS) units of payment raises treatment volume and
costs: ‘Consequently, not to introduce unregulated fee-for-service reimbursement is one of the few
unequivocal lessons of health care financing’ (p. 1580).46
Block payments enable commissioners to cash-limit the cost of health services, as do spot contracts24 and
payments to individual professionals for working a specified period of time.129 Theoretically, block contracts
create an incentive to undertreat, but there is only slight evidence130 that this actually occurs in the NHS.
Capitation (subscription) payments for a defined population theoretically have a similar effect per patient,
but are also incentives to recruit patients. Flat fees prevent monopoly providers using price discrimination
and price fixing.46 Incentives also motivate data collection regarding the activities and outcomes
being incentivised.89,131
Tariff (e.g. DRG-like) payments incentivise providers to treat more patients. In England, HRG payments to
hospitals appeared to reduce average length of stay (ALoS) and increase throughput and the proportion of
day cases, with little effect on three quality indicators (changes in in-hospital mortality, 30-day post-surgical
mortality and emergency readmission after treatment for hip fracture), and exerted downward pressure
on costs.132,133 In Taiwan, switching from FFS- to DRG-based payments reduced length of stay and intensity
of treatment for coronary artery bypass graft and angioplasty patients.134 Tariff payments may remove
incentives for hospitals to transfer services to community care.135
Pay-for-performance incentives are typically used to incentivise specified care processes,136 on the
assumption that if they are evidence based the desired health outcomes will follow. The NHS general
practice Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) produced high compliance with the stipulated care
processes, and little evidence of providers ‘gaming’ the data.137 Nevertheless, two recent systematic reviews
suggest that, overall, evidence about the effects of such payments is ambivalent, especially regarding the
integration and continuity of care.129,138 The effects of incentive payments for service quality may wear
off after a few years, both in (US) hospitals139 and in general practice.140 Financial penalties for high levels
of hospital-acquired infection had little effect,141 although incentive payments did improve asthma and
diabetes management in a large care network.142 Penalties were only one mechanism among several
for reducing late discharges from NHS hospitals.143 A systematic review of incentives for individual
professionals129 found that payment for working for a specified period was generally less effective,
and payment for providing care for a patient or specific population or pre-specified activity or care quality
more effective, at influencing care processes, referrals, admissions and prescribing, but not compliance
with guidelines. Another systematic review140 found that financial incentives had a small positive effect on
the quality of general practice.
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Retrospective reimbursement of patients’ treatment costs (e.g. by tariff payment) usually leaves
commissioners somewhat passive unless probity problems arise (e.g. overclaiming). Commissioners can
influence provider selection only indirectly by framing (‘nudging’) patients’ or gatekeepers’ choices,144 for
instance through promotional or ‘educational’ activities. Cost reimbursement appears to be a suitable
payment for simple services whose outcomes and production processes are clearly definable, while
fixed-cost payments (which can be prospective) are suitable for complex services that have
multidimensional, unstable and uncertain goals.145
The effect of incentives also depends on their credibility. Danish and Swedish hospitals that knew they
would be financially supported for other reasons (e.g. rurality) were less dependent on, hence less sensitive
to, DRG-like payments than private hospitals.118,146 NHS hospital managers also initially doubted the
stability of the HRG tariffs, hence their value for long-term planning.132
Prospective payments give commissioners scope to construct incentives and, if they can, to choose how to
allocate work between providers, to plan the provision and cost of health care for their population. Strict
monitoring of performance targets, coupled with direct incentives to managers, has functioned partly as an
alternative to competition as a mechanism for controlling NHS providers.147 It has also been argued that
financial incentives can displace non-financial incentives to provide high-quality care.148
Provider competition
A credible threat of losing income to another provider accentuates a provider’s resource dependency on
the commissioner.96,149 Yet the mere presence of alternative providers does not necessarily suffice to
increase bargaining power; US self-pay patients are charged up to 2.5 times as much as insurers and
Medicare are per patient.150 Rather, commissioner power is maximised by creating a monopsony.151
During 1997–2002 the fragmentation of English HAs into PCTs, and numerous hospital mergers,152
increased market concentration on the provider side.153 A common NHS scenario is a large commissioner
(HA, PCT, CCG) facing one main provider (e.g. a hospital, mental health trust) with insufficient ‘numbers’
for competition to occur.147 In, say, Italy, commissioners can take a ‘make-or-buy’ decision66 to operate
their own services, which is likely also to make them more proficient in other aspects of commissioning154
and more micro-economically ‘efficient’ for low-contestability, low-measurability services.66 GP
fundholders,11 and later PBC commissioners, as often used their commissioning budgets to ‘make’ new
services and care pathways as to ‘buy’ secondary care. Commissioners can also encourage untried
providers to tender. The creation of preferred provider organisations offered US insurers a way to control
health-care costs without eliminating patient choice.155 Providers at the margin of financial or technical
viability become more susceptible to competitive pressures; cf. Hinings et al.156 Technical complexity creates
asset specificity, reducing providers’ capacity to find alternative commissioners.157
Commissioners may also be able to set the criteria by which to select providers: at its crudest, price versus
non-price (‘quality’) competition. Fixed tariffs are usually thought to force providers to compete only on
service quality, but variable tariffs give commissioners greater power to safeguard competition itself and to
influence providers in other ways.158
English147 and US159 studies in the 1990s found an inverse relationship between competition and quality of
care but, when prices were fixed, competition improved hospital care quality. Mortality from acute
myocardial infarction (AMI) fell in NHS hospitals exposed to greater competition.160 A review of 68,000
discharges from 160 hospitals during 2003–7161 found, that where competition was more ‘feasible’,
AMI mortality rates decreased faster, lengths of stay were shorter and treatment cost the same as
elsewhere. Increasing the number of an NHS hospital’s competitors by three was associated with improved
hospital management practices estimated to cause a 6% reduction in AMI mortality.162 The effects of
hospital competition on quality, however, appeared different inside and outside London.163 Even after
2006, patients were more likely to ‘choose’ hospitals that their GP had referred patients to previously.152
Patient choice effected a small reduction in waiting times.164 UK studies mostly define health-care ‘markets’
in terms of the distance between patients’ general practices and hospital, an approach that they say
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‘accurately reflects the choice sets open to NHS users’ (p. F238).160 However, what matters for
understanding how commissioners (hitherto PCTs, predominantly) harness competition for controlling
providers is the choice set open to them. Studies from that angle are rare.
Providers of different ownership in the UK also appear to concentrate on different aspects of service
design as their distinct competitive advantage. Corporate independent-sector treatment centres (ISTCs)
brought new models of care into the NHS rather than clinical innovation.165 Personal budgets for social
care gave people who employed personal assistants directly (not via a care agency) greater control,
continuity and quality of life.166 Competition between care homes seems to keep prices in check but has
little effect on quality.167 Third-sector providers often have difficulty dealing with NHS commissioners’
procurement systems.168,169
Findings from the USA are also equivocal, and have to be applied to the very different NHS context with
caution. On balance they suggest that provider competition raises hospital quality, particularly for high-risk
AMI patients;170–172 but the opposite has also been reported.173 Some studies have found that competition
improved outcomes for HMO-funded hospital patients but worsened them for Medicare-funded patients.174
Competition had no quality effects for insured patients although it worsened outcomes for the uninsured.175
Incentive payments for quality improvement had greater effects in less competitive markets.139 Lower
Medicare payments were associated with higher mortality, especially in more competitive markets.171
Although increased market concentration and hospital volume have contributed to declining mortality
with some high-risk cancer operations, declines in mortality with other procedures are largely attributable
to other factors.176 US data from 1990–97 suggested that hospital efficiency increased as one moved away
from a very competitive market [Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) < 0.25], but began to decrease again at
HHI > 0.7. Furthermore, HMO market share had a stronger association than HHI with hospital efficiency.177
Non-profit providers may also be less opportunistic and self-interested,87 which may explain why they were
less responsive than for-profits to financial incentives.178 However, under competitive pressure, non-profit
providers began to mimic corporate pricing strategies and merger tactics to increase their market power.179
Provider competition in the USA reduced the costs of services to institutional180 but not individual payers.
Competition made no difference to how closely social service providers in Florida complied with contracts.181
Juridical control
Commissioners can also use juridical processes to influence providers. In some health systems
(e.g. Germany, Russia) commissioners have the right to audit or inspect providers (e.g. to see medical
records) to verify if treatments were necessary and/or correctly billed. Commissioners everywhere can
seek enforcement of contracts, laws and regulations through the courts or regulators, although,
in the ‘new public contracting’, contracts between commissioners and publicly owned providers are
enforced – sometimes only weakly or one-sidedly – through hierarchical governance structures rather
than the legal system.38 If they have such discretion, commissioners can simplify contract formulation by
supplementing a standard base contract,182 with optional additional clauses per provider, speciality or care
group.83 Complete, presentiated contracts (i.e. contracts which anticipate all main contingencies and
specify what will be done should each event occur) are hard to formulate for ‘complex services’ (p. 1).145
Writing them increases transaction costs.39 Nevertheless, managed care (with contracts stipulating such
practices as making primary and preventative services available to patients and controlling secondary care
utilisation) reduced US preventable admissions of over-65-year-olds compared with fee-for-service
reimbursement, especially for sicker patients.183 Long-term contracts reduce transaction costs but also
provider contestability, and remove a disincentive for providers to engage in staff development and
training.83 In England, zonal contracts for social care provision create, in effect, local monopolies of
provision.24 NHS hospital contracts generally had greater flexibility at the margin, the more the provider’s
spare capacity.184,185 Yet, however tightly a commissioner tries to specify contract terms, there are always
practical limits to the completeness and presentation of contracts;84,186 in practice, a negotiated order
(see above) is required to complement them.39,187 Stable contracts become increasingly relational and may
engender stable networks,188 eventually even the replacement of a market or quasi-market with an
integrated hierarchy.82
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr03100 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2015 VOL. 3 NO. 10
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2015. This work was produced by Sheaff et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for
Health. This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals
provided that suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be
addressed to: NIHR Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science
Park, Southampton SO16 7NS, UK.
13
Although these six media of power are distinct, they interact. Negotiation demands certain managerial
skills (performance). A negotiated order rests on agreement about norms and a shared discourse. These
norms may include juridical principles besides beliefs about evidence basing, what the law requires,
and wider social ideologies. If a competing provider is available, a commissioner’s negotiating position
may become stronger. However, whether it has competitors or not, each provider depends on its
commissioners for resources, so a commissioner can exploit that resource dependency even when
negotiating with a monopoly provider, and even in non-market health systems. To understand how
commissioners might exercise governance over providers, it is therefore necessary to understand in a more
concrete way how the media of power combine and interact, reinforce or negate each other depending
on circumstances.
Modes of commissioning
As noted, commissioners try to exercise governance over providers through particular combinations
of media of power. We call each such combination a ‘mode of commissioning’. Globally, many different
modes of commissioning are found. The above research findings suggest, in sum, that differences in
modes of commissioning help explain:35
1. patterns of provider development, the spread or absence of specific kinds of provider or services;
corporatisation and concentration of capital
2. health systems’ capacity for cost control
3. the development and use of evidence-based medicine
4. patterns of managerial development of commissioning and medical involvement therein.
Different types of commissioning organisation are likely to develop different modes of commissioning,
whose effects partly depend on how providers react.24 Except in the extreme case of ‘gridlocked’
governance,189 each mode of commissioning leaves providers some room for manoeuvre. Each medium
of power might therefore be expected to have different effects even on similar providers (e.g. university
hospitals) according to the institutional context. One might expect different modes of commissioning to
develop for, say, diverse care groups. This brings us to our research questions.
THE RESEARCH CONTEXT: COMMISSIONING AS GOVERNANCE
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Chapter 3 Aims and research questions
Contingency theory83,190 predicts that observed commissioning practice is likely to evolve by trial anderror towards the mode(s) of commissioning best adapted to the commissioners’ roles, environment
and the specific characteristics of different care groups and services. Furthermore, one mode of
commissioning may contain elements of use to another, and the different modes of power interact
(whether synergistically or the opposite).
The research aimed to assist this learning by examining existing commissioning practices and their contexts
and effects on providers, that is to:
1. examine which commissioning practices emerge and are adapted to different organisational and
care-group contexts, including other health systems
2. contribute thereby to governance theory, institutional economics, organisational sociology and
organisational theory.
Comparing NHS commissioning with that in other health systems would help illuminate which
commissioning practices – those which recur across health systems – are adapted to the structure of
quasi-markets per se, and which reflect only the circumstances of the NHS during 2010–12. However,
we used the English NHS of 2010–12 as the main context within which to address these aims.
Our research questions (RQs) therefore were:
1. How do English health policy-makers and NHS commissioners understand the policy aims of
commissioning, and how can governance over providers be exercised through commissioning?
2. How has the reconfiguration of commissioning structures occurred in practice and what shapes
this reconfiguration?
3. How far does their commissioning practice allow commissioners to exercise governance over their local
NHS health economies?
i. How much room for manoeuvre do NHS commissioners have?
ii. What are the consequences, and how do commissioners try to manage them, when commissioning
is distributed across different organisations and when it shifts to being client based?
iii. How do provider managers respond to commissioning activity?
4. How do commissioning practices differ in different types of commissioning organisation and for specific
care groups, taking the following care groups as contrasting tracers: unscheduled inpatient care for
older people; mental health; public health; and planned orthopaedic care? On which aspects of service
provision do different commissioning organisations tend to focus?
5. What factors, including the local health system context, appear to influence commissioning practice and
the relationships between commissioners and providers?
We took RQ3 to ask what media of power commissioners use, how and with what limitations. By
‘client-based commissioning’ we mean specifying and paying for services on the basis of each episode
of care for each individual patient (tariff payments, personal health budgets). We defined ‘distributed
commissioning’ as the joint commissioning of a health-care provider or pathway by several commissioners
collaboratively, and ‘room to manoeuvre’ as ‘scope for exercising the media of power over providers’.
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Chapter 4 Methods
Research design
Our research design was a multiple mixed-methods191 realistic evaluation.192 Its components were:
1. Content and discourse analysis of policy documents and interviews with policy-makers and managers
to elicit their programme theories of NHS commissioning, answering RQ1 by identifying their
understanding of:
i. the intended policy and service outcomes of NHS commissioning
ii. the mechanisms that would produce these outcomes.
2. A cross-sectional analysis of publicly available managerial data about local health economies
(commissioners, providers, socioeconomic context), testing for any associations between commissioners’
characteristics and the policy outcomes identified in the programme theory of NHS commissioning.
In agreement with the Health Services and Delivery Research (HSDR) programme, this analysis was
regarded as an initial exploration of the value and uses of reanalysing published managerial data to
characterise and evaluate the impacts of NHS commissioning. The unit of analysis (‘local health
economy’) would for practical purposes be the PCT, considering what data would probably be available.
This method contributed to answering RQ3 and RQ5.
3. A systematic comparison of case studies of commissioning in five English case study sites, with
induction of common patterns, and exploration and explanation of contrasts. Within each site these
case studies were longitudinal, tracing the formation of commissioning structures and practices in
recent years. The framework structuring the comparison was the analysis of the media of commissioner
power outlined in Chapter 2. This method contributed to answering RQ2, RQ3 and RQ4.
4. A systematic comparison, using the same framework, of patterns across the English case studies with
case studies in Germany and Italy. This method contributed to answering RQ3, RQ4 and RQ5.
5. Action learning sets of commissioners from the English, German and Italian case study sites.
This contributed to answering RQ1, RQ2 and RQ3.
6. Framework analyses to synthesise the above findings, contributing to answering all of RQ2, RQ3, RQ4
and RQ5 and to testing the programme theory’s underlying assumptions.
These methods fitted together as follows. The discourse and Leximancer analysis revealed the empirical
and causal assumptions (programme theory) on which current commissioning policy rests, especially
about how commissioners can influence the providers of NHS services (RQ1). Case studies of the
development of local commissioning then explored how far the assumed commissioning organisations
and systems were present to begin with (RQ2). The case studies were also used to explore which
commissioning mechanisms commissioners were using, how they did so (RQ3), if they used different
mechanisms for different care groups (RQ4), how providers responded and what contexts appeared
to influence providers’ reactions to commissioning (RQ5). Within the data availability constraints,
the cross-sectional analysis of managerial data served the same purposes. Action learning was another
way to explore, in ‘real time’, what mechanisms commissioners were using. We used the international
comparisons to explore and differentiate which commissioning contexts, mechanisms (above all, media of
power) and outcomes appear common to quasi-markets more widely, and which are peculiar to English
NHS commissioning. Each method contributed some parts of an overall, perforce incomplete, jigsaw of
the complex relationships between commissioning organisations, contexts, mechanisms and outcomes.
Table 1 gives an overview.
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Because all the above were undertaken during 2010–12, the cross-sectional study data are for 2008–9
(the latest available in 2010–12). Comparison with published managerial data, where available, helped
indicate the likely generalisability of our findings. We also compared our own findings with relevant
empirical findings emerging from research studies in the Health Reform Evaluation Programme, HSDR,
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) and the DH Health Policy Programmes.
We involved patient representatives [through PenPIG, the Patient Involvement Group of the SW Peninsula
Collaboration for Leadership in Applied Health Research and Care (CLAHRC)], consulting them before
research started about the research questions and overall research design (as expressed in the lay
summary) and afterwards about our conclusions (expressed in an executive summary). We involved key
commissioning stakeholders – clinicians and managers – through the action learning set described below,
and will involve them again in the post-project dissemination activities.
Discourse analysis
Design
The discourse analysis of commissioning policy was carried out to identify the programme theory of NHS
commissioning that would apply to CCGs. We analysed key policy documents’, policy-makers’ and
managers’ accounts of these matters; cf. Millar et al.22 We focused on actually occurring texts and
utterances rather than their ‘genre’ or ‘conclusion rules’ (p. 278),193 but did regard the texts as a systematic
set of ideas, values and problematics.194
TABLE 1 Research questions, methods, data, analyses
Research question Method Data sources Analysis
1. Programme theory Discourse analysis Interviews; documents Leximancer analysis; cognitive frame
analysis
2. Development of
commissioning
Cross-sectional
comparison of
longitudinal narratives
Fieldwork (interviews,
document collection);
published managerial
data
Pattern induction from systematic
cross-sectional comparison of
longitudinal case studies
3. Commissioning practice
and governance
Comparative case
studies; cross-sectional
analysis of published
managerial data
Fieldwork (interviews,
document collection);
published managerial
data
Framework analysis comparing uses
and limitations of media of power
across health economies; inductively
classifying commissioning practices;
testing associations between
commissioning practice and service
outcomes
4. Modes of
commissioning for
different care groups
Framework analysis comparing
commissioning practices between
tracer groups
5. Commissioning practice
and commissioner–
provider relationships
Framework analysis;
empirical testing of
programme theory
Results of analyses for
RQ1, RQ2, RQ3
Compare these relationships and their
contexts across countries, with
programme theory and with initial
theoretical frameworks
METHODS
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Sampling
Documents
Our sampling strategy was purposive, selecting what policy-makers emphasised as seminal policy
statements, hence widely distributed to NHS managers between the general election and the start of
legislation (July 2010 to September 2011). The two main documentary samples were:
1. Equity and Excellence: Liberating the NHS195 and its official support documents; this was the most
widely distributed policy document concerning NHS commissioning (43,351 downloads in 2012;
followed by the NHS Operating Framework at 32,869)
2. the 2012 Act196 and its explanatory ‘factsheets’, including one on service quality subsequently
withdrawn from the DH website.
These (see Appendix 1) were downloaded from DH, NICE, Healthcare Commission and National Patient
Safety Agency websites.
Oral material
We assembled transcripts of interviews with policy-makers and top-level NHS managers. Returns from
interviewing diminished after about 20 interviews but we interviewed 23, whose roles Table 2 summarises.
The transcripts (with speeches mentioned below) were inputs for the cognitive frame analysis (see Chapter 5,
section Cognitive frame analysis) which supplemented the Leximancer analysis.
Many informants were so senior that fuller details would compromise their anonymity. However,
their careers and status gave good reason to believe that they would know the rationales for NHS
commissioning policy, having been involved in formulating it. The interviews were audio-recorded and
transcribed. Interviewees were offered the chance to see and correct their transcript.
Besides the above interviews, we also analysed transcripts of (existing) speeches by national politicians and
the NHS Chief Executive about the aims, mechanisms and implementation of the new commissioning
system. These included speeches to the House of Commons, Royal College of General Practitioners,
British Medical Association, NHS Confederation and The King’s Fund, selected to cover both supportive
and unsupportive audiences. We also included evidence to the Commons Health Select Committee from
civil servants and NHS managers. Evidence given by independent experts was not included, as they would
not necessarily be among the policy authors. For the same reason we did not include evidence, or other
speeches and writings, from opponents of the policy.
TABLE 2 Policy-maker and top manager interviewees 2010–11
Role n
Current and former parliamentarians 4
DH policy directors 5
Directors of national and regional NHS organisations 5
National local authority organisation representative 1
Directors of national voluntary organisations 2
Heads of national medical organisations 2
Senior official of think-tank 1
Former NHS Director 1
Other 2
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Leximancer and cognitive frame analyses
To expose the programme theory underlying commissioning policy for the English NHS required exposing
what context–mechanism–outcome (CMO) relationships the sample texts stated or implied. Appendix 2
describes Leximancer analysis more fully, but in brief it is an automated form of quantitative content
analysis which outputs lists of associated terms (‘concepts’), counts and measures of their co-occurrence,
and indexes their original textual occurrences.
Although Leximancer analysis located which CMO relationships the texts most often mentioned, the
original documentary formulations were mostly too broad, ambiguous or brief to specify clearly how these
mechanisms would work. We therefore conducted a cognitive frame analysis of data from our interviews
with parliamentarians and top-level health managers, making a logic analysis197 to elaborate and
supplement the policy texts’ accounts of CMO relationships. In doing so, again seeking to relate our
informants’ accounts and explanations (frames) to the categories (CMO, media of power) required for a
realistic evaluation. Mostly the informants’ accounts were consistent, but where they differed (in emphasis
rather than contradicting each other) we took the more prevalent interpretation as more likely to guide
commissioning practice. Appendix 2 further describes the cognitive frame analysis. We collated the
descriptions of CMO relationships found by these methods and paraphrased them as statements in the
form required for empirically testing CMO assumptions, namely ‘Doing X in circumstances M will cause
agent A to do Y’, or a logical equivalent.
Cross-sectional analysis of published managerial data
Insofar as data were available, the cross-sectional analysis of published routinely collected managerial data
was designed to:
1. provide a sampling frame for the English case studies
2. describe the profile (mix) of commissioning organisation(s)’ practices and resources in the English NHS,
allowing categorisation of local health economies in terms of these variables
3. test for associations between health economies’ organisational characteristics (profiles), commissioning
practices and published indicators of service outcomes.
The second and third of these also contributed to answering RQ3 and RQ5.
Indicators and measures
Three groups of measures were selected by the following methods and criteria (Appendix 3 explains
more fully):
1. Independent variables [(Governance Variable) in the model below] were selected from the published
data sets as measures or prima facie proxies for the media of power described in Chapter 2. Suitable
data were mostly available only for 2008–9, and only for two media of power (provider competition,
managerial performance).
2. Control variables were selected on the basis of existing research into the factors that influence the need
and demand for health services. Ideally one would control for all likely confounders that are not under
PCT control: population age, sex, ethnicity, income and education profiles and case mix (primary
diagnosis, comorbidities, severity of illness).198,199 Published data allowed only limited controlling for
these factors (for instance, PCT income is allocated by criteria intended to reflect – so, in this context,
standardise for – population health needs and local service input costs). It would have been desirable to
have a control variable that enabled us to control directly for differences in hospital case mix, but in
the absence, at the time of the study, of a suitable published variable, deprivation appeared to be the
nearest proxy among the control variables available.
METHODS
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3. Dependent variable selection started from lists of the generic health service and health policy outcome
indicators200,201 that the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and World
Health Organization (WHO) use for international comparisons of health systems, and Greaves et al.’s
list,90 which, so far as we were aware, was then the only published study similar to this one.
Table 3 lists the independent variables, controls and dependent variables that we used. Appendix 3
explains more fully how and why they were selected.
TABLE 3 Regression analysis variables
Category Variable Mean
Standard
deviation
Commissioning governance (independent variables)
Generic provider
competition
HHI 0.511 0.200
Client-based
commissioning
Proportion of ‘Choose and Book’ patients 0.539 0.178
Personal health budget pilot (Y/N) (dummy) N/A N/A
Practice-based commissioning: % GP participation 94.766 17.494
Population based
competitive
commissioning
% of budget spent on local authority and voluntary providers 5.036 5.479
% of budget spent on independent-sector health care 3.447 3.798
Number of provider contracts 6.020 2.470
Proportion of PCT budget spent on main provider 0.572 0.318
PCT management WCC score 109 21
Controls Number of PCT mergers 1.513 1.884
PCT income per capita 1.393 0.505
PCT weighted population 337,689.4 170,141.5
Indices of deprivation, average score 23.722 8.376
Service outcomes (dependent variables)
Quality of care and
primary–secondary care
co-ordination
Amenable mortality annual rate, all causes, under-75-year-olds,
directly standardised
0.961 0.213
Unplanned hospitalisation rate for ambulatory care sensitive
chronic conditions, adults, directly age and sex standardised, as %
of 2007–8
112.516 33.176
Emergency admissions for primary care preventable acute
conditions, indirectly standardised, % change since 2007–8
–3.482 13.365
Emergency admissions for primary care preventable chronic
conditions, indirectly standardised, % change since 2007–8
–6.201 15.828
Emergency readmissions within 28 days of discharge from hospital,
adults over 16, indirectly standardised for age, method of admission,
spell, diagnosis (ICD-10) and procedure (OPCS version 4), % change
since 2007–8
–3.690 6.052
Ratio of observed to expected emergency admissions for conditions
not usually requiring hospital admission, indirectly standardised
90.502 26.213
continued
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Although the range of publicly available data at PCT level about the media of power increased during
2010–12, lack of suitable data still limited the scope of the cross-sectional analysis. Only qualitative data
can describe discursive control, negotiated order and the contents of contracts. Ad hoc financial incentives
to providers also evade managerial data sets. When available at all, quantitative data about patient
complaints, prosecutions or disciplinary proceedings against providers record only exceptional events.
We could identify which PCTs had personal budget pilot schemes, but NHS managerial data contained
little further information about them. Consequently our cross-sectional analysis concentrated on
managerial performance and provider competition.
The mean and SD for each measure were calculated from data sets noted in Appendix 3. The independent
and control variables shown in Table 3 all had variance inflation factor (VIF) scores between 1.164 and
2.273. In general the different quality indicators for hospital services were not highly correlated,163 but
among our selection there were five exceptions (see Appendix 4). Note that PCT budgets did not include
the majority of general medical practice (funded from DH budgets).
Data collection
Deprivation data were downloaded from www.gov.uk/government/publications/english-indices-of-
deprivation-2010. WCC scores were published in the Health Services Journal.202 Data from which to
estimate hospitals’ ‘market’ shares were obtained from the 2011–12 PCT recurrent revenue allocations
exposition book.203 Otherwise, data were downloaded from the NHS Information Centre website
(www.hscic.gov.uk/searchcatalogue). We assembled a database in which the rows were PCTs and the
columns contained the above measures and data about PCT characteristics (e.g. extent of practice-based
commissioning, presence of personal health budgets, number of recent PCT mergers). Data were for the
financial year 2008–9 except for referral to treatment time and WCC data scores, which were reported by
calendar year; we used 2009. According to their accompanying documentation the deprivation data were
‘mainly’ for 2008, but reported for 2011 administrative boundaries. We trimmed percentages back to
TABLE 3 Regression analysis variables (continued )
Category Variable Mean
Standard
deviation
Access to care Mean time waited for admission 47.461 9.218
% change 2007/8 to 2008/9 in proportion of trauma and
orthopaedics patients waiting less than 18 weeks from referral to
planned treatment
0.103 0.455
% change 2007/8 to 2008/9 in proportion of all admitted patients
waiting less than 18 weeks from referral to planned treatment
0.579 3.348
% change 2007/8 to 2008/9 in proportion of all non-admitted
patients waiting less than 18 weeks from referral to planned
treatment
0.820 1.084
Proportion of patients waiting more than 4 weeks for a first
outpatient appointment following GP referral
0.010 0.057
Monthly mean waiting list, IP and day cases, proportionate to
weighted population
0.011 0.004
Cost control PCT surplus (deficit marked with –) as proportion of income –0.273 0.501
Hospital activity Ratio of day cases to admissions 0.365 0.045
Average (mean) length of stay 5.742 0.801
Finished consultant episodes proportionate to weighted population 0.325 0.117
ICD-10, International Classification of Diseases, Tenth Edition; N, no; N/A, not applicable; OPCS, Office of Population
Censuses and Surveys; Y, yes.
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100% when higher figures (e.g. for data completeness, percentage of GPs involved in practice-based
commissioning) were obviously wrong.
Analysis
To measure the relationships between the media of commissioner power (‘governance variables’),
dependent variables (policy outcomes) and the main potentially confounding variables, and the relative
contributions of each explanatory variable, we used stepwise multiple linear regression with backwards
elimination, that is removing all non-significant and/or trivial independent variables until only those that
satisfied our declared criteria remained. Our basic model was:
½Service Outcome = αþ β1½GovernanceVariable þ β2(PCT Mergers)þ β3(PCT income per capita)
þ β4(PCT weighted population)þ β5(Deprivation Index)þ ε
(1)
We used four variants of this model, changing the independent [GovernanceVariable] variable to reflect
different media of power, including the different quasi-market architectures that coexist in the NHS.
The variants of independent variable were therefore:
l a measure of managerial competence (WCC scores)
l a generic measure of competition (HHI)
l four measures indicating the extent of competitive tendering commissioning
l three measures indicating the extent of individualised commissioning.
For each variant of the independent variables, we repeated the regression with different dependent
[Service Outcome] variables, explained below. In all cases PCT Deprivation Index, per capita PCT income
and PCT weighted population were included as controls. (It was a policy aim that PCT income should
reflect the PCT’s weighted population size, but this was not achieved during PCTs’ existence.) The unit of
analysis was the PCT, the main NHS commissioner for the pre-CCG period that the data described,
approximately 2 years before the case study fieldwork began. The implications of this time difference are
discussed below.
We declared negligible correlation to be one where the estimated standardised beta (β) coefficient was
in the range 0.001> β> –0.001 or adjusted R2< 0.01. Significant correlation was declared where p≤ 0.05.
Statistical calculations were performed with R (version 3.1.1, The R Foundation for Statistical Computing,
Vienna, Austria). In analysing the data we have erred towards conservatism, that is towards statistically
underprocessing rather than overprocessing the data. The method of analysis is described more fully
in Appendix 2.
Systematic comparison of case studies
Design
Using the frameworks described below, we systematically compared case studies of English local health
economies. Because health-care processes (types of interventions, models of care, etc.) are likely to
influence commissioning practice, we selected four care groups as ‘tracers’ likely to reveal contrasting
commissioning practices:
1. unplanned admissions of people with chronic conditions
2. mental health
3. public health: prevention of diabetes and coronary heart disease through both clinical activity
(e.g. statin prescribing) and intersectoral action (e.g. to influence diet and exercise)
4. scheduled orthopaedic surgery.
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For differentiating these care groups we took one tracer group in one local health economy as the unit
of analysis (‘case’)204 and, otherwise, the whole study site. (By ‘tracer group’ we meant that one group of
patients is used to trace a sequence of events which will also happen to other care groups. The tracer
group was taken as an instance of a wider, qualitatively similar pattern.) At the start of fieldwork (2010) a
‘local health economy’ corresponded to a PCT and in our study sites this situation did not change as
CCGs developed.205
Sampling
Because we wished to study commissioning as a means of governance under conditions of organisational
diversity, we used our PCT database (see Chapter 3, section Data collection) as the sampling frame for a
maximum-variety sample of four health economies. Our sampling strategy was to select study sites for
early progress towards GP-led commissioning; maximum organisational variety of commissioner;
contrasting proportions of budget spent on their main acute hospital (hence prima facie different levels
of provider competition); inclusion of at least one site with fragmented commissioning, indicated by a
percentage of in-territory spending well below the 57% median for 2008–9, that is so low as to be
likely to involve collaboration with other commissioners; and the presence of personal health budget
pilot schemes.
We approached 11 potential study sites. One failed to reply. Another initially agreed but then withdrew for
reasons unconnected with the study. From the remainder we selected sites with:
1. a newly clustered PCT (‘Shire’) now commissioning three acute hospitals
2. the hitherto commonest NHS arrangement of one (unclustered) PCT commissioning one dominant
acute hospital (‘Milltown’)
3. a PCT that was devolving commissioning to a GP-owned social enterprise (community interest
company) (‘Porttown’)
4. a PCT where a Darzi polysystem of federated general practices also participated in
commissioning (‘Metroland’).
This sample also gave us variety in the amount of commissioner spending on independent-sector providers,
ranging from 0.75% (Shire) to 14.5% (Porttown; England mean 3.47%, 2009–10 figures). In addition, we
selected a site in which two GP consortia were receiving support from a US corporation in commissioning
services for people with chronic health problems (in ‘Livewell’ PCT), which, focusing on just one tracer
group, was a mini case study. Table 4 and Appendix 5 describe the resulting sample.
In each site we assembled a sample of key informants through discussions with the lead commissioning
managers or GPs, who identified the lead commissioning managers for the tracer groups, lead clinicians
and managers in secondary care providers (including those for the tracer groups), local authority leads for
adult social care and patient or carer representatives. It was noticeable that this snowballing method did
not identify PCT Chairs or Non-Executive Directors as key informants, despite their governance roles.
However, one of the researchers was a PCT chair (not in a study site). This process yielded a sample of
104 English informants across the categories summarised in Table 5.
Additionally, action learning set participants (shown as ‘+ 1’ in Table 5) from each site made a total
of 114.
METHODS
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TABLE 4 Study site characteristics (2010–12)
Pseudonym Commissioning structure(s)
Local spend
on main
provider (%)
Personal health
budget pilot?
Office for
National
Statistics
classification
Main study sites
Metroland Commercial PHC provider (two alternative
provider medical services sites+ five satellite
practices), later added commissioning support
role. Polysystem: network of general practices
with employed managerial and non-medical
PHC clinicians; also providing borough-wide
services for specialised forms of PHC
55 No London suburb/
large urban
Porttown Social enterprise (CIC). All practices were
members. SE employed former PCT
commissioning and service improvement team.
Seconded staff member from pharmaceutical
firm. Externally provided patient surveys
93 Yes Regional city/
other urban
Milltown GP consortium taking over (relict) PCT
commissioning infrastructure and staff. Based
on PBC consortium. All practices are members
68 No Regional city/
large urban
Shire Before 2010, general practices organised into
six locality commissioning groups. CCG
developed on federated model but retaining
locality groups, to which relict PCT staff
dispersed. No private-sector involvement in
commissioning support
36 Yes Rural
Mini study site
Livewell US HMO involvement, focus on people with
chronic health problems, including older people
with recurrent unplanned hospital admissions
75 No Large urban
CIC, community interest company; PHC, primary health care; SE, social enterprise.
TABLE 5 Informants (2010–12)
Category Porttown Shire Metroland Milltown Livewell
PCT managers and advisers 5 (+ 1) 6 (+ 1) 9 (+ 1) 2 (+ 1) 3 (+ 1)
GP commissioners 5 (+ 1) 3 (+ 1) 2 (+ 1) 3 (+ 1) 4 (+ 1)
Provider managers 6 7 5 1 1
Provider clinicians 3 7 5 0 2
Local authority (including joint appointments) 6 2 6 2 N/A
Voluntary organisations 1 1 1 0 N/A
Patient representatives 1 1 1 0 N/A
Total 27 (+ 2) 28 (+ 2) 29 (+ 2) 10 (+ 2) 10 (+ 2)
N/A, not applicable.
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Data collection
Data were collected from informant interviews and documents. Semistructured interviews used variants
of the schedule in Appendix 6. All interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed by professional
transcribers, and interviewees were offered the chance to correct their transcript. Our collection of
managerial documents was guided by our interviewees, since they were best placed to say which
documents were locally seminal. We also collected professional press reportage. As data analysis
proceeded, we supplemented these data sources with ad hoc e-mail and telephone enquiries when
data triangulation revealed gaps or ambiguities, or if we had reason to believe that circumstances had
changed at a particular site.
The concept of power implies a counterfactual account of what providers would otherwise do206 if
commissioners were less powerful (and vice versa), which we obtained empirically from informants’
accounts of commissioners’ attempts to change provider practice, of providers’ response(s) and of what
happened when providers proposed changes that the commissioners contested.
Coding and analysis
From the theoretical framework described in Chapter 2, we constructed a coding frame (Appendix 7) by
which to code case study interview transcripts. To ensure reliability, the researchers cross-checked each
other’s coding of an initial maximum-variety sample of transcripts and wrote coding criteria where their
initial coding had differed. The coded transcripts were entered into NVivo (version 10, QSR International,
Warrington, UK), and nodes created for each of the main concepts in the analytical framework and to
identify the study site, professional role, organisation(s) and tracer group(s). As data entry proceeded,
we created additional nodes for concepts suggested by the data but which the original coding frame
could not accommodate. We thus made both a framework and an inductive (‘ground-up’) analysis of the
interview data. NVivo reports for different combinations of nodes were produced, reproducing the source
pieces of transcript text. We reduced these data by writing a ‘pithy sentence’ summarising what each
report segment said about commissioning for that site and/or care group. We then collated all the pithy
sentences (across sites) concerning a research question or part thereof.
We examined how the reconfiguration of commissioning structures occurred in practice and what shaped
it by constructing a narrative of those events in each study site during the study period. The action
learning sets gave an opportunity for a deeper interpretation of these findings, to correct and update
them. Within and across sites, all these materials were then synthesised by the methods reported below.
International comparisons
Design
To discover what other factors, including health system context, influence commissioning practice,
we compared our English study sites with two national case studies of European quasi-market health
systems. Similarities between commissioning practice in the three countries would suggest which features
and consequences of commissioning practice appear to be intrinsic to commissioning in quasi-markets.
Differences would suggest features, consequences and problems which were specific to one type of
quasi-market, or to such contexts as the political culture of that country. Additionally, examination
of well-developed commissioning practice elsewhere might yield findings (e.g. proof-of-concept findings)
of practical value for commissioning practice in England. For comparability and to draw these explanatory
and practical lessons, we used the same analytical and data-collection methods as for the English
case studies.
METHODS
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Sampling
We selected Italy as a Mediterranean health system207 similar to, indeed partly modelled on, the English
NHS, and for contrast Germany, a paradigm Bismarckian system of commissioning health services through
SHIs, where multiple commissioners commission public and private providers, paying them by DRG-like
tariffs. As German and Italian study sites, we chose respectively:
1. one of the largest German SHIs, with 7.2 million members, over 100 years’ experience and a reputation
for technically sophisticated commissioning methods
2. the Lombardy and Emilia Romagna health regions, whose health-care commissioning practices have
parallels to those in England.
Data collection
German data were collected at national, commissioner and provider levels by mixed methods from the
following sources:
1. interviews and discussions with key informants: these were representatives of the three main federal
associations of health organisations and the Federal Joint Committee [Gemeinsame Bundesausschuss
(GB-A)]; 11 staff, covering a range of functions, at the SHI; and managers from five hospitals
(university, third sector and publicly owned) in one of the largest provincial industrial cities
2. grey material including official regulations and guidance, Sozialgesetzbuch V above all
3. participation in three national events involving German SHIs
4. ad hoc enquiries from individual experts
5. published research found by hand-searching journals.
Interviews carried out in 2011–12 were recorded and transcribed. Two of the researchers analysed material
in German.
In Italy data were collected at regional, ASL (azienda sanitaria locale, local health authority) and provider
level by mixed methods from the following sources:
1. Interviews and discussions with 23 key informants in Lombardy. These included two managing directors
(one for secondary and one for primary care) in each of seven ASLs; and seven other managing
directors who between them represented each ownership category of provider – public firms
(aziende ospedaliere, AOs, the equivalent of NHS trusts), non-profit, for profit, public–private partnership,
national research centre – and each of the following levels of provider – acute care, general practice,
domiciliary care and residential care. These interviewees were geographically dispersed across the regions.
We also interviewed two regional managing directors, one from the health Directorate-General (DG) and
one from the family DG (responsible social and health-care activities and organisations).
2. Key documents, above all decrees.
3. Participation in two regional events for heads of primary care (one in Emilia Romagna, one
in Lombardy).
4. Ad hoc enquiries from individual experts.
5. Published research found by hand-searching journals.
Material in Italian was translated and initially analysed by one of the researchers and a senior Italian
National Health Service (INHS) manager, both native Italian speakers with postgraduate training at
English universities.
Analysis
As far as possible, transcripts and texts were directly analysed in the original language to avoid misleading
translations (e.g. of the term ‘commissioning’, which has no exact German or Italian equivalent). Data from
the German and Italian case studies were assembled into the same framework as used to synthesise data
from the NHS case studies, reported below.
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Action learning
The action learning set (see Appendix 8) aimed to:
1. refine our research questions and tools in collaboration with commissioning managers and clinicians,
test the face validity of emerging preliminary findings with them and consider dissemination strategies
2. bring together an international cohort of interested clinicians, managers and researchers to explore the
potential for learning from commissioning experiences in England, Germany and Italy
3. offer busy managers and clinicians a forum for learning and development reflecting their own personal
and organisational agendas rather than one imposed by commissioning ‘experts’, as a catalyst for
participants to work on their own challenging commissioning problems, capitalising on the knowledge
and experience within the set.
Items 2 and 3 would also help generate recommendations for commissioning practice.
One clinician and one manager from each of the five study sites participated in action learning sets
between November 2011 and March 2013. At the outset the participants established their own:
l ground rules (e.g. about confidentiality) for conducting the learning set
l check-in rules
l update frequency
l reporting process, including rules of confidentiality
l check-out rules, including arrangements for subsequent sets.
Three of the researchers were facilitators. At each meeting we also presented emerging research findings
to the participants and provided expert input in specific areas (e.g. supply chain management, findings
from other research studies on commissioning). One learning set was combined with a mini-conference in
which the learning set members exchanged updates and practical ideas about commissioning with
informants from the German and Italian study sites. The learning set members agreed conclusions at each
meeting, and from the action learning set overall. The anonymised summary findings were included in the
evidence synthesis.
Synthesis
By these methods we assembled and analysed the data summarised in Table 6.
TABLE 6 Data assembly
Method Interviews Other material
Discourse analysis 23 34 policy documents, 7 speeches, 147 grey documents
Cross-sectional analysis N/A 44 published data sets, 1 dissertation
Case studies 110 57 documents, 22 contracts, 111 press reports
Learning set 10 5 meetings, mini-conference
Germany 20 39 documents, 3 national events
Italy 24 14 documents, 2 national events
Secondary data N/A 412 published papers, 87 research reports
N/A, not applicable.
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As noted, the cross-sectional method used pre-CCG data for a period of 2 years before the case
study fieldwork.
Data were synthesised by framework analysis. Conceptually this was equivalent to constructing, for each
research question, a data grid in which each row contained data relevant to some aspect of that research
question and each column represented a site; and then populating the cells with the relevant data from
the case study ‘pithy sentences’, cross-sectional analysis, action learning set, international comparisons and
other published studies. Collating data this way provided an immediate means of triangulation, revealing
gaps, ambiguities or apparent contradictions in the data, prompting supplementary data collection. By
noting common or divergent patterns across cells, we ‘read off’ answers to our research questions and
discovered where new categories or concepts were required to accommodate unforeseen empirical
findings.208 We also compared our own findings against those from other studies. The same method was
used for cross-country comparison except that the virtual columns now represented countries.
A second framework analysis recollated these data under the standard CMO categories of realistic
evaluation, which allowed us to evaluate the empirical validity of the programme theory assumption.
Ethics and research governance
South West Research Ethics Committee approval (reference 09/H0206/50) was subject to informant
anonymity and to obtaining management permission from each research site, which we did for all the NHS
sites. University of Plymouth ethical approval was obtained for non-NHS sites. Obtaining study site access
was laborious and slow (many months) because of a combination of site staff overload (see Chapter 6,
section Overload), cumbrous procedures for obtaining the permissions, and administrative delays.
The growing importance of evidence-based policy-making contrasted with the difficulty of accessing
the necessary evidence. No such difficulty arose in Germany or Italy.
Findings
Our findings are presented by research question, indicating as necessary what their evidential basis is.
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Chapter 5 How English health policy-makers
and NHS commissioners understand NHS
commissioning policy
To ask how English health policy-makers and NHS commissioners understood the policy aims ofcommissioning, and how governance over providers can be exercised through commissioning (RQ1), is
to ask what the programme theory of NHS commissioning policy was during 2010–12. Policies state, or
assume, that, if policy-makers and managers do what the policy prescribes, then in the prescribed
circumstances (which the policy might also attempt to create) a pre-defined set of policy outcomes will
result. These assumptions, indeed predictions, are the programme theory underlying the policy. Our
discourse analysis was intended to expose what the fundamental documents, key informants and the 2012
Act196 said or implied are the most salient:
1. CMO relationships that NHS commissioning in England involves
2. mechanisms by which NHS commissioners exercise governance (power) over providers.
Specifically, we aimed to reveal what these salient patterns say or imply that the media of power by which
English NHS commissioners exercise governance over their service providers will be.
Quantitative (Leximancer) content analysis
The Leximancer analysis aimed to list, and quantify the salience of, the assumptions about the structures,
mechanisms and outcomes of NHS commissioning stated in our samples of documentary and oral material.
Note that in Leximancer analysis the term ‘concept’ denotes only the repeated co-occurrences of terms in
the texts analysed. ‘Themes’ are repeated co-occurrences of concepts. Tables 17, 18 and 19 in Appendix 1
show in descending order of frequency what concepts concerning contexts, mechanisms and outcomes
were found when the three text samples were combined. For each of the seven outcome-concepts,
Table 20 in Appendix 1 shows how frequently each mechanism-concept co-occurred. Appendix 1 also
shows the frequencies of occurrence of concepts relating to the outcomes, mechanisms and contexts for
each of the three samples of policy text separately.
The mere presence of these associations did not, however, reveal what specific context–mechanism–outcome
relationships the policy texts were assuming. The concepts found by Leximancer analysis were too broad for
that. We therefore extracted from the source texts each passage in which these associations occurred. Having
removed substantively duplicate passages, we made a précis of each that remained, using a formulation
suitable for empirical testing; that is, ‘Doing X under conditions C will cause agent A to do Y’ or a logical
equivalent. Sometimes these passages described CMO relationships explicitly but more often they were
elliptical, calling on the reader’s background knowledge to supply the implicit missing elements. Then we
supplied the apparently missing assumptions, which are italicised to distinguish them from the original explicit
texts. Appendix 9 shows what we added, and that the additions were few (5% of the programme theory
word count).
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The analysed materials contained many assertions about what organisations were needed, their duties
and defects in existing commissioning systems. They only briefly described how CCGs, the main NHS
commissioning mechanism, would work. Apart from mentioning ‘effective dialogue’ with hospitals, almost
all that Equity and Excellence: Liberating the NHS says on that point is that clinical commissioning
will bring together responsibility for clinical decisions and for the financial consequences of these
decisions . . . reinforce the crucial role that GPs already play in committing NHS resources . . . increase
efficiency, by enabling GPs to strip out activities that do not have appreciable benefits (p. 27).195
Little detail appeared, either, about the mechanisms of patient involvement in care decisions; about how
public health measures, research and evidence basing will improve patient outcomes; about how joint
working between NHS commissioning groups and local government, patient involvement, research and
evidence basing will help contain NHS costs; or about what makes a provider ‘qualified’. Much of the
2012 Act itself was uninformative on these points (naturally focusing on defining terms, public bodies’
powers of appointment, remuneration, accounting arrangements and amendments to previous law),196 but
the official Factsheets published to explain it209–228 did describe examples of effective commissioning. The
speeches and, much more, Select Committee material229–236 explained more fully some of the mechanisms
and mechanism–outcome relationships left unexplained in the written material. In summary, the policy
documents and public debates comprised mostly descriptions of contemporary practice and normative
assertions about the new organisations’ roles and duties, but offered only a few, mostly meagre, accounts
of the mechanisms or the reasoning behind them, some of which may be post hoc rationalisations.22
Cognitive frame analysis
To reach a more complete, coherent account of the programme theory, it was necessary to impute more
explicitly the missing assumptions that policy documents had left the reader to supply. We used our data
from interviews with policy-makers and senior implementers to fill these gaps, especially about what
Leximancer analysis had shown to be the most salient CMO relationships in the policy texts: competition
(patient choice, contestability), financial incentives and negotiations between commissioners and providers.
There was also the question of how other NHS governance structures would interact with commissioning,
and how the different commissioning structures would interact.
Commissioning isn’t the route by which improvement is . . . necessarily . . . driven in the system . . . [But
by] peer pressure within providers, professional competition, information data and . . . public pressure
around that choice, the extent to which punters will be moving, there will be regulatory pressure at
the bottom end as well.
Senior manager 1
Another senior civil servant agreed, adding that accountability and audit arrangements would be stronger
than under GP fundholding. Transparent, accessible information would enable patients to compare
commissioners and choose their hospital. Regulation would guarantee minimum standards and safety
of care.
What the [2012 Health] Bill is trying to do is to try and find a, kind of, pragmatic way through the
middle that combines the best aspects of all of those different things. I think if you only have
integration that can’t be the way forward and if you only have competition, and no integration, then
that can be problematic too in certain circumstances. So I think it’s trying to somehow try and steer
the middle ground.
Senior manager 2
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The new commissioning mechanisms were intended partly to strengthen commissioners’ control over
NHS costs:
[C]ommissioners are . . . most of the time . . . merely acting as literally the payers at the end of the day,
on stuff that they don’t really have much control over. . . . And the reason why they’re writing the
cheques is that there are a bunch of other people in the system, GPs . . . actually incurring
the expenditure.
Senior manager 2
Yet commissioners’ role would be narrow:
[T]he only way a provider is accountable to a CCG is via the contract. There isn’t another thing.
Senior manager 3
Hence:
[T]hat doesn’t really get them [CCGs] into the arena of managing providers within a local health
system, it’s completely different from that.
Senior manager 4
Policy-makers suggested that population-based, general practice-based and client-based commissioning
were compatible and coherent because they were all designed to commission services on the
patient’s behalf:
So the main function of commissioning is to be an effective agent on behalf of the people for whom
they are purchasing care in ensuring that people get access to the right level of care or sufficient
quality in the system in way that actually doesn’t exceed the amount of money that is available.
Senior manager 1
General practitioners will commission as patients’ proxies, because patients will be able to select GPs for,
among other things, referral opportunities:
Parliamentarian 1: If people in one geographical area can see in comparison to another nearby
geographical area that their GPs are delivering a poorer-quality service with less good outcomes, less
access to pharmaceutical products, slower referral times, da, da, da, etc. etc. they’re going to want to
say ‘Well why? I’m going to move my personal register to another GP practice’.
Interviewer: [. . .] You seem to be envisaging a situation where if the patient moves their registration
then presumably some fragment of the GP’s commissioning budget eventually goes?
Parliamentarian 1: Yes, the money for the patient, yes.
As for media of commissioner power, Parliamentarian 2 suggested that, within commissioning consortia,
managers would perform much of the commissioning work while GPs undertook the overall governance.
For both
a starting point [is], I think in terms of them being clear about your commissioning strategy, and
particularly priorities for investment and disinvestment, making sure they are coherent, they tie back to
need, they’re affordable, but also that you engage with providers at an early stage.
Senior manager 5
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He added that commissioners’ negotiations with hospitals were intended to ‘rebalance, empower
commissioners’ in negotiating with providers. GPs could not only negotiate with hospital consultants more
critically and in greater depth than lay managers could, but thereby involve consultants in managerial
decision-making:
So the aim is to actually increase clinician engagement across the pitch but using GP commissioners as
the way in.
Senior manager 3
The negotiations would concern technical efficiency (care pathway design) and service cost, and stimulate
consultants to raise the quality of, even reconfigure, secondary care. The concomitant risk was that GPs
and consultants might collaborate to stymie provider competition. In a second set of negotiations a CCG’s
central co-ordinating body would review its own member practices’ quality of care and ‘work with’
individual practices to improve it:
[S]howing clinical leadership to improve services at scale and pace . . . [so that] the whole primary care
body start behaving along the lines of the redesigned services.
Senior manager 6
Peer pressure within CCGs would induce GPs to refer as CCGs want. GPs would also have the interest and
capability to integrate more fully the now-fragmented general practice, community health, social care and
outpatient services.
Transparency was the main discursive mechanism (as we have called it) putting pressure on providers to
improve service quality. Commissioners and patients would be able to
monitor performance using a range of mechanisms . . . There’ll be the hard information they receive,
the comparative information they’ve got to look at performance compared with other areas. There’ll
be the soft intelligence they get through their own patients, through the public and other parties,
HealthWatch, CQC [the Care Quality Commission], the Commissioning Board and so on.
Senior manager 4
Commissioners’ asymmetry of information with secondary providers would be less for GPs (as clinicians)
than for non-medical managers. Furthermore:
There is of course a political dimension to this, because any politician, any MP who doesn’t stand up
for his or her local hospital won’t be the MP for very long. And that’s why it [commissioning] needs to
be clinically led rather than politically led, and also politicians need to say when a clinician says ‘well I
think we need to do X, Y and Z’, rather than saying ‘oh no, oh no, how terrible’, say ‘well actually
that’s right, I agree with that because it’s going to improve patient outcomes and survival rates,
experience etc. etc.’
Parliamentarian 1
Tariff payments would give providers financial incentives and the means to self-finance their own
investment and/or disinvestment strategies. Also:
[C]ommissioners will have some say over [tariffs] locally, up to a point, and then the national
commissioning board have a key role in structuring the tariff.
Senior manager 1
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Tariffs would also make providers face the financial consequences of what they did. Commissioners would
be able to
say ‘I’m withdrawing my contract from you in six months if it [your performance] hasn’t improved’ and
then you actually do it. . . . And then if you could work it out and you had a failure regime where the
service didn’t close but the organisation collapsed and moved to another place [sc. new management],
you could see driving improvement being accelerated.
Senior manager 6
They would not have to solve providers’ debt and solvency problems, which would help deal with
problematic providers and hospital overcapacity (e.g. in London). Also the new financial incentives would
raise service quality:
shifting the least good or the lower mean towards the mean or a bit beyond the mean.
Senior manager 1
Only a limited range of standards would be incentivised across the NHS at any one time. The tariff system
might also be revised to include ‘year-of-care’ payments for chronic ill-health, because existing tariffs
incentivised providers to increase activity.
Competition was intended to raise service quality, reflecting a general policy assumption that markets
‘deliver efficiency and innovation, and improve the quality of services’ (www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/
economic_research/oft887.pdf), and increase provider diversity:
so that it’s not a monopolistic capture, you can have more than one provider and you can have some
dynamism and change and some sense of challenge.
Senior manager 1
New provider entry was a means of introducing new models of care. (Two different informants both cited
Diabetes UK providing primary care management of diabetes as an example.) Similarly, the AQP policy
would mean that:
for those procedures where you’re able to specify . . . anybody who can meet the requirement can
provide the service . . . I suspect it’s more around pathway diversification so seeing the more traditional
forms of pathway delivery being changed.
Senior manager 4
Finally, provider competition would facilitate patient choice of provider, a policy goal in itself. Both
interviewees and policy documents mentioned that staff-owned providers (social enterprises etc.) might be
commissioned, but their formulations suggested only weak interest. Provider competition was national
policy, not discretionary, although local commissioners could decide which services to place under the AQP
mechanism rather than competitive tendering.
Informants mentioned juridical controls mainly as mechanisms preventing commissioners (and providers)
from acting anticompetitively. The European procurement requirements were, senior manager informants
said, very general and high level. The UK government (through the 2012 Act196) would in practice decide
what specific procurement requirements NHS commissioners faced and not go far beyond those already
applying to PCTs. Professional regulations would prevent competition or patient choice having any adverse
effects on quality of care:
[A]ny provider organisation, whether it’s a hospital or a community service or a general practice, they
know that at the end of the day their duty is to provide the right care for the individual patient and as
an individual clinician they could be in breach of professional regulatory standards or as an
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organisation they could be in breach of contract if they ever did something that . . . was the wrong
decision for that patient.
Senior manager 7
Contracts were seen largely as a framework for specifying services. However:
If GPs and hospital doctors don’t agree or are at war or at least can’t see a way ahead, then actually
the contract will not solve any of the issues by and large that they’re throwing up.
Senior manager 8
Disagreements or problems about service redesign, cost or quality would normally be
resolved negotiatively.
Policy-makers’ and top managers’ programme theory
Combining the explicit and the imputed material, Figure 1 represents the overall structure of the
programme theory of NHS commissioning policy during 2010–12. It combines what have been called
‘clinical’, ‘managerial’ and ‘political’ discourses.237 Arrows represent the main mechanism–outcome
relationships that the policies assumed. Figure 1 represents high-level mechanisms rather than all the
intermediate processes nested within them, such as GPs’ and patients’ everyday care choices. Each
concrete mechanism noted in Figure 1 may combine several media of power. ‘Providers’ include
community health, mental health and non-GP services besides hospitals.
Each arrow in Figure 1 denotes a testable proposition or complex of them. Formulated as CMO
propositions, the main programme theory assumptions of NHS commissioning policy were:
PT1: Central government’s decisions and actions lead NHS Commissioning Board, NICE, etc, to set
regulations and guidelines that reflect ministers’ priorities.
PT2: Through joint commissioning with local government, commissioners will understand care group and
population health needs.
PT3: NHS England’s management and GPs’ knowledge of patient needs together allow and stimulate GP
commissioners to link clinical and financial decisions.
PT4: General practitioners’ commissioning role will lead CCGs to review primary care quality.
PT5: General practitioners’ commissioning role and joint commissioning with local government will lead to
stronger integration of primary health and social care services (before and after hospital episodes).
PT6: General practitioners’ commissioning decisions, reviews of primary care quality and stronger
partnership working with social care will bring about reconfiguration of primary care pathways, removing
ineffective activities.
PT7: The reshaping of primary care pathways and the development of new information technology (IT)
(online consultations etc.) together result in primary replacing secondary care to some extent.
PT8: General practitioners’ commissioning decisions, the outcomes framework, the presence of alternative
providers and patients’ choice of providers (in particular of GPs) together stimulate and enable GPs to
exercise greater influence over other providers.
HOW ENGLISH HEALTH POLICY-MAKERS AND NHS COMMISSIONERS UNDERSTAND NHS COMMISSIONING POLICY
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
36
M
ec
ha
ni
sm
s
H
ea
lt
h 
an
d 
W
el
l-B
ei
ng
 B
oa
rd
s 
w
ri
te
Jo
in
t 
H
ea
lt
h 
N
ee
ds
 A
ss
es
sm
en
t 
Pl
an
M
in
is
te
rs
 s
et
 n
at
io
na
l p
ol
ic
y,
pr
io
ri
ti
es
, r
eg
ul
at
io
ns
N
CB
, N
IC
E,
 M
on
it
or
, D
H
 e
t 
al
.
de
fi
ne
 t
ar
if
fs
, i
nf
or
m
at
io
n
an
d 
co
m
pe
ti
ti
on
 r
eg
im
es
G
Ps
 k
no
w
 p
at
ie
nt
an
d 
po
pu
la
ti
on
ne
ed
s
Be
tt
er
 s
oc
ia
l p
lu
s 
he
al
th
ca
re
 in
te
gr
at
io
n
G
Ps
 li
nk
 fi
na
nc
ia
l
an
d 
cl
in
ic
al
de
ci
si
on
s;
 a
nd
m
on
it
or
 e
ac
h 
ot
he
r
D
iv
er
se
 P
H
C
pr
ov
id
er
s 
en
te
r
N
H
S 
qu
as
im
ar
ke
t
Pa
ti
en
ts
 c
ho
os
e
pr
im
ar
y 
ca
re
pr
ov
id
er
 (h
en
ce
se
co
nd
ar
y 
ca
re
co
m
m
is
si
on
er
)
G
Ps
 a
nd
 C
CG
s
re
co
nfi
gu
re
pr
im
ar
y 
ca
re
pa
th
w
ay
s,
su
bs
ti
tu
te
pr
im
ar
y 
fo
r 
se
co
nd
ar
y 
ca
re
Co
nt
ex
ts
O
ut
co
m
es
Cl
in
ic
ia
n-
co
m
m
is
si
on
er
s
ar
e 
se
ns
it
iv
e 
to
 in
ce
nt
iv
es
,
‘e
ng
ag
e’
 w
it
h 
co
m
m
is
si
on
in
g
Co
ns
or
ti
a 
bu
ild
 o
n 
PB
C
Pa
tie
nt
 a
bl
e,
 w
ill
in
g 
to
 c
ho
os
e
G
P,
 c
on
su
lt
an
t,
 h
os
pi
ta
l
CC
G
 d
ec
is
io
n
s 
re
fl
ec
t 
G
P
ju
d
g
em
en
ts
 a
b
o
u
t 
n
ee
d
s
an
d
 s
er
vi
ce
s
N
on
-N
H
S-
‘q
ua
lifi
ed
pr
ov
id
er
s’
 e
xi
st
, w
an
t
to
 e
nt
er
 N
H
S 
m
ar
ke
t
N
H
S 
pr
ov
id
er
s 
ab
le
 a
nd
w
ill
in
g 
to
 r
es
po
nd
 t
o
fi
na
nc
ia
l i
nc
en
ti
ve
s
Cl
in
ic
al
co
m
m
is
si
on
er
s 
(1
) h
av
e 
‘e
ff
ec
ti
ve
 
di
al
og
ue
’ w
it
h;
 
(2
) s
el
ec
t;
 a
nd
 
(3
) a
pp
ly
 fi
na
nc
ia
l
co
nt
ro
ls
 a
nd
 in
ce
nt
iv
es
to
 h
os
pi
ta
ls
.
H
os
pi
ta
ls
 r
ev
ie
w
an
d 
ch
an
ge
 t
he
ir
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
Pa
ti
en
ts
 c
ho
os
e
ho
sp
it
al
s
Im
pr
ov
ed
 q
ua
lit
y 
of
 c
ar
e
Co
st
 r
ed
uc
ti
on
Im
pr
ov
ed
 c
lin
ic
al
 o
ut
co
m
es
(e
.g
. c
an
ce
r,
 s
tr
ok
e)
N
H
S 
pr
ov
id
er
s 
an
d
co
m
m
is
si
on
er
s 
be
co
m
e
m
or
e 
ac
co
un
ta
bl
e
Re
du
ce
d 
he
al
th
 in
eq
ua
lit
ie
s
Se
c 
of
 s
ta
te
sp
ec
ifi
es
 O
l
fr
am
ew
or
k
N
IC
E 
pr
od
uc
es
O
ut
co
m
es
 F
ra
m
ew
or
k
N
H
S
pr
od
uc
es
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
co
m
pa
ri
ng
pr
ov
id
er
s’
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
Pe
rs
on
al
 b
ud
ge
ts
D
iv
er
se
 h
os
pi
ta
ls
en
te
r 
N
H
S
qu
as
i-m
ar
ke
t
‘N
o 
hi
dd
en
 b
ai
l-o
ut
s’
LA
 r
ol
e 
pl
us
 jo
in
t 
w
or
ki
ng
Pa
ti
en
t 
in
vo
le
m
en
t 
 
Re
se
ar
ch
 a
nd
 e
vi
de
nc
e
Re
se
ar
ch
 a
nd
 e
vi
de
nc
e
Pa
ti
en
t 
in
vo
lv
em
en
t
PH
 a
nd
 p
re
ve
nt
io
n
FI
G
U
R
E
1
Th
e
u
n
d
er
ly
in
g
p
ro
g
ra
m
m
e
th
eo
ry
:N
H
S
co
m
m
is
si
o
n
in
g
p
o
lic
y
20
10
–
12
.L
A
,
lo
ca
la
u
th
o
ri
ty
;
N
C
B
,N
at
io
n
al
C
h
ild
re
n
’s
B
u
re
au
;
O
I,
o
u
tc
o
m
e
in
d
ic
at
o
r;
PH
,p
u
b
lic
h
ea
lt
h
;
PH
R
,p
ri
m
ar
y
h
ea
lt
h
ca
re
.
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr03100 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2015 VOL. 3 NO. 10
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2015. This work was produced by Sheaff et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for
Health. This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals
provided that suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be
addressed to: NIHR Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science
Park, Southampton SO16 7NS, UK.
37
PT9: Increased GP influence over other providers and the substitution of primary for secondary care
together improve clinical outcomes.
PT10: Increased GP influence over other providers, GPs’ focus on quality and the substitution of primary for
secondary care together improve quality of care.
PT11: Increased GP influence over other providers and the substitution of primary for secondary care
together reduce costs of care.
PT12: Ministerial decisions lead NICE to produce the specific outcomes framework.
PT13: The outcomes framework and IT developments result in patients, commissioners and providers
themselves having information by which to compare providers’ performance, and in patients and
commissioners selecting (and deselecting) providers.
PT14: The outcomes framework, information for patients, provider plurality and (later) personal budgets
lead patients and commissioners to choose between (and deselect) providers.
PT15: Commissioners and patients choosing between health-care providers causes the latter to improve
clinical outcomes together.
PT16: Commissioners and patients choosing between health-care providers causes the latter to improve
quality of care.
PT17: Patients choosing between health-care providers causes the latter to reduce the cost of care.
PT18: Research and evidence production causes health-care providers to improve clinical outcomes.
PT19: Patient involvement in care decisions causes health-care providers to improve clinical outcomes.
PT20: Public health activity causes health-care providers to improve clinical outcomes.
PT21: Refusing ‘bail-outs’ causes health-care providers to reduce costs.
PT22: General practitioner and local government joint commissioning causes health-care providers to
reduce costs.
PT23: Patient involvement in care decisions causes health-care providers to reduce costs.
PT24: Research and evidence cause health-care providers to reduce costs.
PT25: The availability of information by which to compare providers’ – and by implication commissioners’ –
performance increases NHS organisations’ accountability to the public.
These relationships are moderated by the presence or character of GP engagement with commissioning,
local experience of practice-based commissioning, patients’ willingness to choose their hospital and on that
basis their GP if necessary, the availability of ‘qualified’ competing providers, and existing providers’
capacity and scope to respond to financial incentives and competitive pressures.
The above propositions, and Figure 1, omit many details, nuances and complications, outlining only the
gross overall architecture of the exposed programme theory. As with previous policies,22 the policy aims
were broad and difficult to pin down. Nevertheless, the above propositions are amenable to empirical
testing in light of NHS commissioning practice, to which we now turn.
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Chapter 6 Reconfiguring commissioning structures
Next we consider RQ2: how English NHS commissioning structures were reconfigured during 2010–12,and what factors shaped that reconfiguration. By ‘commissioning structures’ we mean PCTs, the
emergent CCGs and local authorities taken together. CCGs ‘went live’ 2 months before the end of the
study period. We report who participated, how they were ‘engaged’ and how during 2010–12 CCGs
converged from different local origins on a common pattern. These findings are drawn mainly from the
English case studies and press reportage.
Reconfiguration as recycling
In all our study sites CCGs evolved from existing organisational structures for GP involvement, but which
ones existed, were used and reconfigured varied between sites. In Porttown the starting point was a
social enterprise (community interest company), which originated as the practice-based commissioning
coordinating body, concentrating on referral management and owned by the city’s GPs. After the 2010
election the PCT transferred the Professional Executive Committee’s (PEC) commissioning functions to it.
As its role extended, the social enterprise was ‘rolled up’ into the CCG. Paradoxically, the 2012 Health Act
was an impediment.196 To work around its requirement that the CCG be a statutory body, the PCT created
an interim ‘Clinical Commissioning Executive’ to work after the fashion of a holding company. In Milltown
those parts of the PCT in which GPs were active (the PEC, various micro-commissioning groups) evolved
into the CCG by ‘scaling up’ already-established arrangements. In neither site had the PCT been clustered
with another. Metroland split the PCT cluster (and other cross-London groupings) back into four, creating
one CCG for each borough in the cluster’s territory. It populated its CCG from an existing polyclinic
(or ‘polysystem’):
[S]o they’ve actually basically kept that poly, the sort of, there were, sort of, four, five, if you like
groupings within the PCT and they’ve basically kept that within the CCGs.
General practitioner, Metroland
General practitioners involved in the Metroland polysystem became CCG enthusiasts, but others were
generally unfamiliar with commissioning. Consequently the new CCG was constructed almost from
scratch, initially with six GPs and designated PCT staff to assist them. Shire formed its CCG by clustering
two PCTs. One had developed autonomous locality structures that undertook practice-based
commissioning. Clinical commissioning programmes were long established there, with PCT, GP, other
primary care and local authority representatives meeting acute and mental health trust medical directors
every month. This PCT became the platform for CCG formation, absorbing the existing cardiac, stroke and
diabetes networks. The other PCT had little practice-based commissioning and had to start recruiting GPs
into commissioning work with the other PCT almost from scratch.
The transition to CCGs blurred the division of commissioning labour between PCT, cluster and shadow
CCGs, which retarded commissioning work in all four sites. Metroland informants were also uncertain
whether the CCG should be shaping or implementing GPs’ wishes. Those in Shire were uncertain whether
the CCG should focus on primary or secondary care.
Incremental engagement
Another common pattern across sites was difficulty in recruiting GPs to ‘engage’ with commissioning. PCT
informants in Metroland, Shire and (more guardedly) Porttown emphasised how fast this was happening,
but some GPs presented a more nuanced view.
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Availability
Reconfiguration of the commissioning organisations was hampered by a shortage of GP participants,
even where GPs already participated in commissioning. Partly this was a matter of GP availability. Few GPs
wanted to participate actively in commissioning because of lack of interest, work overload, multiple
commitments or the cost and quality of locum cover. Many GPs simply attached more importance to direct
patient care. Most Milltown GPs were unfamiliar with commissioning and not confident about doing it.
Few GPs responded to consultations about service changes in Porttown or Milltown. Metroland PCT set up
clinical forums with two local acute hospitals. At first few GPs or consultants attended, although later they
began initiating discussions with (other) commissioners and seeking their advice. Shire and Porttown GPs
were mostly content to leave commissioning to the former PEC members and social enterprise respectively.
Capability
Many GPs still lacked knowledge about commissioning and confidence in their commissioning skills:
Some GPs don’t understand the risk in taking out 30% of inpatient services from a Trust.
Commissioner manager, Metroland
Metroland GPs were still at the stage of familiarising themselves with such policies as Quality, Innovation,
Productivity and Prevention (QIPP), so the PCT began education work with them. Some Milltown GPs
were confident about the clinical aspects of commissioning but not the other aspects, with which they
were less familiar. To address this problem and the lack of GP availability, the study sites used different
commissioning support organisations and to different extents. Porttown subcontracted its social enterprise
to provide commissioning support and sought advice from its NHS regional procurement organisation.
Both Milltown and Metroland relied on cross-PCT commissioning support organisations. Metroland also
used management consultancies for a few discrete tasks (see Chapter 7). Shire provided each of the clinical
commissioning project group with PCT commissioning and finance manager support, but made little use of
commissioning support organisations, apart from some ad hoc external evaluations of proposed or actual
service reconfigurations.
Distrust
To assume, as parliamentarians did, that GPs would commission differently from non-medical managers
implies possible disagreements between the two. The GPs were most interested in community provision of
mental health services, while PCT managers prioritised cost-saving bed closures. These differences tended
to reduce GPs’ appetite for helping develop service specifications. Shire PCT managers sided with local
hospitals in rejecting GP proposals for direct GP referral to MRI scanning for young people with knee pain
(to reduce outpatient referrals) and replacing regular hospital biopsies with GP monitoring of patients
screened negative for prostate cancer. Some GPs concluded:
there’s a sort of pretence of [GP] involvement but it doesn’t make any difference.
General practitioner chair of clinical commissioning programme, Shire
It took persistent GP pressure to induce Porttown PCT to support vascular disease checking (a national
mandate). The lead GP thought that the PCT had given a pilot project for vascular disease checking, and
the evaluation of that project, insufficient practical support, which
makes you pretty impotent when you’re trying to improve your commissioning.
General practitioner cardiology lead
Other GPs became disengaged when they felt that their ideas for better ways of working did not get
commissioned because Porttown PCT lacked authority with (other) providers. In Milltown, though, there
was little evidence of distrust between GPs and commissioning managers. The PCT had encouraged GP
involvement. Its long-established commissioning strategy groups included commissioning managers,
GPs and other providers, between whom relationships were friendly.
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These disagreements spilled over into the GP body itself. Some GPs felt that their PEC colleagues had
‘gone native’, becoming too compliant with hospital and PCT priorities in Shire. Two or three Porttown
GPs were antagonistic towards the social enterprise from which the CCG was built, although most were
passive. Having regarded the PCT as a failure, they tarred the social enterprise with the same brush.
Some Metroland GPs saw the reconfiguration of commissioning as their chance to get rid of the PCTs,
others as an opportunity to recruit PCT commissioning and contract staff. Milltown PCT found it necessary –
and hard – to sustain a consistent message about commissioning objectives and how to achieve them
(e.g. by closing a walk-in centre).
Study-site PCTs followed a strategy of gradually increasing the above bodies’ commissioning activity and
remit, building up trust and reconfiguring commissioning structures incrementally as opportunities arose,
so that preponderance gradually shifted from managers to GPs. Methods included:
l Widening the decisions and issues delegated to shadow CCGs to include such issues as linking
commissioning plans to heath outcomes, priority setting, contract management, integrated care,
management of long-term conditions in Metroland; referral management, implementation of QIPP
priorities in Shire; and contract monitoring with hospital consultants in Porttown. Milltown PCT built on
practice-based commissioning groups that involved a mix of stakeholders in reviewing commissioning
for specific care groups.
l Involving GPs throughout the commissioning cycle, for instance in Metroland having a GP chair
commissioning meetings on mental health services; or in Porttown scrutinising the business cases for
new projects or services.
Our [commissioning] team used to carry laminated copies of the commissioning cycle and every time
a GP said ‘Let’s do this’ . . . we’d pull it out of the bag and go ‘right, where on the cycle is that
question you are asking?’
Commissioning manager, Milltown
l Inviting ‘ordinary’ GPs (not previously involved in commissioning) to lead commissioning groups for
specific clinical areas, such as clinical pathways, long-term care, apparent hospital ‘over-activity’
(e.g. for myringotomy at Porttown), mental health services, coronary heart disease (CHD) and diabetes
prevention, musculoskeletal services, trauma and public health. Milltown introduced formal processes
for selecting GPs for some roles rather than relying on ‘usual suspects’ or unskilled volunteers.
l Inviting GP ‘enthusiasts’ with particular clinical interests to attend meetings to give their opinions
(Shire, Porttown).
l Involving GPs in referral triage, in Porttown by reporting their work and its cost implications through
quarterly meetings with a GP committee; and in Metroland by reviewing audit data and observations of
local practice.
l Clinical pathway and service redesign (with PCT staff and hospital consultants), although in Metroland
this activity was more fruitful at one hospital than another with ‘less maturity’. Milltown ended up with
42 project groups for these purposes. Clinical commissioning projects served a similar purpose in Shire.
Porttown GP leads contributed to redesigning health services for homeless people.
l Prioritising commissioning work on care groups or problems that interested GPs: specific diseases, such
as diabetes (Shire); high-spending services, such as mental health, general medicine (Shire, Metroland,
Porttown); and high-volume patient groups (Metroland, Porttown).
l Primary care trust managers and borough directors collaborating with GP practice managers over
budget setting (Metroland); or, in Milltown, identifying clinical and non-clinical commissioning leads in
each general practice.
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Wider collaboration
A parallel task was to reconfigure joint commissioning with local government and GP negotiations with
hospital, mental health and community health services trusts.
Consultants
The fora described above sought expert advice from secondary care clinicians, usually consultants. In
Metroland and Shire these meetings became, among other things, a venue for consultants to make
presentations about clinical matters (e.g. prescribing for patients with long-term health problems in
Metroland). Consultant participation was comparatively straightforward in Milltown, where the lead GP
commissioner had strong personal relationships with some consultants and mediated the relationship
between them and other GPs; hesitant in Shire, where the consultants were conscious of being both
clinical experts and (potentially) organisational or speciality representatives; and patchy in Metroland,
where the separate clinical fora for each hospital developed at different rates because at one hospital it
was hard to involve the consultants. Corporate providers never participated.
Local government
Joint commissioning with local government also tended to evolve from existing arrangements. A
preliminary step was cross-over membership between NHS and council bodies, adding a CCG member or
two to the Health and Well-Being Board (Shire, Metroland) and a social services director to the CCG Board
(Porttown, Shire, Metroland). The Metroland Director of Social Services attended the meetings of NHS
chief executives hosted by the PCT. Porttown and Milltown Directors of Public Health were already joint
Local authority (LA) and NHS appointments, as were some of the more junior commissioning managers in
Milltown. Existing joint commissioning and public health activities were also broadened and elaborated,
making public health an increasingly joint NHS–local authority activity. Porttown PCT was already involved
in an existing health theme group and local strategic partnership addressing health inequalities, which
developed into the Health and Well-Being Board, using its health inequalities strategy as a basis for joint
commissioning plans and activity. Metroland borough council had a long-established Health and Social
Care Liaison group, which in 2002 had agreed a concordat with the NHS and established an intermediate
care partnership that mostly obviated the need for Section 75 arrangements (although there still were
some for mental health services). The Health and Well-Being Board was a successor to this activity. Shire’s
long-established joint commissioning board gained a wider remit, but public health work continued
more separately.
Overload
These developments occurred despite the disruptive side effects of NHS restructuring on staff turnover
(although the disruption was least in Metroland). Three successive changes of Shire commissioning
structures meant that:
They [commissioners] never develop that expertise that you can start having a sensible dialogue.
Medical director, Shire
It caused
loss of organisational memory.
General practitioner, Metroland
Staff turnover and increased work demands forced those remaining to prioritise tasks. Metroland and
Porttown PCT rotated their attention around care groups so that some service specifications were reviewed
in depth with ‘just programme managing essentially’ (manager, Porttown) for the rest. Shire ‘rationalised’
22 Clinical Commissioning Programmes into 7, aligning each with a national programme budget heading,
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but also making agendas and meetings (20–40 people) too large for easy decision-making, and mostly
irrelevant to the hospitals. This made clinicians see the groups as mostly for information gathering.
Other tasks were simply delayed, for instance out-posting hospital diabetic nurses to general practices
(to reduce outpatient attendances; Shire) or finalising plans for social work assessments in winter of older
people with long-term conditions (Metroland). Commissioners also engaged external commissioning
support: management consultants (e.g. to review the viability of rehabilitation beds; Metroland), the
London Health Programme (Metroland), the Procurement Supplies Agency (Porttown), the SHA (Shire,
Milltown) and independent experts (Shire). Livewell bought substantial support from a US HMO to develop
a unified view, across the commissioners, GPs and other primary care providers, about what services
should be commissioned, monitored and reviewed.238 Overload was less evident in Milltown, perhaps
because so many GPs contributed to commissioning there. It became more severe the year before CCGs
went live, with less work being done on commissioning initiatives, revising service specifications
(Metroland) and setting public health priorities (Porttown).
Convergent reconfiguration
Despite their different origins, the study CCGs converged on a common structure, partly stipulated by
legislation and central guidance: clinical senates; subgroups for specific care groups, clinical specialities or
service problems; and the shadow CCG that from April 2013 would manage the first two. Commissioners
created their organisational structures partly in order to involve clinicians (e.g. the 42 project groups
in Milltown).
Recycling existing organisations implied recycling the existing local GP leaderships, as others have also
found.239 The Shire GPs dominating service redesign work and chairing clinical commissioning programmes
tended to be former PEC members, GPs with a special interest (GPSIs) or, as in Porttown and Milltown,
former practice-based commissioning activists. The former PCT chair in Metroland reappeared as assistant
director of the CCG. As noted above, Milltown PCT took steps to moderate, but not reverse, this
tendency. These continuities of GP leadership, of subgroups doing much of the commissioning, and of
non-GP managers doing the commissioning work that GPs would not, seemed to presage more an
evolution of commissioning practice than the upheaval, even ‘revolution’, that many commentators and
policy-makers predicted before April 2013.
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Chapter 7 NHS commissioning practice and
governance over health economies
Research question 3 concerned how far NHS commissioning practice in 2010–12 allowed commissionersto exercise governance over their local NHS health economies. Using all the study methods except the
international comparisons and Leximancer analysis, this chapter reports how NHS commissioners exercised
governance unilaterally over providers. Later chapters consider the rest of RQ3: what room for manoeuvre
NHS commissioners had; the consequences of distributed and client-based commissioning; and how
providers responded to commissioning activity. By ‘commissioners’ we mean the combination of residual
PCT and emergent CCG organisations.
Case study informants’ accounts of current NHS commissioning practice in 2010–12 mainly concerned
negotiated order, managerial performance and discursive control, and (less so) provider competition
(Table 7).
Since informant responses covered all six media of power, we report how the study site commissioners
used each one, and how the media interacted.
Management performance
Separating commissioner and provider forced commissioners to be more deliberate, focused and explicit
(documented) in specifying what services they wanted from Porttown and Milltown community health
services. Existing providers still won the tender, but had to specify services and costs more precisely.
Service specifications were becoming evidence based, as others have found.102,240 In all four sites, public
health professionals contributed local data on which to base service specifications. Shire PCT did so least,
but (like Porttown) did use the Map of Medicine (http://mapofmedicine.com) to redesign care pathways
and specify referral criteria. Porttown and Metroland also re-used Hospital Episode Statistics data. Their
public health staff contributed to service specifications and pathway design. When evidence was absent or
ambivalent, medical consensus or majority opinion was followed – again reported elsewhere102 – and
commissioners made more subjective judgements (‘intelligence’) based on financial information, their own
perceptions of local services, and staff and patient feedback (e.g. complaints).
Providers, indeed the main provider, played a large part in formulating service specifications. Commissioners
in all sites spoke of provider proposals for service provision, which ranged from consultants advising about
the evidence base for service specifications (Porttown) to consultants telling commissioners what service
changes were feasible (Metroland). Provider input compensated for the commissioners’ lack of clinical and
TABLE 7 Frequency of informant responses mentioning each mode of power (2010–12)
Medium Number of references Percentage of references
Managerial performance 920 29
Negotiated order 845 27
Discursive control 607 19
Financial incentives 252 8
Provider competition 340 11
Juridical governance 180 6
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technical knowledge, as provider informants often commented. Nevertheless, mental health commissioners
sometimes argued that:
I think that I can commission better because I was involved in providing the service.
Mental health commissioner, Metroland
Clearer service specifications helped in introducing referral-screening criteria aimed at reducing hospital
activity by diverting suitable patients to primary or community care, at least for extra-contractual referrals
(Metroland). Where referral criteria were lacking, peer review was used, often with consultant (Porttown,
Metroland, Shire), and in Shire also physiotherapist, input.
Commissioners in our study sites often felt that they lacked the procurement skills required for dealing
with competing providers. They were aware, however, of the transaction costs of procurement work,
which they saw as a somewhat futile waste of money and time when only one bidder was available.
Informants at Shire contrasted the local authority’s ‘scrupulous’ application of tendering rules with the
small number of providers. Our study sites followed official procurement procedures and regulations most
carefully for large contracts and when there were two or more bidders, but, if market testing identified
only one potential provider and they could keep within EU law, they would avoid tendering.
Commissioners mainly used nationally mandated measures such as target compliance, patient-reported
outcome measures (PROMs)241 and DH ‘vital signs’ for monitoring providers. During our fieldwork the latest
NHS Operating Framework242 measured recorded quality, resources and reform. Two (of eight) of the
headline and nine (of 27) supporting quality measures concerned health outcomes; the rest measured
work processes. (No resource or reforms targets concerned health outcomes.) The NHS Outcomes
Framework had not yet appeared.243 Porttown PCT benchmarked its providers against regional comparators,
as did Shire. All sites used contract reports that included Monitor’s reporting requirements, QIPP data and
exception reports for non-compliance with contract or quality standards. Metroland required local providers
to give ‘narrative’ explanations of outliers, exceptions and untoward incidents. Metroland, Shire and
Porttown encouraged provider staff to report service quality problems. Porttown commissioned a local firm
to undertake patient surveys, but dealt directly with any patient who wrote comments (rather than just scores)
on the survey form. Livewell collected data via its telephone helpline.
Although commissioners relied on their providers to supply and interpret monitoring data, providers
sometimes withheld information, such as ‘commercially sensitive’ financial data, on the grounds that they
had to make a surplus (Metroland). Non-disclosure could have adverse consequences for both sides.
Porttown hospital trust masked its financial problems as long as it could until the PCT and hospital found
themselves having to make savings exceeding £30M. Tariff payments made provider finances, patient
flows and case mix more transparent than did block contracting. Similarly, because there were QOF
payments for diabetes and epilepsy treatments, Shire PCT knew how many of those patients were treated,
but knew the number of Parkinson’s disease treatments only because it employed a specialist nurse.
At Metroland especially, our informants thought that involving GPs made service monitoring more incisive,
especially regarding clinical outcomes and cost-effectiveness.
The action learning participants suggested that an important aspect of management performance
(especially service specification and contracting) was to promote integration of the disparate primary,
secondary and social care pathways that an individual patient followed, although, in practice,
commissioning was rarely carried out in this way. Often, discussions between commissioners and providers
about how to identify patients with long-term conditions who might be diverted to community care
(to reduce costs) reached an impasse. This was an obstacle to reducing inpatient activity.
Looking at all English PCTs cross-sectionally, we had data on 16 service outcomes (see Chapter 4, section
Indicators and measures). Only one, PCT surplus/deficit, correlated with PCTs’ summary WCC scores
(see Table 23, Appendix 4), and then weakly and in the opposite direction from predicted; larger PCT deficits
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(or smaller surpluses) were associated with higher WCC scores. However, PCT surplus also correlated
negatively (r= –0.319, p< 0.001) with monthly mean waiting list size (combined inpatient and day cases)
per 100,000 population: the shorter the waiting list proportionate to population, the smaller the PCT’s
financial surplus (or the larger its deficit). The more numerous correlations between the controls and the
service outcomes were, with two exceptions, also verging on negligible. One might have expected WCC
scores to reflect among other things the implementation of contemporary managerial objectives.55 If so,
our finding casts doubt on the validity of the WCC self-scoring system (which was subsequently discontinued).
During the study period the Francis Report244 exposed a culture of vague monitoring criteria and
unrealistically optimistic findings. Francis reported that commissioners (and providers) often responded to
prima facie adverse monitoring reports by reinterpreting the findings rather than acting on them. (Stafford
was not one of our study sites.)
Negotiated order
Contract negotiations were conducted mostly by chief executive dealing with chief executive, and other
non-medical managers dealing with their counterparts (e.g. PCT finance manager with trust finance
manager etc.). Senior clinicians sometimes participated, but not uniformly, especially not in negotiations
about cost savings. In Metroland mental health trust, even the medical directors were not always involved
in such negotiations. Negotiations about the unscheduled care contracts in Porttown involved the PCT
and acute trust finance directors, with marginal input from other PCT commissioning staff, let alone
anyone else:
It’s just a contractual numbers negotiation.
Commissioning manager, Porttown
Shire was similar. There clinicians’ proposals (e.g. for diabetes pathways) would not necessarily enter
contract negotiations. One Metroland consultant believed that ‘difficult’ consultants were kept out
of contract negotiations (no one else either corroborated or denied this). One way to bridge the two
negotiated orders was by judiciously selecting consultants – and GPs – to involve. Porttown hospital trust
involved selected consultants in order to demonstrate to them (and, through them, other consultants) that
the trust had obtained the best deal it could. Action learning participants reported instances when a
consultant spent much time negotiating the introduction of new services and reconfiguring care pathways
with one commissioning manager, only for the agreement to be reversed elsewhere in the PCT. The
consultant then felt she had wasted her time and spent less time working with the commissioner.
National policy priorities (targets, budgets) largely set the commissioners’ agenda, as another study102
also found.
Commissioners need to demonstrate that they exercise control. They are only interested in national
diktats and money.
Consultant, Metroland
However, the national policy focus did give providers and commissioners common interests, especially
concerning hospital referral criteria, substitution of primary for secondary care, compliance with QIPP
targets, emergency department (ED) utilisation and hospital outcomes, although Porttown community
health service (CHS) managers argued that their commissioners paid too much attention to minutiae
(e.g. heart failure nurses’ referral habits). Indeed, our hospital informants described the main
commissioning focus as being costs, although in Metroland waiting times were no less central. Action
learning set members used the term ‘class hegemony’ to describe the close networks among small
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numbers of nationally prominent NHS managers, networks which local managers would use when trying
to influence the other party in commissioning negotiations.
Financial negotiations were often separate from ‘real-side’ negotiations. In Shire, Metroland and Milltown,
a financial agreement (and, in Milltown, also local authority budgets) framed subsequent ‘real-side’
negotiations about service priorities, population needs and service specifications. In Porttown, for instance,
the clinical and service specification of a new eating disorder service was adjusted to meet the budget, not
vice versa. The main exception was that, when the London Health Programmes awarded contracts for
‘hyper-acute’ trauma and stroke centres, specifications for quick access and clinical quality determined the
cost. As others report,102 both financial and ‘real-side’ negotiations were framed by historical patterns:
[W]e commission most things on a historic basis unless there’s a good reason to start arguing and we
need to change things . . . you’re basically arguing around the margins with the provider about what
changes. But . . . where there are significant risks around delivery . . . you’re likely to take more of [a]
care pathway approach to such as A&E [accident and emergency], such as maternity.
General practitioner, Metroland
Commissioners’ proposals for cost containment and service re-profiling were bound to be contentious.
Providers who disliked commissioners’ proposals disputed the justifications for them. Shire PCT and one
hospital argued inconclusively for years about why ED attendances were increasing. ED consultants blamed
the lack of GP availability; the PCT cited its own data and surveys suggesting the opposite.
A second negotiated order involved GPs and consultants (and other secondary care clinicians), who often
liked to deal directly with each other, blurring the commissioner–provider distinction (especially in the
small-scale Livewell project) and bypassing the aforementioned managerial negotiations. Clinicians’
attitudes towards non-medical commissioners ranged from:
We don’t just want to be a manager with a clinician’s hat on
General practitioner, Porttown
to:
I do my level best not to deal with commissioners.
Consultant, Metroland
Livewell GPs disliked even the word ‘commissioning’.238 Doctor-to-doctor negotiations could have
constructive results for a commissioner. Porttown consultants endorsed changes to ear, nose and throat
services as a consequence of dealing directly with the GP organisation, while the GPs questioned and
reportedly limited the orthopaedic consultants’ income-maximising activities. The obverse of this medical
collegiality was, at times, scepticism about the value of non-medical inputs to commissioning and
about managers trying to control things in which they were not competent. There were also limits to
medical collegiality:
[O]ne of the hardest things I’ve found is convincing my GP colleagues that the hospital doesn’t have a
hidden agenda, it’s not out there to ruin general practice.
General practitioner, Milltown
Porttown and Milltown informants described mediating debates between GPs and consultants.
Disagreements about what work should transfer to non-hospital settings soured relationships between
Shire GPs and consultants.
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In terms of quantity of work and participants, the most important negotiated order was what GPs called
‘micro-commissioning’: interdisciplinary, interorganisational redesign of care pathways, most often
(and protractedly) for complex, non-commodified activities such as rehabilitation, chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease (COPD), unscheduled care and mental health care. However, care pathways for
less organisationally complex care – for example orthopaedic surgery – were also sometimes
micro-commissioned. Micro-commissioning typically involved several providers, NHS and local authority
commissioners, patient representatives and ‘third-party’ experts such as a lead psychiatrist, public health
consultant (Metroland) or immunologist (Porttown), but could also be small scale (e.g. at Livewell).
From the pathway design followed decisions about providers’ functions, service access criteria, resource
needs – including decommissioning decisions in Milltown – and in Livewell an overall redesign of primary
care provision. From these decisions followed service specifications and monitoring arrangements, raw
material from which contracts were prepared. Micro-commissioning gave the participating clinicians and
providers a head start in bidding for the ensuing contract.
Building up trust with providers took years. It required compromises and trade-offs (as others report39),
and partly depended on the personalities and interests involved. After Milltown PCT decommissioned its
community matron service, it collaborated with (other) providers to redeploy the community matrons,
which the commissioner saw as investing in future goodwill. Metroland PCT agreed that its hospitals
could cut beds (hence costs) provided their activity was not reduced, and paid for some (not all) of the
above-contract activity that the acute hospital had undertaken. To resolve a potential dispute about
upcoding, a private hospital invited Metroland PCT to send a coder to agree the disputed codes jointly
with its own coders. Shire PCT claimed to avoid disputes by mutually recognising divergent interests and
reaching compromises. As others report,39 regional NHS bodies (SHAs, during most of 2010–12) would
sometimes intervene in contract negotiations to exercise hierarchical control over both sides, including
dispute resolution. Shared beliefs in a commonality of NHS interests and in NHS-wide interorganisational
collaboration, persisting from earlier NHS structures and rules, also helped mitigate tensions and disputes,
indeed facilitated micro-commissioning.
In all four sites, patient and carer representatives (e.g. from Diabetes UK) were involved in
micro-commissioning and, in Shire, decisions about service closures. Patient voices were not necessarily
unanimous. Some patient groups in Shire opposed acute bed closures, while others preferred replacing
acute beds with care closer to home. User representatives for Milltown mental health services shifted over
years from an adversarial to a more supportive stance. Porttown patients whom the PCT consulted were
interested in wheelchair supply but not vascular risk assessment or ISTC orthopaedic services. For mental
health, one challenge was to engage with users at the more disabled end of the spectrum, for instance
those with chronic schizophrenia. Neither did patient representatives merely respond to NHS initiatives.
Porttown patients participating in a regional heart/stroke network (as opposed to the PCT patient
consultations) presented their own proposals for a CHD self-help service. Porttown council had learnt
that user involvement worked best when users participated in the early stages of service design
and specification.
Over time, negotiations usually became more relational as trust and goodwill accumulated, the participants
recognising that they would need each other’s help in future. In Milltown and Porttown, GP–consultant
relationships rested on the precept ‘If you have got a problem, ring me’, forestalling the use of other
media of power. This social capital was reported in Milltown as helping to repair the harm that tariff
payments did to commissioner–provider relationships. Metroland also built on the relationships formed in
operating its ‘polyclinic’. Because they influenced what media of power a manager was usually inclined
to use, certain personal attributes, skills and management style were important for commissioners, as
others have also found.245 One such skill was motivational interviewing (e.g. inviting providers to state their
view of the evidence base to frame negotiations in terms that the provider accepts). Another was to blame
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a third party (e.g. national policy, the behaviour of another local organisation), not the other negotiator,
for the dispute. Patience and emotional resilience were two more.238 A corporate hospital
manager explained:
I’m from a sales background so you learn never to burn a good relationship because it costs you down
the line.
Private hospital manager, Metroland
Nevertheless, some relationships had already been burned by personality clashes (Milltown),
argumentative, competitive and antagonistic negotiating styles (Shire) or bullying:
I’ve been in meetings that were so bad that if you’d filmed them you’d be in front of a court.
General practitioner, Porttown
Indeed, action learning participants suggested that our analytic schema should include bullying as a
method which negotiators used.
Discursive control
Etic discourse framed much of the micro-commissioning negotiation mentioned above and was a main
currency of provider monitoring. Thus Shire PCT stated that services without an evidence base would be
decommissioned. Commissioners in our study sites mainly used nationally promulgated materials when
persuading providers to accept commissioners’ proposals, most often NICE guidelines, the Recovery Model,
QIPP targets, the Map of Medicine, National Service Frameworks (especially for mental health, older people
and CHD) and the Improving Access to Psychological Therapies (IAPT) programme. Before negotiation or
monitoring meetings with providers, commissioners would also supply data on local problems to frame
the discussion, for example case-load and case mix spreadsheets (Porttown) or studies showing that a
walk-in centre raised ED admissions (Milltown).
At times etic persuasion resolved disagreements between commissioner and provider (e.g. about
remodelling eating disorder services in Porttown), but not always. Etic arguments could cut both ways, as
they did against commissioner proposals for GP triage in EDs (Metroland) or when the Shire mental health
provider simply dismissed national guidance about home treatment as ‘out of date’. ‘Evidence’ was
sometimes used to justify rather than ground decisions.
Then debate fell back on emic discourse. Commissioners sometimes cited patient consultation (but seldom
patient choice) to legitimise their claims on providers. Porttown PCT asked its providers to show evidence
of patient – and staff – consultation about proposed service changes. Occasionally, wider ethical
imperatives were invoked. The Porttown pathway group for non-psychotic mental health problems
succeeded in remodelling services because everyone recognised the fatal consequences when these
services fail. ED consultants in Shire argued that, although they could not control which patients presented
at the ED, they could not clinically or morally justify sending patients elsewhere either. The argument
that proposed service changes would have no bad consequences for patients was often persuasive to
provider clinicians. One influential emic argument reflected the relationality mentioned above, expressing a
culture of joint responsibility for the local NHS: ‘the [Milltown] way’. Porttown GPs’ leaders said that their
GPs had more appetite for collaboration and integrating their work than for competition.
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Financial incentives
There was little disagreement that tariff payments incentivised providers to increase the number of patient
episodes, which had
driven a wedge between us over the last few years.
Commissioning manager, Milltown
Commissioners asserted that treatment thresholds had fallen and upcoding had appeared. The volume of
providers’ activity became the focus of contract negotiations rather than service specifications. However,
rising marginal costs of care limited the expansion. The main Porttown hospital had to open wards and
theatres at weekends, at costs above the tariff payments. Shire hospitals wanted to discontinue costly
out-posted clinics in community hospitals. Tariff payments constrained micro-commissioning by placing a
ceiling on the cost of any new care pathway in Metroland.
Unless commissioners responded as reported below, the combination of tariff system, AQP and patient
choice rules weakened their power to control provider case load and case mix, hence overall costs, and the
sources of service provision. When Metroland PCT and its main hospital agreed a reduced volume of
elective activity, the hospital still deliberately delivered more services than agreed, presenting the PCT with
a fait accompli and corresponding bill. Shire PCT found its obligation to pay for hospital ‘overperformance’
an obstacle to transferring funds into long-term care. Porttown commissioner and provider informants
agreed that tariffs incentivised hospitals not to transfer services to primary care.
Under tightening financial constraints, commissioners in the study sites responded by bundling their tariff
payments to providers into blocks (see also Petsoulas et al.39), the ‘cap-and-collar’ or ‘managed PBR’
system. If provider activity fell below a certain ‘floor’ or (more likely) exceeded a certain ‘ceiling’ (in
Metroland, 5% above the expected volume), tariff payments for the marginal activity were reduced by an
agreed amount, eventually falling to zero in Porttown. One Shire hospital, though, so far exceeded its
expected volume that the PCT exercised its option to pay it on a ‘non-contractual activity’ basis, that is to
pay a monthly sum that was retrospectively adjusted for deviations from the level of activity that the PCT
had forecast. There were exceptions; Porttown PCT changed its de facto block contract with the ISTC to
tariff payments. Nevertheless, the predominant response was bundling in order to dampen what,
according to commissioners, were perverse incentive effects.
Block payments were still used for community health and most mental health services. They sometimes
prevented providers from being incentivised, even reimbursed, for work. Metroland mental health trust
was not commissioned to treat, say, schizophrenics, nor the Shire trust people for autism, but both trusts
were still expected to treat them under a block contract, so that the providers either cross-subsidised the
work or sought voluntary-sector provision and/or finance. When Porttown GPs began performing minor
operations, the local hospital, not the GPs, was still paid under the hospital’s block contract. Not that block
contracts inherently denied commissioners scope to incentivise their providers. A block contract between a
Metroland provider and PCT shared the costs of referrals above a specified level in return for the provider
increasing its bed capacity. Shire PCT used a block contract to offer its community and mental health
service a secure income in return for the providers taking an increased case load. Milltown PCT built into
its ED block contract an incentive to send suitable patients to an ambulatory care centre, where the
average case cost was £70, not £2000. In theory, CQUIN could also be used as a supplementary incentive
mechanism, but the targets and payments were in practice decided nationally and regionally. Within
the national NGMS contract, Porttown and Shire used QOF payments to incentivise general practices
to implement vascular disease checking. Although in practice the study site commissioners did little to
measure the volume of work of block contract holders, well-designed block contracts could accommodate
strong monitoring arrangements. One in Shire stipulated the quarterly provision of monitoring information,
which was used to review and improve performance, with the commissioner having the option of
contract termination.
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Commissioners also used block payments to hypothecate funding for nationally prioritised services
(e.g. early intervention, Metroland). Conversely, block funding made it easy for Metroland to divert £5M
from its mental health provider to meet hospital overspend resulting from tariff incentives, although such
transfers also occurred in pre-tariff days. When commissioner budgets were tight, the use of block
payments compelled providers to negotiate adjustments with the commissioner; but by the same token
Milltown PCT found that this tended to lock the commissioner into using existing providers.
Independent-sector treatment centres were initially paid irrespective of what volume of cases they
treated246 and so the Metroland ISTC seemed to feel no incentive to engage with GPs and, we were told,
‘cherry-picked’ patients (PCT commissioning manager, Metroland). That corporate provider, at least,
seemed to respond to block payments differently from NHS providers, who were more willing to waive
their contractual claims on commissioners.
Like others,71,247 we found that our study site commissioners shrank from financially destabilising the main
local providers on whom they depended for fulfilling their commissioning duties. Shire PCT did not exercise
its option of non-payment when local providers did not comply with their contract. Neither would Shire
or Metroland PCTs reduce total tariff payments to reflect a large reduction in admissions. A Milltown
commissioning manager argued that it would be short-sighted to disrupt long-standing, usually productive
relationships with a provider for the sake of a one-off financial gain. For voluntary and corporate providers,
losing an NHS contract was undesirable but not fatal (Shire, Metroland).
The shift towards lower, ‘best-practice’ tariff prices began only at the end of the study period, as did
the introduction of mental health tariffs and (in some places but not our study sites) experimental
‘year-of-care’ (in effect, capitation) payments. In our two study sites where they had been trialled, personal
health budgets had so far had little perceptible effect:
I don’t know anything about them.
Commissioner, Metroland
Shire PCT was still ‘investigating the use’ of personal health budgets for brain injury patients (PCT
commissioning manager, Metroland).
Provider competition
Provider competition was the medium of power about which the most cross-sectional data were available.
Preliminary examination (see Table 21, Appendix 4) showed that spending on independent-sector providers
correlated negatively with spending on local authority and voluntary-sector providers, consistent with the
interpretation that some PCTs used local authority and voluntary-sector provision, and others used
independent-sector provision, in response to hospital overload; and that these two options were to some
extent alternatives.
Given our data, the theoretical maximum numbers of correlations, with the sign as predicted, that might
be found between measures of competition and of policy outcomes were:
1. provider competition, generically: 1 measure (HHI) × 16 service outcomes= 16 possible correlations
2. population-based competitive bidding: 4 measures × 16 service outcomes= 64 possible correlations.
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Ignoring negligibly small ones, 3 of the 16 possible predicted correlations between HHI and the selected
service outcomes were found (see Table 24, Appendix 7). HHI correlated as predicted with:
1. amenable mortality rate, all causes, under-75-year-olds, directly standardised
2. monthly mean waiting list, in-patient and day cases, proportionate to weighted population (but this
correlation was weak)
3. finished consultant episodes (FCEs) proportionate to weighted population.
Twelve of the other 13 predicted correlations between HHI and the policy-relevant service outcomes were
not found. The remaining correlation, between HHI and percentage change in the proportion of all
non-admitted patients waiting less than 18 weeks for planned treatment, was in the opposite direction
from predicted. The following service outcomes were more strongly associated with a control variable, the
PCT Deprivation Index, than with HHI:
1. change in emergency admission for primary care preventable chronic conditions
2. change in emergency admission for primary care preventable acute conditions
3. ratio of observed to expected emergency admissions for conditions not usually requiring
hospital admission
4. mean time waited
5. ratio of day cases to admissions
6. average length of stay.
Primary care trust income per capita was more strongly associated with PCT budgetary surplus or deficit
than was HHI.
Conceivably, though, gross patterns of association between a generic measure of competition (HHI) and
the service outcomes might mask more nuanced associations. We therefore repeated the analysis,
replacing HHI in turn with each of the four variables indicating the extent of possible provider competition
under population-based commissioning. Of 64 possible correlations, we found four, all with the opposite
sign from what the programme theory assumed (see Table 25, Appendix 4). Since the other possible
associations were either negligible or absent, it appears that, under population-based commissioning, less
concentrated provision of secondary care was not associated with ‘better’ performance on the service
outcomes that we considered. Again, control variables (especially deprivation) were more often associated
with the service outcomes than were those reflecting the extent of provider competition.
This evidence therefore seems mostly against the assumption that provider competition has helped PCTs
realise the service outcomes studied. Advocates of competition might reply that these findings occur because
NHS organisations are half-hearted about competition, or because a single provider dominates most local
NHS health economies. We therefore repeated the analyses for PCTs with the lowest supply-side market
concentration only. For PCTs with the lowest quartile of HHI scores, two more correlations with the predicted
sign emerged but the previously found correlation between HHI and FCEs proportionate to weighted
population disappeared. Thus 4 of the 16 theoretically possible correlations were as predicted (see Table 27,
Appendix 4). The findings suggested that less concentrated hospital provision may be associated with
‘improved’ (reduced) unplanned admissions for conditions sensitive to primary and to ambulatory care; but
to complicate matters these patterns probably reflect primary care activity besides hospital competition.
We also examined whether the correlation between HHI and waiting lists might reflect PCTs’ use of
independent-sector hospitals. For the quartile of PCTs with lowest HHI scores, the correlations between the
same service outcome measures and PCT spending on independent-sector providers had the opposite sign
from that predicted by the programme theory for mean time waited, for average number of patients waiting
more than 4 weeks for a first outpatient appointment (proportionate to weighted population) and for
inpatient and day-case waiting list (proportionate to population; see Table 28, Appendix 4). These findings
appear to suggest, if anything, that PCTs facing the greatest waiting-list challenges responded by buying
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independent-sector services. However, PCT spending on independent-sector providers did correlate
(with the predicted sign) with the improvement compared with the previous year in:
1. percentages of unplanned hospitalisation for chronic ambulatory care sensitive conditions
2. primary care preventable acute conditions
3. emergency readmissions within 28 days of discharge from hospital
4. admitted patients waiting less than 18 weeks from referral to treatment
5. non-admitted patients.
The findings are also consistent with the hypothesis that PCTs that faced the greatest waiting-list
challenges were also those where recently discharged patients and those with primary care preventable
conditions were less likely to be admitted to hospital via ED. The contrast between these findings and
those regarding HHI reflects the non-correlation between HHI and spending on independent-sector
providers (r= –0.0508, p= 0.534). Thus 5 of the 16 possible predicted correlations between spending on
independent-sector providers and the service outcome measures were found. Again, the service outcomes
studied correlated more often with the controls than with the measures of competition or the use of
independent providers.
While the above analyses included the four most obvious possible confounders of the above relationships
between provider competition and service outcomes, further research may reveal others. These
controversial subjects sometimes provoke objections248 that the researchers selected outcomes likely to
produce findings supporting their policy preferences. We minimised that risk by analysing multiple
outcomes, and some of the outcome measures we used were sensitive to competition; but since our
analysis was limited to published data it remains conceivable that yet further outcomes would be more
sensitive to competition. Analyses of the relationships between competition and quality are sensitive to the
way market size and London factors are entered into the analysis.163 The present analysis may corroborate
that finding: it defines market size as PCT size and did not adjust for London factors. More important,
things may have changed since 2009. For one thing, the policy (in 2009) of regarding NHS trusts as
preferred providers was supplanted in 2010 by the Any Willing/Qualified Provider policy. Further research
to test whether or not that is so will be required when later data are published.
Our case studies did find some evidence of commissioners using provider contestability as a means of
control. Porttown PCT opened negotiations with private nursing companies in case the community health
services trust proved unwilling to meet the PCT’s service specification, and decommissioned its wheelchair
provider. Metroland commissioners used similar threats to reduce the cost of care packages by 20%. Shire
PCT found itself new providers for talking therapies, diagnostics and primary care ophthalmology services.
However, Milltown used only the alternative secondary care providers (i.e. the ISTC) imposed on them by
higher-level NHS management. Like others,249 we found that provider competition occurred mostly for
specific care groups and among small community health service providers, although not, in our study sites,
only at their geographical margins.
Existing providers were often the only credible bidder. PCTs had usually (including all our study sites)
transferred their community health services en bloc either to the existing, near-monopoly mental health
or hospital trust, or to a single dedicated NHS trust or a single social enterprise (Porttown, Surrey). The
selection criteria in the London Health Programme’s ‘competition’ for hyper-acute stroke centre contracts
included having certain numbers of suitably qualified consultants already available. Pharmacy provision of
vascular risk checks was ruled out a priori in Porttown. In Shire the criteria for provider selection included
provider experience and relationship with the local health community. Sometimes the third sector also
contained only one credible bidder: for Shire memory services, the Alzheimer’s Society.
Metroland and Shire allocated emergency work in certain specialities to one hospital and elective work
to another. Whether or not a cartel was intended, there were also volume, hence quality and safety,
arguments for concentrating these clinical activities. Shire hospitals, we were told, also had informal
NHS COMMISSIONING PRACTICE AND GOVERNANCE OVER HEALTH ECONOMIES
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
54
agreements about not ‘poaching’ each other’s orthopaedic work. London had 10 mental health trusts
but they did not compete. In Milltown, services designated as ‘pilot projects’ were exempt from
competitive tendering.
We found two contrasting approaches to competition between NHS trusts and ISTCs. It was more
common to make ISTCs subcontractors of an NHS acute trust (Shire, Metroland, Milltown), with Metroland
PCT initially requiring two of its NHS hospitals to refer a percentage of patients onwards to a selected
ISTC. Porttown, however, set up head-to-head competition between its NHS trust and an ISTC and, as a
demonstration of intent to the local hospital trust, used its ISTC contract to the full. Other studies show
that some165 but not all246 other PCTs also did this. The prospect of losing income to competitors made
NHS trusts negotiate more constructively with their commissioners about service changes, for instance in
audiology (Shire), ophthalmology and orthopaedics (Porttown).
Consultants’ conflict of interest over private work, reported nearly 20 years ago,250 was still evident. The
Porttown ISTC employed its own consultants. Its manager claimed that, insofar as NHS consultants could,
through their links with the referral management scheme, influence what choices GPs offered patients,
they encouraged referrals to the other local private hospital, where they practised privately. The manager
of the large private hospital in Metroland had
an agreement with the [NHS] trust that if they have a consultant who deliberately seems to be keeping
their clinic to a minimum so that it will default to the private sector the trust will ring me so that the
consultant doesn’t benefit from this behaviour.
Corporate hospital manager, Metroland
She ‘wanted to nip that problem in the bud’ in order to build a strong relationship with the PCT and not
endanger her firm’s reputation for probity. Nevertheless, it was not in her hospital’s commercial interest to
help the NHS reduce waiting times to the same as those for private hospitals, because that would be a
disincentive for patients to buy health insurance and use private hospitals. Consultants using her hospital
had the same incentive and would switch patients to other private hospitals if hers appeared to give NHS
patients the same access as private patients. Tariff payments were lower than the premium prices once
paid to private hospitals, which risked having to pay any costs above tariff level. Some Metroland GPs
formed surgical provider groups, sometimes with consultants as members, and were commissioned by the
PCT; a US study suggests that such hospitals stimulate demand for complex procedures.251 Shire PCT found
it harder to ensure uniform pathways across independent-sector providers than across NHS acute trusts.
NHS trust clinicians were also under managerial pressure to meet NHS waiting-time targets; corporate
providers were not. Private mental health services were mainly provided by the third sector, including a
service user group (Metroland) and in Milltown a social enterprise involving leading commissioning GPs.
Attributing impacts to provider competition is not straightforward. After the ISTC opened, ALoS for
orthopaedic patients in Porttown fell from eight days to four, the combined effect of competition and
extra capacity. After hyper-acute stroke services were established in London, stroke mortality fell by
50% but in this case ‘provider substitution’ meant replacing existing treatments with evidence-based
alternatives, not provider competition.
As case studies we selected PCTs both with and without multiple hospitals. Like others147,160 we initially
equated multiple providers with ‘possible’ provider competition. Our case study findings undermine that
assumption. Citing patient reluctance to travel152,252 and difficulty in influencing GP behaviour, the two
case study commissioners (Metroland, Milltown) in large conurbations with many other hospitals nearby
did not regard hospital competition as feasible or desirable, Milltown describing itself as ‘landlocked’.
Metroland commissioners argued that patients prefer going to their local hospital or mental health service.
Shire had three hospitals plus a teaching hospital just over its boundary, but still made the case-load
allocations reported above. ‘Possible’ competition was not actual competition. Only Porttown stimulated
head-to-head hospital competition, but having no other NHS hospital within or near its boundaries,
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competition there was between the NHS trust, a small private hospital and the ISTC. Even so, Porttown
commissioners felt that they had limited competitive leverage over their local foundation trust:
Commissioning is about a power struggle between clout of PCTs and a hospital that will never close.
General practitioner, Porttown
Juridical controls
The standard DH contracts were used everywhere, but they accommodated local variation and their
mandatory contents varied by care group. However, they specified only service volumes, not service design,
case mix, clinical pathways or (until late in the study period) feedback of monitoring information. Mostly
the same contract framework and terms were used for all providers, except that independent providers
were always paid the normal HRG tariff (Shire). Additional local performance requirements reflected any
local operating framework, health needs assessment (e.g. in Shire) and local agreements about care
pathway changes (Metroland). DH control over contract formulation relaxed towards the end of the
study period, putting PCTs in a stronger negotiating position by giving them more negotiating latitude
about, say, how the 18-week waiting target would be met (Porttown). Some local authority contracts
(e.g. in Shire) were for as long as 25 years, making them difficult to terminate early. At the opposite
extreme, Porttown awarded annual contracts, creating uncertainty for providers. Community and mental
health service contracts were less complete than hospital contracts. Provider non-compliance was initially
dealt with by informal discussion. For instance, when a private diagnostics company in Porttown ignored
written notice that it had breached its contractual obligation to obtain PCT approval before directly
marketing its services to GPs, the next stage was to involve the PCT board, placing the matter in the
public domain with possible adverse media coverage for the provider.
More complete contracts made service provision less flexible. Providers became reluctant to do work
(e.g. diagnostic tests in Metroland, laparoscopic hernia repairs in Shire) off contract. CHS providers in
Porttown complained that the PCT criticised them for not delivering activities that were not stated in the
contract. Commissioners were reluctant to pay for off-contract treatments (even when a consultant had
already offered to treat the patient), including novel procedures for which no tariff existed (both in Shire).
Informants readily cited local authority standing orders, EU regulations and DH Cooperation and
Competition Panel requirements for competitive tendering. Many believed that the DH contestability
framework generally permitted PCT collaboration with one provider.
Care Quality Commission (CQC) investigations could also trigger service reconfigurations independently of
local commissioners. A CQC enquiry closed one ED and transferred maternity services to another hospital,
irrespective of Metroland PCT’s hospital contracts. Adverse CQC reports compelled Porttown PCT to
decommission an inpatient learning disability service. Similarly, Monitor imposed its own requirements on
providers irrespective of their contracts with commissioners. In response to a financial crisis, Monitor
replaced the entire management team in a Shire hospital, which the PCT took as opportunity to make
a fresh start in working with its replacement.
In summary, the reconfiguration of commissioning structures (see Chapter 6) was resulting in the negotiated
order between commissioners and providers evolving gradually from a predominantly manager-to-manager
regime to one with a greater medical admixture. The discourse used in these negotiations correspondingly
became somewhat more medicalised. Medical involvement appeared if anything to reduce the weight
that commissioners gave to provider competition. The financial incentive regime changed little, being
anyway partly beyond commissioners’ control, and juridical control over providers remained marginal.
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Chapter 8 Commissioners’ room for manoeuvre
Policy statements about NHS commissioning, and the underlying programme theory, assumed thatcommissioners would have room for manoeuvre to adapt their commissioning activity, hence service
provision, to local circumstances and health-care needs, and to local GPs’ and patients’ preferences.
A subdivision of RQ3 was therefore to ask how wide this room was during 2010–12. Drawing on our case
studies and secondary sources, we found that commissioners had limited room for manoeuvre both
‘vertically’ (freedom from central control) and ‘horizontally’ (latitude to innovate, experiment and
take risks).253
Certain limits on commissioners’ room for manoeuvre were practically irremovable for commissioners.
Paradoxically, as commissioners in Milltown pointed out, evidence-based medicine was one. During the
study period, evidence-based guidance and service specifications were becoming more numerous,
comprehensive and specific. However, in return for this constraint, commissioners gained increased
transparency of providers’ practice and of the quality, safety and outcomes of the commissioned services.29,123
Like many researchers,27,160,252,254,255 our study site commissioners assumed that patients would not travel to
‘non-local’ providers. Consequently, and because of the physical concentration of hospital services over
many years, most PCTs relied on one hospital for about two-thirds of their secondary care. In our
case study sites, secondary mental health and community health services provision were similarly
concentrated. Metroland and Milltown commissioners knew that the pattern of their unplanned ED
admissions also reflected patients’ proximity to (or distance from) a hospital. These conditions limited a
priori the scope for provider competition. As commissioners saw it, they also made it imperative not to
destabilise these main providers. Two areas in which provider competition was nevertheless feasible were
for low- to medium-complexity planned secondary care (competition between NHS trusts and private
hospitals) and for certain types of community care and mental health services, for which small private- and
third-sector providers sometimes competed.
Other constraints were theoretically more tractable, but not for commissioners. National policy and
guidance rather narrowly defined commissioners’ latitude about what services to commission. As others
report,256 mental health commissioning was described as:
driven by national ‘must dos’ so you didn’t need to think about it or interpret it.
Mental health commissioner, Metroland
This has most recently referred to national dementia strategy. National policy and guidance also stated
how commissioners should select providers and which providers to consider. Shire hospitals tried to turn
this requirement on its head, challenging a decision to tender community dermatology and endoscopy
services because they were outside the national mandate for tendering. The tariff system had
competition-inhibiting implications for private hospitals. One in Metroland – part of a national
chain – found that tariff payments decreased its capacity to offer alternatives to NHS provision because
the company knew that its overhead costs were higher than in NHS hospitals. The CQUIN and QOF
payment systems allowed commissioners a certain discretion in setting provider incentives, but in practice
higher NHS management largely decided what behaviours or targets would be rewarded or penalised.
SHAs also directed both commissioners and providers. So far as Metroland was concerned, their main
interest seemed to be in securing Foundation Trust (FT) status for the NHS trusts; in Porttown, reducing the
main hospital’s deficit. Porttown and Milltown commissioners said they faced inconsistent demands from
the SHA, PCT cluster and DH. Shire commissioner managers perceived their chief executive as feeling
accountable above all to elected representatives and the DH for the use of public funds, which sometimes
justified making decisions that other local organisations might not like. Milltown PCT had experienced
public opposition to some of its decisions, but did not change them. However, the medical director of one
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Shire hospital argued that the other side of this coin was that PCTs shrank from making decisions, for fear
of public opinion and of the local MP getting involved.
National cost-control imperatives exacerbated conflicts of interest between commissioners and NHS trusts,
which protracted negotiations and micro-commissioning discussions, and constrained the extent to which
service provision could be reconfigured or depart from historical funding patterns. Some GPs were
uninterested in participating in commissioning and, a greater constraint on commissioning, were not
amenable to changing their referral habits, referral screening notwithstanding. The staff turnover and
overload reported above also limited commissioners’ room for manoeuvre. In theory there was no
obstacle – except the cap on commissioning management costs – to commissioners engaging external
expert help in writing service specifications and monitoring providers, but they seldom did.
Nevertheless, our case study data and commissioning practice in the case study sites together suggested
that the above conditions left commissioners with room for manoeuvre in:
l prioritising which care groups to concentrate on
l allocating any additional money that did become available
l what commissioning support to use
l which GPs, consultants and others to involve in commissioning negotiations
l how to redesign or respecify services through micro-commissioning
l collecting local evidence about services and their effects
l bundling tariff payments
l using the elements of QIPP, QOF and other payments that were at their discretion
l how they filled out the national contract framework
l how far beyond the legal requirements they took competitive procurement
l how far they used contestability or discretionary payments to incentivise providers
l ways of collaborating with local government and/or GPs on admission-reduction projects.
In sum, commissioners’ vertical room for manoeuvre remained narrow. Their horizontal room for
manoeuvre was becoming narrower in some ways (having to accommodate local government and GP
requirements) but wider in others (possibility of new providers, development of micro-commissioning).
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Chapter 9 Distributed commissioning
During 2010–12 there were three main types of distributed commissioning:
1. for about 15% of contracts,128 one PCT (later, CCG) ‘lead’ commissioner commissioning a provider on
behalf of all commissioners whose residents the provider treated
2. joint NHS and local authority commissioning of the same provider(s)
3. ‘client-based’ commission, effected through the tariff system and personal budget pilot schemes.
Our findings on these points come from the case studies and (to a lesser extent) the
cross-sectional analysis.
The lead commissioner approach
In our study sites the nearest PCT or the one sending most patients to the jointly commissioned provider
acted as lead commissioner (Shire, Porttown). This happened:
1. For very small care groups (e.g. certain ophthalmological treatments in Metroland, assisted conception
in Shire).
2. In dealing with large teaching hospitals in conurbations. Thus Metroland was an associate commissioner
for one of the largest London teaching hospitals (‘it’s a Goliath . . . we are small’) and lead
commissioner for a smaller one.
3. For larger but evenly dispersed care groups. Thus Porttown PCT was lead commissioner for orthopaedic
work for its ISTC on behalf also of three neighbouring PCTs. Before 2010, London PCTs with the same
local acute or mental health provider also commissioned them jointly.
Lead commissioning required the associate commissioners to trust the lead commissioner to uphold their
interests. Thus, commissioners sending just a few patients to a third-sector provider did not bother
attending monitoring meetings because they trusted Porttown as lead commissioner to uphold their
interests. Metroland subscribed to a distributed commissioning arrangement in which the lead role
rotated between PCTs. PbR also promoted financial transparency, hence trust, between collaborating
commissioners. Porttown and fellow commissioners began sharing information about service redesign.
Metroland and its three cocommissioning PCTs produced a common commissioning strategy that led in
turn to more standardised models of care (e.g. similar home treatment teams for people with dementia),
standardised contracts and cost savings (e.g. through sharing older people’s home treatment teams across
two PCTs). Shire resolved its disagreement with a neighbouring PCT about access criteria to assisted
conception services.
However, commissioning was sometimes only partly standardised and pooled. Even in Metroland, each
partner-commissioner also had separate meetings with the mental and community health service trusts
about clinical change, information, finance and performance management. Initially each PCT negotiated
service volume and costs independently of the other PCTs. Indeed, the mental health trust asked each PCT
to keep the details secret lest other PCTs demand the same. After PCTs were clustered, they became more
open with each other about such matters.
When different commissioners’ financial or service requirements were too diverse, lead commissioner
arrangements broke down. Metroland PCT discovered that a lead commissioner without financial problems
was likely to be more financially generous to providers than its less wealthy associate commissioners
wanted. Metroland PCT eventually withdrew from jointly commissioning a cardiac service because it felt it
could not influence, and hence could not gain much from, lead commissioner arrangements. Shire PCT
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disengaged from a lead commissioning arrangement that did not give it sufficient clarity about its financial
commitment and risks. Discrepant fees for different PCTs’ patients led Porttown PCT to disaggregate the
commissioning of the small but sole available provider of eating disorder services. Other disputes between
lead and associate commissioners arose because, reflecting their populations’ different needs, they
wanted different methods for approving changes to services and decisions about individual patients’
care pathways. Shire PCT withdrew from a dispersed commissioning arrangement because the lead
commissioner had unilaterally decided not to stipulate distinct contract terms for Shire patients.
Detaching from a lead commissioning group at times enabled a commissioner to negotiate better terms.
When Metroland began commissioning a large teaching hospital directly, it had to pay more attention to
and take a stronger role in negotiating with it, obtaining more favourable terms for managing the financial
risks of referrals of severely ill patients. Similarly, by negotiating independently, Shire made more flexible
contracts with its providers.
While commissioning power was concentrated by having a single lead commissioner for a specialty or
condition, the consequences of the lead commissioner model of distributed commissioning still depended
on how convergent the different commissioners’ interests were. When they differed substantially,
commissioners responded by reverting to separate commissioning. Otherwise, they responded with more
standardised service specifications and contracts, gaining countervailing power in dealing with large, even
merged, providers.
Joint local authority–NHS commissioning
In our study sites, joint NHS and local authority commissioning was ‘joined at the top’ (p. 21):257 more
collaborative at higher (strategic, planning, governance) levels than at the operational level of dealing with
service providers.
NHS and local authority commissioning strategies were often coordinated through reciprocal membership
of each other’s working committees. Metroland had borough-wide commissioning groups with local
authority members, primary care representatives and one patient representative. There was also a Health
and Social Care Liaison group, but its only governance function was to manage Section 75 agreements,
so the NHS bodies regarded it as a consultative mechanism. Porttown PCT included a local authority
representative in its QIPP monitoring meetings. A psychiatrist from the mental health trust and the CCG’s
mental health lead GP contributed to local authority commissioning of mental health services. Local
authorities and NHS commissioners consulted quite widely about their joint commissioning objectives.
Metroland public health leads made a ‘concordat’ and a Joint Strategic Needs Assessment, focusing on
reducing health inequalities, which became the basis of a joint commissioning plan. In Shire a joint
commissioning board agreed on collaborative work programmes, including hospital discharge
management and preventing orthopaedics admissions, although that did not lead to any concrete
commissioning decisions. Shire Health Scrutiny Committee still interpreted its role as approving significant
variations in NHS services, so one of the Shire hospitals appealed against the commissioners’ proposals for
competitively tendering community dermatology and endoscopy services. A local strategic partnership in
Porttown aimed its public health priorities at the most deprived areas with poor health outcomes and at
leisure, weight management and smoking cessation. The partners intended this work to inform joint
commissioning plans. In practice, though, it had little influence on services to reduce childhood obesity or
the licensing of fast food and alcohol outlets, although they did jointly commission stroke services.
At a strategic level, commissioning was more often a joint activity for community and mental health than
other services. Metroland, Porttown and Shire were already jointly commissioning mental health services
(since 1999 in Shire). Metroland and Shire both used Section 256 funds to help finance local authority
re-ablement services and in Metroland falls prevention, re-ablement, home support, crisis intervention and
home treatment services. The NHS and local authority jointly revised the corresponding care pathways
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and cofunded health crisis-intervention teams in Metroland, learning difficulties services and voluntary
organisations’ memory adviser services in Shire. Shire social care, community hospitals, rehabilitation
services and interface (GPSI) services were jointly commissioned, as was the mental health ‘floating’
support service in Porttown. Shire council also contributed to implementing clinical commissioning
programmes for stroke, CHD and diabetes.
Being implemented through separate line-management structures, the operational work of provider
negotiations, procurement and monitoring were more distinct, reflecting the differences between NHS
and local authority regulatory and accountability regimes, financial and planning cycles, and whether local
politicians were directly involved. NHS commissioners had larger budgets (for instance £25M vs. £2M for
mental health in Shire), but local authorities had more experience of provider competition, commissioning
private providers and involving service users in assessing tenders. The nearer to operational level one came,
the greater these differences, hence the difficulty co-ordinating the different commissioners and through
them the providers. PCT commissioning in Shire was organised by localities, which were coterminous with
those of the local authority, but the intermediate care teams commissioned by either organisation were still
resourced differently. Ill-defined boundaries between health and social care for, say, re-ablement (NHS)
and rehabilitation (local authority) were reported to create commissioning overlaps and duplication.
Thinking that trying to pool budgets would cause long delays in commissioning or changing services, local
government and NHS commissioners in Shire chose instead to move towards colocation and then full
integration of services. They were jointly developing specifications for integrated services, but had not yet
commissioned any when our fieldwork finished. Although Porttown council and PCT agreed about mental
health service development, their agreement was not translated into combined (mental health) service
delivery teams or shared IT systems. In Metroland, both health and social care commissioners saw their role
as keeping people out of hospital, but a lot of the real decision-making occurred at senior level in health
and social care commissioners separately, ‘so that’s where things start to come apart’. Measuring health
and other service outcomes was a new activity for many local authority staff, who discovered that many
relevant outcomes (e.g. quality of life) are complex and hard to measure. Metroland borough therefore
used falls outcome measures developed by the NHS commissioning support organisation, and some developed
for the DH national outcomes framework, collecting its own data (e.g. on older people’s experiences of care
homes) to populate them.
To mitigate these differences, NHS and local authority managers at both commissioner and provider levels
set up informal, network-like working arrangements. Metroland managers set up an intermediate care
partnership without seeking formal Section 75 status for it. Shire PCT and local authority informally agreed
not to divert their budgets to other uses without consulting each other.
Nevertheless, points of friction between local authority and NHS managers remained, impeding
joint commissioning.
1. Differences in priorities reflected the different accountabilities of NHS managers and local government
managers, and, still more, councillors:
[T]he big difference is in culture between the NHS and its way of working and local council and its
way of working . . . the members of the council are elected members and . . . the NHS is a very
different way of working. And, I think there’s going to be, you know, lots of work, as we go
forwards, around that culture because it’s just the culture changes will need to happen.
Local authority manager, Metroland
Metroland council found shifting from health-care scrutiny to commissioning partnership a big cultural
change. Porttown informants reported deep-rooted differences between elected councillors’, PCT
managers’ and CCG members’ priorities, so that joint commissioning requirements could not be
agreed, nor joint action taken. TCS and QIPP had made NHS–local authority relationships more ‘spiky’
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(GP, Porttown). Different local authority and NHS managerial cultures were also reported in Shire. There
especially, the local authority was service provider as well as commissioner, which our NHS informants
saw as a conflict of interest.
2. Reconfiguration of NHS commissioners meant that they were no longer coterminous with local
authorities. Metroland and Milltown CCGs were coterminous with a borough, but the central support
organisation (for commissioners) for Metroland covered eight boroughs, which our informants feared
might be hard to reconcile with the council’s wish to focus on local needs and services. When the
shadow Shire CCG replaced locality-based PECs, it was coterminous with the county council instead of
with several second-tier local authorities. Porttown PCT became part of a CCG locality coterminous with
several councils, not just the city council.
3. One party to an agreement unilaterally changed commissioning arrangements and/or services. In
Porttown the council established a single point of entry to mental health services, onto which the PCT
could not easily map its service-commissioning methods. Metroland borough unilaterally cut £250,000
from mental health contract funding, leaving the PCT to pay for services that the PCT considered
should be local authority funded. The PCT’s quick response to news of proposed local authority budget
changes pre-empted similar unilateral reductions in Shire.
4. Clinicians were sceptical about whether or not local authorities would commission better services than
themselves. For this reason, Porttown GPs were reluctant to publish a tender for mental health services,
believing it would precipitate a city council ‘takeover’. The mental health trust was equally sceptical, but
still thought it had a better working relationship with the council than with the CCG. In Shire the PCT,
local authorities and clinicians had wide-ranging disagreements about strategy, priorities, service
specifications and commissioning intentions for mental health services.
5. There were divergent interests and priorities for secondary care, for instance over priorities for
disinvesting from inpatient services in Porttown.
The transferred public health activities and staff were the least connected. In Metroland, the role of the
public health department was described as primarily strategic, delegating the implementation of its plans
to others (disappointing the local authority’s initial hopes that public health staff transferred to it would
have implementation experience or expertise), in contrast to Porttown, where the city council delegated
the commissioning of drug services to its new public health department. In Shire, a still more silo-like
relationship persisted, with public health apparently operating almost (but not completely) in isolation.
During our fieldwork Health and Well-Being Boards were still being set up and did not ‘go live’ until late in
the study period.
Distributed commissioning involved a negotiated order between commissioners, supplementing the other
negotiated orders reported in Chapters 6 and 8. In theory, collaborating commissioners disposed of
stronger financial incentives and greater ability to exploit provider competition, but they did not make
obviously greater use of either than non-collaborating commissioners did. In joint local authority–NHS
commissioning, differences in the discourses that the two kinds of commissioner used in dealing with
providers were also apparent. Juridical controls remained marginal.
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Client-based commissioning
We defined ‘client-based commissioning’ as specifying and paying for services on the basis of each episode
of care for each individual patient (tariff payments, personal health budgets). Chapter 7 reports our main
findings about tariff payments in England during 2010–12. As an initial exploration of whether or not
service outcomes were associated with provider competition under client-based commissioning rather
than population-based commissioning, we repeated the cross-sectional analysis, testing for associations
between our 16 available policy outcome data sets and the three indicators showing the extent of provider
competition in terms of client-based commissioning. Of the 48 predicted possible correlations only 1 was
found (see Table 26, Appendix 4). The presence of a personal budget pilot scheme was associated with an
increase in patients being treated within the 18-week target, but the association was weak. Otherwise the
associations had the wrong sign, or were negligible or absent. Once again, the control variables were more
often, and in this case also more strongly, associated with the service outcomes studied.
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Chapter 10 Providers’ responses
Our case studies suggested that, in ascending order of difficulty that they posed for commissioners,providers’ responses to commissioners’ proposals during 2010–12 ranged from negotiated agreement,
through inability to respond, to unwillingness, even resistance.
Negotiated agreement
NHS trusts’ responses to commissioners’ demands were never exclusively protectionist. They sometimes
made alternative proposals for achieving results that the commissioners also wanted or, at least, were
compatible with the commissioner’s priorities. Shire and Metroland hospitals were content to divert
patients away provided the necessary alternative community and (social) care was available. Discussions at
Metroland solved the problem of how to treat mental health patients who turned up at the ED in the
absence of a 24/7 mental health service. Clearly specified, ‘micro-commissioned’ care pathways and
common clinical interests were often enough to make providers respond constructively to commissioners’
proposals, especially if additional payment was also available.
Providers’ ability to respond
Even when provider managers agreed with a commissioner about what should be done, they might still be
unable to implement their side of the bargain, for instance if consultants were unenthusiastic. In practice,
pathway changes and bed reductions could not be made without clinician involvement. Shire hospital
informants in particular explained that the hospitals’ ‘corporate’ view was that of the senior managers and
consultants who dealt with the PCT, not necessarily that of other hospital staff. Repetitive discussions in
Porttown care pathway groups led PCT representatives to doubt if the commissioners’ proposals were
‘getting back to’ hospital consultants (commissioning manager, Porttown). Consultants’ traditional
autonomy from management worked against such involvement. In one Shire hospital especially, the
consultants had customarily had a free rein to the extent of agreeing activity changes with the PCT
without senior management approval. Milltown consultants took legal advice about who was responsible
for the safety of patients triaged away from the ED, until their medical director persuaded them that this
was a non-problem. In Porttown community services, consultants, psychologists and psychotherapists were
reported to be very powerful, and managerial leadership weak, to the extent of its chief executive asking
the PCT’s negotiator:
how he could bring about transformation in his organisation, which didn’t inspire hope in me I have
to say.
Commissioning manager, Porttown
In a Metroland hospital, distrust between hospital managers and consultants had reached the point where
a consultant believed:
Just about the time I started here, or just before, they shut the consultant common room because they
were concerned that the consultants were using it to meet and plan the downfall of the executive,
literally, at least that’s the story . . . you know, the agendas of consultants are not always the same as
those of an executive board.
Surgeon, Metroland
Consultants were consulted about commissioning activity and ‘what we are required to deliver’
(hospital manager, Metroland), but not about curtailing or cutting services.
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We found no evidence that NHS trust managers responded to other trusts, commissioners or private
providers predominantly by developing competitive strategies, even when (as in Porttown and Shire) they
knew that national policy favoured competition and there were ISTCs nearby. Rather, as indicated above,
they tended towards more collusive, negotiative strategies (often with tacit commissioner endorsement) to
circumvent competition.
Providers’ willingness to respond
A minor though common irritant to providers was commissioners’ demands for detailed information,
which providers thought was clinically uninformative, ill chosen or not used once provided. When these
requests became vexatious, one of the Shire hospitals merely ignored them. Provider-side informants
sometimes interpreted the ideology of a ‘purchaser–provider split’ as endorsing their separation and
independence from commissioners. Metroland trusts, we were told, had historically been quite inwardly
focused and saw little need to engage with commissioner requirements. Personality clashes [such as the
‘massively adversarial’ relationship between commissioner and hospital chief executives in Porttown
(GP, Porttown)] were another exacerbation.
When providers disagreed with commissioner suggestions for restructuring service provision, one response
was to make incompatible counterproposals, as has been found elsewhere.258 A Shire hospital proposed
discarding services that it did not want to provide (surgery in community hospitals), protecting existing
services (e.g. endoscopy) against provision by alternative providers (GPs in this case) and expanding other
services. Especially when commissioner budgets were tight, some commissioner demands were simply not
in the provider’s interest:
We call them efficiencies and to some extent they are but they are also service cuts, there’s no two
ways about that, and it’s then you go from collaboration to confrontation.
Commissioning manager, Metroland
Shire commissioners were aware that they faced strong providers whose interests lay in maximising income
and whose culture was that they, not commissioners, should determine service provision. Even after the
medical director and consultants in one Shire hospital had agreed to reduce their high rates of cardiology
intervention, hospital managers stopped them because of the financial implications. In Metroland, private
care providers sought higher profit levels than the local authority was prepared to fund. Despite engaging
in micro-commissioning, some providers (e.g. in Porttown) complained of being unable to influence
commissioners. Indeed, the action research participants reported initial resistance by the providers to closer
working between community and secondary care services.
When conflicts of interests became palpable, providers might, first, try to force the commissioners’ hand.
As reported above, Metroland hospital reneged on its agreement to reduce its case load by 20%,
knowing that PbR and AQP rules obliged commissioners to meet the costs anyway. This hospital also
made unilateral changes to services (e.g. rapid-access nurse-led pain clinics, arrhythmia clinics) and then
expected the commissioner’s post facto endorsement and funding. The main Porttown hospital unilaterally
reconfigured stroke services to seek better integration with other providers. The smallest of three Shire
hospitals threatened to withdraw its ED service, forcing the PCT to negotiate with another hospital to
transfer the service there. Another hospital unilaterally informed the PCT that it would cease doing spinal
treatments (it was the sole provider), forcing the PCT to retender the work. A third established a foot
surgery department that increased its activity, even though another Shire hospital offered cheaper
bio-mechanical alternatives. When Shire PCT could not afford to pay for additional patients to receive
non-surgical treatment for prostate cancer, the provider obtained charitable funding and continued the
service that way. Such tactics did not always succeed, however. A Metroland consultant raised money to
build a cardiac catheter laboratory, but the commissioners refused to meet the running costs.
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Arbitration between commissioners and providers rarely took place through any juridical process, although
Milltown had agreed formal procedures for negotiating and resolving disputes. More often hospitals in
Shire, Porttown and Metroland attempted to go over commissioners’ heads by asking the SHA to overturn
agreements with the commissioner. The SHA could impose its preferred solution because it could sack
both the provider and the commissioner chief executives if they did not implement it. Similar patterns are
reported elsewhere.39 At times SHA interventions weakened the commissioner’s bargaining position, for
instance by imposing on the commissioner – but not providers – a deadline for agreeing contracts.
[Porttown] hospital has always won partly because the SHA undermined the PCT by covertly
subsidising [the hospital]’s poor financial problem.
General practitioner, Porttown
However, another SHA refused to do that for the main Metroland hospital.
The commonest response on either side, though, was inertia: the often-reported phenomenon of
seemingly endless, unproductive negotiations, even when much joint effort had been put into developing
service plans, for example when it was proposed to cut services or change CQUIN payments (Metroland).
As an extreme case, the only tangible outcomes of 10 years’ negotiation about ED services in Shire were a
patient leaflet explaining the different purposes of EDs and GPs, and training care home staff not to
telephone 999 but to use other providers. Especially if there were funding implications (e.g. when setting
up an urgent care centre in Metroland), a negotiated agreement often had to be referred back to higher
managers on either side, who might not endorse it. NHS providers were not necessarily enthusiastic about
acting as autonomous public firms.253 Corporate providers also had their moments of inertia (e.g. when
Metroland PCT tried to renegotiate better terms and when Porttown tried to improve private hospital
compliance with the 18-week wait target). Their culture of separation from NHS commissioners naturally
ran deeper than in NHS trusts.
In a situation of mutual dependence, a commissioner with only one provider to hand might alternatively
capitulate. Thus, Metroland PCT was forced to renegotiate its unrealisable admissions plans partway
through the financial year. In the face of consultant opposition, Shire PCT turned down the GP initiatives
mentioned above, which, a GP told us, was typical of the PCT’s tendency to placate and prioritise
secondary care interests. Falling short of capitulation, Milltown commissioners developed a practice of
trying to understand, rather than simply blame, providers whose actions or decisions caused problems for
the commissioner. Indeed, a powerful, financially secure hospital trust could come to see its main
commissioner as barely relevant to its own plans for strategic and service development.
Making providers more helpful
Providers’ responsiveness to commissioners thus reflected the presence or absence, and depth, of any
conflicts of interests between the two. Providers often responded passively, but commissioners could
sometimes rouse them into helpfulness by threatening loss of resources (possibly to a competitor) or
a third party’s intervention. Porttown PCT had difficulty persuading a local hospital to provide wet
age-related macular degeneration treatment as an outpatient service until it threatened to commission
an independent provider. The same PCT discovered that, when the mental health trust felt that it might
be about to lose resources or services, it became more willing to listen to the commissioner. In Milltown
too, the threat of withdrawing the mental health trust’s psychology and rehabilitation service contracts
triggered more constructive negotiations and micro-commissioning. More subtly, the Milltown
commissioner hinted that, if the community health service specification were ‘refreshed’ in the ways
the commissioner wanted, there would be no need to retender the service. In Shire audiology and mental
health services, the threat of losing services (hence income) to other providers made the existing providers’
negotiators become more helpful. The availability of a competing provider was one way to make the
threat of losing funds credible, but not the only way (see Chapter 7, section Provider competition).
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The absence of any existing vested interest also gave the commissioner a free hand, for instance when
remodelling eating disorders and other non-psychotic mental health-care pathways in Porttown.
Soft coercion took the form of claiming that the SHA would intervene – to everyone’s detriment – if no
agreement were reached: a credible threat, as explained above. Shire and Porttown PCTs both argued that
the SHA would reduce budgets if QIPP targets were not reached. National financial targets were used as
an argument to persuade the Porttown hospital to change its activities. In Milltown the lead GP commissioner
represented herself as a ‘buffer’ between GPs and city-level commissioners, representing her own ideas as a
lesser evil than what the city-level commissioners might otherwise do.
Our informants did not dwell upon the potential conflict of interest between GPs as commissioners and
GPs as providers, although national media and the professional press raised this issue at intervals. Our GP
informants who did mention it (e.g. in Metroland) perceived it in terms not of conflict of interest, but of
opportunities for general practice entrepreneurship in developing primary care and substituting for
secondary care, with little sense of any possible juridical or political implications.
PROVIDERS’ RESPONSES
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
68
Chapter 11 Commissioning for specific care
groups
Services for many care groups were commissioned together in the rather generic ways described above.RQ4, concerning commissioning for specific care groups, turned out (our case studies suggested)
to have only a limited empirical application. During 2010–12 only mental health had specialised
commissioners and commissioning, in our study sites as elsewhere. Public health was commissioned with
a very light touch, if that.
Planned orthopaedics
For many of the more common orthopaedic procedures, measures and outcome indicators were
relatively well defined and standardised, as were diagnostic criteria, care pathways, treatment methods
and expected outcomes (although not, we were told, for every treatment, e.g. shoulder surgery).
Our informants reported using PROMs data (mandatory), the National Hip Fracture Database (except
Metroland), ALoS data (NHS Information Centre secondary uses service) and some generic measures
applicable to orthopaedics (e.g. the Patient Environment Appraisal Tool) to compare providers’ activity,
spending and performance and, in Shire, to assess the risks of reducing orthopaedic surgery provision in
order to identify contract priorities. Metroland PCT also monitored hospital infection rates, but reportedly
did not react to them. Shire PCT collected GPs’ reports of patients’ reactions to orthopaedic care, including
patients who subsequently regretted having had ineffective surgery, with a view to introducing
physiotherapy-based advisory services for patients contemplating orthopaedic surgery. For orthopaedics:
[Y]ou can absolutely quantify every stage of that, know what it’s going to be and for 96.4% of the
time that will be exactly what happens and then the rest of it there’ll be a few complications.
Commissioning manager, Porttown
Because planned orthopaedic treatments were mostly rather ‘commodified’ it was relatively easy to
establish criteria for appropriate referrals and to screen GP referrals accordingly, as Shire, Metroland and
Porttown did, in effect making a single point of entry to planned orthopaedic services. Commodification
also facilitated the substitution of one provider for another. Indeed, a corporate hospital in Metroland was
for a time the PCT’s second largest orthopaedics provider. The predictable costs of much orthopaedic
surgery, its high volume and a sufficiently generous tariff meant that:
elective orthopaedics is a money spinner.
Hospital manager, Shire
This applied both for NHS trusts’ ISTCs and for other for-profit providers over a long period.250
Porttown fully used its orthopaedics contract with its ISTC to give the commissioner (and only incidentally
GPs or patients) a choice of provider. Similarly, Shire PCT commissioned three corporate hospitals to do
(mainly) joint replacement so that it could stop paying local NHS trusts extra each spring and summer to
catch up with the orthopaedic work they had cancelled during the winter. In Metroland, though, both
the private hospital and the ISTC were the subcontractors of local NHS trusts, not of the PCT or CCG
(see Chapter 7, section Provider competition). However, corporate providers tended to treat only the less
complex patients [American Society of Anesthetists classification 1 (ASA 1) to the stable end of ASA 3
comorbidity groups] in Porttown and Metroland. While some Shire NHS trust managers would also have
preferred to concentrate on these patients, the consultants favoured a broader, more complex and varied
case load.
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Commissioners did renegotiate care pathway redesign for orthopaedics, but micro-commissioning had
neither the centrality – compared with competition and financial incentives – nor the depth of work found
with two other care groups (mental health and recurrent unplanned admissions). Commissioners thus
controlled providers of ‘commodified’ planned orthopaedic surgery mainly by a combination of discursive
control (evidence-based medicine) and provider competition.
Recurrent unplanned admissions
Commissioners’ efforts to reduce unplanned hospital admissions were impeded by a lack of knowledge of
the categories and causes of these admissions. Shire and Porttown commissioners felt unable to predict
even the direction of change, let alone number, of unplanned admissions in the coming year. Hospital
informants in both sites stated that the underfunding of community services hindered them from
discharging unscheduled patients, but PCT funds were mostly committed to hospital services. Shire GPs
also perceived community services to be insufficient and so for safety referred older people who fell to an
ED. In general, hospital services were commissioned per speciality or group of specialities; no one had
dedicated overall commissioning responsibility for people prone to recurrent unplanned admissions.
Competition was of slight use to commissioners for influencing how providers managed this care group.
If they required orthopaedic surgery, Metroland patients with long-term conditions and comorbidities were
for safety unlikely to be referred to private providers, who merely took the less complex cases. The need
to co-ordinate care pathways across multiple organisations was also, our informants thought, hard to
reconcile with provider competition. Micro-commissioning was required. Thus the local authority and the
mental health trust collaboratively commissioned re-ablement services (Porttown, Metroland, Shire),
the Stroke Association to provide postdischarge care, home treatment for end-of-life care (Porttown),
case management, carer’s services, intermediate care beds (Metroland) and GP triage of patients entering
EDs (Shire, Porttown). In doing so, Shire reduced the number of re-ablement service providers from around
100 to 10. It also supplemented the contract of one local NHS hospital to pay for clearing the discharge
backlog. However, both commissioner (in Metroland) and hospital informants (in Shire) claimed that they
had difficulty dedicating sufficient time to the laborious tasks of redesigning care pathways for patients at
risk of frequent unplanned readmission, especially if case management was envisaged (Shire). Each side
recognised the value of such work and each argued that someone else should do it. In Livewell that
someone else was a US HMO, engaged by the PCT (under pressure from general practices), which with
those general practices comprehensively redesigned services for this care group, building in risk assessment
and telephone support services.238 Learning set members, however, emphasised that these integrative
activities were not as routine as they ought to be, because of such impasses as the hospital asking the
PCT to identify which patients to divert to community care, and to which services, but the PCT being
unable to do so. Metroland PCT did not set targets for hospital discharge or providing services to prevent
readmissions. Shire clinicians felt that the psychologists, CPNs and social workers were not much involved
with the commissioners’ attempts to reduce unplanned admissions, so those attempts had little effect
on working practice.
Prevention of coronary heart disease and diabetes
Coronary heart disease and diabetes prevention concerned two main types of activity and therefore
provider. One was activity aimed at changing individuals’ consumption and behaviour patterns,
addressing at-risk populations not in their capacity as patients (which most of them were not) but in terms
of ‘lifestyle’, as consumers or residents. The other was clinical prevention, addressing at-risk individuals
in their capacity as patients, whether undergoing routine health checks (e.g. under the national health
checks programme), being treated for CHD and/or diabetes, or being treated for some other condition,
and as necessary either treating the patient in general practice or referring the patient on to ‘lifestyle’
(e.g. smoking cessation) or other clinical services.
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The commissioning of service providers was an activity ill adapted for stimulating primary prevention259
through ‘New Public Health’ methods – changing lifestyles and consumption patterns or regulating the
production, promotion and sale of food etc.260 – for CHD and diabetes as for many other
preventable conditions.
[W]hen you do a needs assessment, this happens especially [with inter-]sector and other partners, they
automatically think that you are going to commission a service and sometimes it’s not always about
commissioning a service as such because if you’re looking at population health, you know, it might
not be it.
Public health doctor, Metroland
One public health informant asserted that commissioning for ‘lifestyle prevention’ is simply not possible,
whether through the Local Enhanced Services scheme or in any other way. Commissioners did not discuss
long-term prevention much.
Because preventative services would not deliver immediate savings (e.g. within 3 years) they were not a
high priority for commissioners, who thought that more pressing tasks such as tackling unplanned
admissions had to be handled before moving ‘upstream’ to commission preventative activities. For lack of
resources, few ‘lifestyle service’ providers were commissioned, although mechanisms such as the local
enhanced services (LESs) provided ways to incentivise providers who did so. Indeed, the Porttown
commissioner chief executive rejected public health proposals for the primary prevention of diabetes.
Accordingly, public health staff there concentrated on trying to persuade the city council to be stricter in
licensing fast food and alcohol retailers, and on carrying out health impact assessments for the council.
Shire’s stroke and diabetes networks did succeed in commissioning exercise groups at sports centres, but
the financial crisis led the PCT to withdraw finance for a diabetes-prevention pilot. These conditions might
partly explain the reports that public health worked somewhat separately, a phenomenon reported beyond
our study sites.261
Secondary prevention, and prevention through clinical activity, was commissioned much as any other
primary care clinical intervention, for instance through QOF incentives and LES incentive payments, as
others have also reported.259 Through its GP-owned social enterprise, Porttown PCT provided GPs with
access to electrocardiograph machines and a toolkit to assist in vascular risk assessment, although the
vascular checks petered out when the pilot project ceased. It also commissioned a small-scale project
through which CHS nurses ran CHD and diabetes-prevention clinics in a deprived part of the city. Shire’s
public health department set up a hub where GPs could send patients with mild diabetes or CHD for
prescribed exercise or weight-loss services. A clinical commissioning project piloted the introduction of an
intermediate diabetic care nurse and audited the clinical outcomes. The commissioners agreed to monitor
hospitals on (among other measures) diabetics’ blood pressure and body mass index.
Mental health
Mental health service commissioners in our study all faced one near-monopoly NHS mental health trust
absorbing above 60% (in Milltown, Metroland and Shire, 80%) of the mental health budgets alongside
numerous niche providers, often local authority funded. (Metroland had at least 50, besides contracts for
specialist tertiary services.) These small providers included voluntary and charitable providers, churches,
counsellors and patient self-help groups, private care homes and domiciliary care. GPs and social services
also provided substantial inputs (e.g. older people’s and learning difficulty care homes, day centres,
domiciliary re-ablement).
Four media of commissioner power were noticeably weak in mental health care. One was discursive
control. Mental health commissioners had only a small evidence base on which to draw. A few
well-defined outcome indicators were available (e.g. return to activities of daily life), but our informants
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generally averred that outcomes were opaque and hard to measure, as well as difficult to relate to national
policy, and monitoring data were usually incomplete. As for emic discourse, there were cultural differences
between local authority and NHS models of the nature of mental health care and its intended outcomes,
reflecting the different professional training and cultures of social workers and clinicians. Porttown,
Metroland and Shire informants contrasted the recovery model (on the NHS side) that promotes patients’
active involvement in their treatment and tailoring services to the episodic nature of long-term mental
problems versus a social model (on the social work side) offering indefinite low-key support (e.g. housing
and employment) to maintain client independence. The medical director of psychiatry in Metroland
complained that the social work ethos had gained ascendency, which ‘infuriates’ health workers and
‘disenfranchises’ clinicians. Second, the financial incentives were predominantly mainly block (on the health
side) and per diem payments (for some local authority-funded services). The small-scale contracts stipulated
patient volume, but seldom costings or performance measures. Against that, it was possible to discuss
patient-level events in detail with small providers, which led to problem identification and solving.
Monitoring of the large provider relied more on ‘generalisation and anecdote’ (commissioner, Porttown).
Mental health commissioners in all case study sites foresaw difficulties in using tariffs for mental health
services, but also that tariffs would provide greater openness and clarity about provider activity and costs.
The only scope for competition was among the small non-statutory providers, although Shire had opened
negotiations with Mind and Rethink. Even among the smaller providers, though, Metroland PCT had never
decommissioned an entire provider except for when a few temporary fixed-term contracts expired. PCTs’
limited tendering capacity and their aim to integrate health and social care were further disincentives to
promoting competition.
Mental health care often required the assembly of co-ordinated care pathways across multiple providers,
hence micro-commissioning and emic discursive control over providers. Micro-commissioning networks
were relatively stable. Users’ voice was often more evident in these networks than in the commissioning
of acute care, but users’ input did not necessarily translate into influence over budgets, the commissioners
or the main provider. Mental health service commissioners in our study sites were more likely than their
acute commissioner counterparts to include (besides managers) former service providers with social work,
nursing or mental health provider backgrounds (Shire, Porttown, Metroland). Action learning participants,
especially a GP commissioner, argued that too many psychiatrists spent their time medicating patients
who do not get better. Consequently patients with drug and alcohol problems did not get access to
psychological therapies.
The IAPT programme was an important exception to these patterns. IAPT contracts stipulated outcomes
and limited access to services to a fixed number of contacts (20 in Porttown), giving a fixed end-point at
which to evaluate treatment outcome.262 Mental health commissioners in Shire and Porttown perceived in
IAPT an evidence-based, outcome-oriented approach to commissioning services that might be adapted for
dementia and personality disorder services too. Milltown commissioners also commented that it was
unprecedented . . . quite a sophisticated minimum data set.
Mental health commissioner, Milltown
The IAPT was thus a prototype for extending commodified commissioning further into mental health.
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Technical contrasts
Table 8 summarises the empirical contrasts in NHS commissioning practice between these care groups.
These contrasts reflect technical differences across five dimensions between services for these care groups:
1. how far the commissioning of service providers is relevant at all (cf. primary prevention)
2. extent of the available evidence base
3. whether the episode of care and its outcomes are discrete and well defined
4. case mix homogeneity, hence, with (2) and (3), ‘commodification’
5. complexity of provision (number of providers simultaneously involved with one patient), hence the
number of commissioners.
Provider responses to commissioners (cf. Chapter 10) also varied by care group. GPs responded to
commissioners trying to strengthen clinical preventative services insofar as the services could be financed
through LES, and above all the QOF, payment systems, but were otherwise not responsive. Few attempts
were made to commission providers of intersectoral health promotion activity, so we had little opportunity
to observe how they reacted. Providers of planned orthopaedic surgery responded more as the programme
theory of NHS commissioning assumed, readily expanding case-loads when commissioners demanded,
often competing with each other. In contrast, mental health providers tended to respond with renewed,
or adapted, and collaborative micro-commissioning activity.
TABLE 8 Commissioning practices for specific care groups
Medium of
commissioner
power Care group
Medium of
commissioner
power
Mental health Planned orthopaedic
surgery
CHD/diabetes prevention Older people,
recurrent unplanned
admissions
Management
performance
Service specification and
monitoring limited and
problematic. IAPT a
prototype alternative
approach
Standardised
outcome measures
and care processes
stipulated
Commissioning largely
irrelevant to intersectoral
primary prevention.
Otherwise, as for primary
care generally
Utilisation patterns
poorly understood,
making contract
specification difficult
Negotiated
order
Micro-commissioning of
care pathways in depth,
multiple providers and
commissioners
Slight: focus on post-
discharge care
‘Horizontal’ negotiation
with local government
and other interest groups.
Some interdisciplinary
projects
Micro-commissioning,
often at individual
patient level
(case management)
Discursive
control
Weak: little evidence
(except IAPT) and
different NHS and social
work models of care
Etic: evidence-based
practice and outcome
measures
Etic: evidence-based
practice and outcome
measures
Emic: emphasis on
shared targets and
cost-control
imperatives
Financial
incentives
Mainly block payments
(cost control) but tariffs
being introduced
Per-case payments,
harnessing provider
profit motive
As for primary care
generally, but vulnerable
to budget cuts
Block contracts with
ad hoc supplements
Provider
competition
Sometimes when
dealing with small,
third-sector niche
providers; otherwise
marginal
Applied for
high-volume, low-
and medium-
complexity case loads
Marginal Marginal
Juridical control Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal
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Chapter 12 Commissioning practice and health
system context
Research question 4 asked what factors, including the local health system context, appear to influencecommissioning practice and the relationships between commissioners and providers. Comparisons
between NHS commissioning and its counterparts in other health systems indicate which commissioning
practices and problems recur across health systems, hence may stem from the structure of quasi-markets
per se, and which stem from the particular English NHS context in 2010–12. Insofar as they face similar
problems to those of NHS commissioners, other health systems’ solutions or workarounds offer possible
practical ‘lessons’, in the sense of empirical proofs of concept, for NHS commissioning practice.
Descriptions of the German and Italian health systems are available elsewhere.263,264 Below, we briefly
note the mode of commissioning in each, and then, for each medium of power, possible lessons for
NHS commissioning.
Germany
In Germany, the main health-care commissioners were SHIs (‘sick-funds’, Krankenkassen) and Land
(provincial) governments. Eighty-seven per cent of the population were SHI members (2012), the remainder
privately insured or self-payers. A separate SHI system finances long-term care.265,266 Hospital ownership is
diverse (public hospitals had 49% of beds in 2008, corporate hospitals 15% and charitable hospitals
36%). Acute care is paid for through DRG tariffs. In future, mental health care will be too. Land
governments planned the allocation of hospital beds and largely financed the corresponding infrastructure.
Patients can self-refer to any ‘ambulatory’ doctor, that is a generalist family doctor or non-hospital
specialist. Ambulatory doctors were commissioned by dividing a cash-limited budget according to the
points that each doctor earned, with different numbers of points for different medical acts. Reforms in
2004 required SHIs to promote a gatekeeping role for GPs to reduce direct access to specialist services,
but in 2007 a survey (O’Shea L. The German Health System. London: Nuffield Trust [unpublished briefing
paper]; 2010) showed that 44% of Germans saw two or more specialists in the last year (UK 19%).
Cost control is a long-standing national policy. Table 9 summarises the mode of commissioning in the
German system.
Managerial performance, negotiated order and juridical controls were the dominant media of power.267
TABLE 9 German case mix commissioning
Medium of power Form under case mix commissioning
Managerial performance Case mix modelling+ audit+ subscriber marketing
Negotiated order Rhineland model (consensus and multistakeholder model)+ episode based
Discursive control Emic: solidarity+ juridical rights
Etic (evidential): case mix data
Financial incentives Fixed tariffs
Provider competition None that commissioners can harness: referral ‘framing’ at most
Juridical Comprehensive regulation+ administrative law
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Management of commissioning
German commissioning practice shows how powerful and sophisticated the monitoring aspect of
managerial performance can become. Data were collected in real time. SHIs audited, confirmed and made
payments continuously, collecting from hospital bills and medical records data about what activity was
being paid for. Such data enabled one SHI, reputedly the most developed in this respect, to make routinely
such analyses as volumes of hip-replacement revisions per provider, evaluations of disease-management
programme costs and outcomes for diabetes, and analyses of case mix distributions and trends for any
geographical level, any provider(s) and any DRG. Each SHI knew its own data for hospital case mix and
compared them with the publicly available national figures, interrogating apparent inconsistencies between
the two. The Medizinische Dienst der Krankenkassen (MDK), run jointly by the SHIs, routinely reviewed
patient case notes in order to verify if the coding and therefore payment were appropriate given the
clinical facts, but did not review the effectiveness of care.
Hospital activity was nevertheless far from transparent to German SHIs or patients.265 German hospital
managers told us that when negotiating with commissioners they aggregated data and income data into
large blocks:
Interviewer: Why did you decide that?
Controllingschef, hospital 4: To make in all one negotiation about the DRGs and one for nursing
care for children. And it’s less transparent to the SHIs. . . . We have an orthopaedic department in
[hospital 1] and one at [hospital 2], and the SHIs could see from our data, our Excel tables, we have
done this here but more there . . . if we handle matters at a large scale we don’t have to discuss these
things with the SHI.
Hospital staff also tended to dislike the Medical Review Board and its members.
Lessons for NHS commissioners concern the availability and analysis of performance activity data. DRG
adoption alone is insufficient. NHS commissioners’ performance management, cost control and planning
roles might be strengthened by having rights of access to provider data but German practice also
suggested that gaining the modelling and monitoring benefits of a tariff system requires data warehouses
and specialised staff, centralised at the level of some millions of patients, and an extensive IT infrastructure.
These specialised functions may be more effectively and cheaply undertaken at regional or subregional
level (e.g. by commissioning support units) than at CCG level. However, greater transparency and the
resulting commissioner interventions appear, on German evidence, at times to strain relationships between
commissioners and providers.
Negotiated order: the Rhineland model
The German health system contains nested negotiated orders at national, Land and provider levels.
Annual negotiations involving all main national interest groups (federal associations of SHIs, doctors and
dentists, hospitals and patient organisations), co-ordinated by the Gemeinsame Bundesausschuss and with
the state as arbiter, agree the broad framework of health service planning and guidelines for quality of
care. This ‘Rhine’ or ‘Ordoliberal’ approach was deeply rooted in German political culture.268 Although
binding, these decisions were consensual. Consequently, doctors and SHIs could block changes. For
instance, the Association of Ambulatory Physicians vetoed other doctors doing out-of-hospital surgical
procedures. Similar negotiations establish a Land bed plan based on predicted needs for hospital services,
make regional adjustments to DRG payments, and agree the points tariffs by which ambulatory care
doctors are paid.
At provider level, the main currency of commissioning negotiations between SHIs and German hospitals
was the number and case mix of episodes and, for ambulatory care doctors, medical acts. To launch the
annual contract negotiations, German SHIs sent each hospital spreadsheets of DRG targets. The proposed
case mix implied an overall number of DRG points, hence an implied budget. It was possible to reduce,
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even remove, groups of cases by reallocation within the total number of points, but the system did not so
readily allow an overall reduction in case load, case mix or budget. National SHI federations, SHI national
offices and local health-manager networks advised and updated SHI negotiators about the commissioning
climate and local issues, but the hospitals had better data about their own case mix and internal costs
than the SHIs did. The Land plan framed the ensuing commissioner–provider negotiations by defining
each hospital’s bed numbers, overall case load, case mix and, in effect, ceiling for SHI-funded activity.
Negotiations focused on the hospital’s DRG points allocation, its case mix and the nationally defined
growth margin rather than clinical quality. Payment for new treatments not yet in the DRG system and for
discretionary services were also negotiated. Assuming that some degree of planning of the overall profile
of health-care provision is desirable, the German DRG system instantiated a concrete, detailed way of
modelling and managing hospital activity, case mix and revenue costs, although it might be argued that
deciding DRG volumes within the constraints of a Land bed plan puts the infrastructural cart before the
epidemiological horse of health-care needs.
For NHS commissioning, German experience seems to confirm that a consequence of making DRGs the
commissioning currency is to focus commissioners’ negotiations on service volume, case mix and cost
rather than on service quality, which commissioners therefore need to manage through another
mechanism. Giving hospitals the right to reimbursement for whatever patients they could attract tied the
German commissioners’ hands when negotiating with providers. SHIs strengthened their hand by
negotiating jointly with providers, and negotiating with each provider separately.
Discursive control
German informants mentioned emic discourses used in commissioning management and negotiations.
They tended to refer to the different parties’ rights and obligations under the nationally negotiated
agreements and regulations. These arguments cut both ways. When SHIs claimed to represent patients’
interests, the hospitals replied that they – and SHIs – were equally obliged to ensure that patients could
get the services that they (patients) chose. Apart from having to work within the Land bed plan,
considerations of public accountability did not appear to figure much. Neither did EBM, and still less in
primary than secondary care.269 Provided they stuck to treatments authorised under the Land plan, law and
regulations, German hospitals’ treatment methods were beyond SHI scrutiny. The place of EBM was more
at national level. When the GB-A decided which new therapies, devices, pharmaceuticals or models of care
to include in the DRG tariff, it used above all evidence about effectiveness from the Institut für Qualität
und Wirtschaftlichkeit in Gesundheitswesen.
An implication for NHS commissioners appears to be that a shared framework of norms is what makes
discursive control possible. The norms do not necessarily have to be technical ones. Neither does the norm
of ‘complying with health policy’ have to be defined any single way (e.g. compliance with a negotiated
settlement vs. compliance with the latest government pronouncement). What matters is that
commissioners and providers share the same norms.
Incentives
Diagnosis-related group-based payments gave hospitals a financial incentive to increase activity,270 whereas
the SHIs wished to avoid patient numbers, hence costs, spiralling out of control. Only a few treatments
(e.g. short-term nursing care at home) required SHI consent to pay. Otherwise, the DRG tariff system left
German commissioners little discretion for using financial incentives to renegotiate provider behaviour
locally. As a workaround, SHIs negotiated with hospitals a ‘corridor’ (Flur) for the main groups of DRGs,
agreeing an expected level of activity for each, what rebates the SHI would receive should the volume or
case mix fall below that range and the payment for justified additional work above it. Since 1998, German
SHIs have offered selective contracts, restricting subscribers’ choice of providers in return for lower
subscriptions, but many patients assumed that only providers with difficulty attracting patients accepted
such contracts.
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Neither did the tariff system directly reward providers for improving the clinical quality of care (as opposed
to attracting more patients). SHIs had discretion to pay providers for new and off-tariff treatments, but
otherwise were obliged to pay for all acute hospital treatment irrespective of quality. Complex and
long-term care presented different problems. For chronic care, the SHIs paid a per diem Pflegekost
(care cost) and will from 2013 have the option to do the same for some psychiatric services, instead of
making cost-plus payments as hitherto. Some experimental integrated care projects constructed
interorganisational care pathways linking primary and secondary providers for certain patient groups, but
these required specially negotiated contracts because DRGs were available not for network-based care
provision, but only for paying single providers. For ambulatory care, the points tariff also had to be
modified to accommodate disease-management programmes, that is preventative case management
and continuous care for certain chronic conditions (e.g. diabetes, COPD). Some 14,000 such schemes
existed but only about 5.5% of people were enrolled in them. Integrated care and disease-management
programmes represented only 1% of health-care spending. The benefits appeared to be improved care,
at least for diabetics,269 rather than cost savings.
These problems and workarounds have parallels in England. German SHIs independently invented what
NHS commissioners call ‘cap-and-collar’ agreements, and independently discovered that the construction
of cross-organisational (‘integrated’) care pathways requires substantial modifications to tariff payment
systems. A hidden limitation of a tariff system is the requirement for a separate, parallel system for
undertaking the commissioning function of managing clinical quality in care providers, raising transaction
costs in consequence. It is possible to define DRGs in terms of clinical procedures but this negates a
theoretical advantage of DRGs: that providers are paid per episode of care (ideally, by outcome), remaining
free to introduce innovative clinical procedures.
Provider competition
Except for selective and integrated care contracts, German commissioners could not choose their providers.
Only the Land government could select or deselect hospitals as providers, by including them in the bed
plan or not. For ambulatory care doctors and dentists, not even this mechanism was available. The German
equivalent of an AQP policy prevented commissioners from using selection (competition) of providers as a
means of controlling them, despite – indeed, because of – patient choice of provider.
Hospital capacity was 5.66 acute beds per 1000 population (2010), reflecting German health care’s greater
orientation towards secondary rather than primary medical care and community health services, and
‘a hospital on every hill’. In the west, Germany also had a tradition of religious foundations providing
hospital care, especially small local hospitals. Corporate providers were also entering the hospital market.
That appeared, on German experience, to promote market concentration and centralisation on the
provider side, with firms such as Aesculapias developing a strong national organisation to counter those
of the SHIs. [Competition between SHIs also produced concentration on the commissioner side of the
quasi-market (TK data, 2010), as in the Netherlands.271] Nevertheless, public- and third-sector hospitals
were no less – perhaps more – efficient than private ones.272,273 Attempts to control the health system
by regulation and tariffs pushed provider competition into the marginal ‘windows’274 not foreclosed by
regulation, tariff or policy fiat. When competing providers are entitled to payment once patients have
chosen them, commissioners’ control over provider costs is weakened from a budgetary cash-limited
system into one that, at most, contains care costs within ‘corridors’.
If NHS commissioners are to harness provider competition as a medium of governance, German SHIs’
experience suggests that commissioners need scope to deselect providers, for instance from providing
services for specific care groups. Long-term provider competition may become self-weakening as providers
merge or fail in the face of competition, which suggests that commissioners would need to be continually
searching for possible new providers and (insofar as they can influence such events) default towards taking
a critical view of proposed provider mergers. Comparing German and UK experience suggested that the
possibility of provider redundancy, hence excess provider capacity, may be required to sharpen provider
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competition. That would appear to confront commissioners with having to decide whether to control costs
through provider competition or by reducing the numbers of providers.
Juridical controls
German commissioning relied on nationally standardised regulations, contracts and legal entitlements,
clearly specified decision-making processes and participants in them, and allocations of decision-making
powers among particular institutions. The range and number of services offered, and remuneration
rates, were stipulated at national level for all SHIs.263 German SHIs’ obligations to patients were legally
prescribed. In disputed cases a first step was to seek an independent opinion from MDK about the medical
necessity of the treatment in question, followed by appeal to the Schiedstelle (administrative court) and
then to the civil courts, but even Schiedstelle cases were infrequent (maybe one or two a year for the
largest hospitals) and expensive (€7000 or more per case). The hospitals won perhaps 80% of these cases.
A lesson for NHS commissioners was that, even in the juridically oriented German system, judicial remedies
were for commissioners and providers alike costly, unpredictable instruments of last resort, used only
exceptionally. Most important, regulations intended to maximise provider diversity and competition for
patients removed provider competition as a medium of commissioner power.267
Italy
Lombardy health policy context
Like its English counterpart, the Lombardy region of the INHS had a quasi-market structure, a mixture of
public, third-sector and corporate secondary-care providers, between which commissioners were legally
required to ensure fair competition. Public hospitals were semi-autonomous ‘private firms’ (AOs). All
organisations wishing to provide publicly funded health care had to pass a four-stage accreditation
process, whose last stage was the award of a contract. Local HAs (ASLs) commissioned services for
populations of similar size to those of English PCTs, although unlike English CCGs they controlled only
2% of the budget for ambulatory and diagnostic care. The regional authority, a branch of the regional
government, commissioned both social care and the rest of health care. It had considerable discretion over
what kind of quasi-market structures to establish. It could, for instance, vary the national DRG tariffs and
take ‘make-or-buy’ decisions. All region authorities directly managed some hospitals, although Lombardy
retained only one (Table 10).
Of the media of commissioner power over providers, discursive (ideological) control predominated,
followed by negotiated order and the managerial (above all, regional) performance of commissioning.
Incentives and provider competition were less important, juridical controls least of all (Table 11).
Elements of population-based commissioning coexisted with client-based commissioning (DRG tariffs), but
the former, undertaken mainly at regional level, predominated. More like the UK than Germany, a range
of community health services and intermediate care providers existed.
TABLE 10 Italian regions: proportion of beds in directly managed INHS hospitals275,276
Model % Regions
Integrated > 66 Veneto, Aosta Valley, Trentino Alto Adige, Abruzzi, Molise and Sardinia
Mixed, quasi-integrated 40< n< 66 Liguria, Umbria, Marche, Basilicata, Calabria, Piedmont, Emilia Romagna,
Tuscany and Puglia
Mixed, quasi-separated 20< n< 40 Friuli, Lazio, Campania and Sicily
Separated model < 1 Lombardy
‘Integrated’ means that providers were directly managed by the INHS.
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Managerial performance
Commissioners planned their local health economy. Every January the regional authority set overall
inpatient case mix and numbers for each ASL, and the range, level and volume of non-tariff payments
(FNTs; see below). Each ASL then made a territorial plan and negotiated contracts with its accredited
‘preferred providers’, chosen on a value-for-money basis. The ASL agreed admission levels with each
provider and the contract duration. Providers had two kinds of contract. One, with juridical status, was
awarded as the last stage of the accreditation process. It stated the main rules and quality standards with
which the provider must comply. An annual operational contract fixed the provider’s budget and activity
level for that year, but had no legal status. Both contracts were managed at ASL level, although the
regional DGs oversaw the whole process, allocated resources and actually licensed the providers.
Comparing the roles of local commissioners (ASL in Lombardy, PCT or CCG in England) and regional
organisations made the Lombardy INHS appear more centralised than the English NHS; but it was the
reverse at national level.277 Compared with the English NHS, the strength of this highly vertical system was
its control over providers and its homogeneous way of gathering information and data, which has been
described (p. 209)276 as a ‘quasi-administered’ system.
Nevertheless we found at regional level a considerable fragmentation of management, a ‘silo’ approach
coupled with a lack of information sharing and of transparency in decision-making. In Lombardy, health
services commissioning remained divided from that of social services, at both regional and ASL levels.
Indeed, the so-called integrated care for frail people with health and social care needs was commissioned
by the family DG, even though the regional health fund financed these services. Within each ASL, the
social care department (attività socio sanitarie integrate) and its director were responsible to the ASL
general director for the key strategic policies, but still maintained a good deal of autonomy, networking
with different institutional stakeholders such as the municipalities, social services, schools and other local
actors. Other local (ASL) commissioning staff had limited discretion but when they tried to exercise it they
were often admonished by the regional DGs. Primary care was an exception due to the social capital on
which it called and its different territorial characteristics, which let commissioners collaborate more actively
with providers.
Providers’ contracts stipulated external audits of services and peer reviews of service quality. (Each
Emilia Romagna hospital also had an advisory committee, which included patient representatives and
often conducted user surveys.) Commissioners appeared to consider monitoring by means of administrative
data management too laborious and inefficacious as a means of quality control in Lombardy, although
inspection of medical records was used in Emilia Romagna. However, monitoring data were not necessarily
converted into information through which commissioners could exercise governance over providers:
of course we have all the data and whenever we do something we perfectly know who will be
influenced by that intervention and the expected results. . . . We conduct a lot of survey and data
analysis, . . . surveys and tables for the national accounting court . . . but no documents and scientific
studies have been made. . . . Research of course could be done. But there is also a point of the political
TABLE 11 INHS (Lombardy) mode of commissioning
Medium of power Form under surrogate planning (Lombardy)
Managerial performance Programme planning+ patient-level care management programmes (pilots only)
Negotiated order Local managerial problem-solving networks
Discursive control Doctrine of subsidiarity+ evidence-based protocols
Financial incentives Tariff+ per diem+ ad hoc payments
Provider competition Limited scope for commissioners to harness+ referral ‘framing’ at the margins
Juridical Dual legal and managerial contracts
COMMISSIONING PRACTICE AND HEALTH SYSTEM CONTEXT
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
80
willingness and interest in doing that: to open the data and information as well as a clear interest in
confronting with other realities.
Director-General, regional government
Health technology assessments and evidence-based protocols were applied, but not systematically and very
little by commissioners at ASL level.
For English NHS commissioners, one lesson appears to be that interdisciplinary rather than uniprofessional
organisational structures are more conducive to an integrated approach to service commissioning. More
striking, though, is the proof of concept of the feasibility of regionally managed commissioning by
organisations with the latitude to select providers and set contract duration. To overcome the information
asymmetry between providers and commissioners, and to make the health system more transparent to the
public, required the political will on the part of the commissioners and the higher-level bodies which
oversee them.
Negotiated order
Unlike their NHS equivalents, most senior commissioning managers in Lombardy (and Emilia Romagna) had
occupied the same role for 10 years or more. Long-term stability, investment in training commissioners and
long-standing relationships with providers gave commissioners a deep knowledge of the regional health
system, its development and commissioning mechanisms. These relationships and the trust which had
accumulated were an important medium of commissioner influence over providers, especially the AOs but
also private providers. Commissioners’ relationships with providers have been described as more like a
‘compact’ than a ‘contract’ (p. 3).278 In both Lombardy and Emilia Romagna, disagreements between
commissioners and providers were usually resolved negotiatively and, in Lombardy, tended to concern
quite focused activities and services. It was a way in which clinicians participated in commissioning.
(In Emilia Romagna, few people other than clinicians participated.) Most commissioning negotiations were
about adjusting recent historical patterns of provision. Nevertheless, there was also an informal vertical
hierarchy in decision-making about commissioning, with the regional DGs and directors-general for health
and for social care services at its apex. The other important interest group (in both regions) was the GPs’
trade union, which negotiated GPs’ contracts at both national and regional levels.
For NHS commissioners, the Lombardy and Emilia Romagna cases suggest that frequent changes in
commissioning personnel may be counterproductive for commissioners’ exercise of ‘relational’ governance
over providers. The Italian examples also indicate the practicality of giving clinicians (medical managers) a
substantial role on either side in commissioning negotiations.
Discursive control
This negotiated order partly rested, too, on shared ideologies. Because programme planning, resource
allocation and therefore commissioning were mainly driven by political decisions, they had an ideological
substrate and a disciplinary force over the professionals and managers involved. A regional school for
public managers, and training programmes for health-care managers and professionals, helped foster
common disciplinary and ideological norms across the regional health system. A key, distinctive shared
belief was the idea of subsidiarity, expressed by many theories (e.g. the New Public Management,
the so-called Third Way, the new public governance).279 In Lombardy it shaped a unique view of
government, focused not on the division of powers among different layers of government (‘vertical
subsidiarity’) but on ‘horizontal’ subsidiarity, conceived as a sort of division of labour between the public
sector and civil society. It reinforced the ‘knightly’ public service ethos, (p. 195)280 which interviewees
expressed more strongly than provider or professional interests. In Emilia Romagna, in contrast,
the Alma-Ata declaration281 was a chief reference point. These (emic) principles appeared more pervasive
and influential than evidence-based (etic) discourse.
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As with Germany, a lesson for NHS commissioners appears to be that what makes governance by
discursive means possible is not so much how the norms are formulated – whether as policy or technical
norms – but the fact that commissioners and providers share the same norms.
Financial incentives
Lombardy commissioners’ only lever of control through DRG tariffs was by negotiating a production ceiling
in the providers’ contracts. For ambulatory and diagnostic services, a provider was guaranteed 95% of
the previous year’s expenditure and case load. For activity from 97% to 103%, the tariff was cut by
30%; from 103% to 106%, it was cut by 60%; and above that the tariff was zero. This arrangement
incentivised providers to achieve the 106% level, to grow the next year’s starting budget level. As
cost-control pressures increased, ‘ceiling budgets’ were introduced into provider contracts, enforced by
tariff caps should service use exceed the planned budget. Neither would the regional authority reimburse
providers for treatments not included in its annual plan. In these ways the Lombardy commissioners
contained costs by (in effect) constructing a hybrid of cost-and-volume (below the 106% level) and block
contracts (above 106%).
In response to other limitations in the tariff system, commissioners kept some services outside it, financing
them as ‘functions with no tariff’ (funzioni non tariffate, FNTs). This was partly because tariffs could not be
introduced for all services at once. Outpatient, diagnostic and some highly specialised clinical services
were still paid for through cost-plus fees for service. Rehabilitation, residential services, domiciliary services
and long-term care were still paid for per diem. For other services (A&E, dialysis, foetal and neonatal
pathology), commissioners considered payment by DRG undesirable because they believed it would restrict
access. Neither was it practicable to finance teaching and research through tariffs. FNTs had also been
used to support private and non-profit hospitals that could not access other public funds for their activities,
and indeed public hospitals that had exceeded their budgets. However, as cost pressures increased,
extra-budgetary payments were gradually reduced. Other exceptions to the tariff system included
integrated care management; ASLs would assess each patient’s needs, decide the necessary treatment plan
and give the patient a payment voucher to cover the cost. From 2012 the regional DGs paid a variable
premium (adjustment) of ± 2% of the budget to providers according to the provider’s performance against
certain quality standards. The local ASLs also allocated 2% of each provider’s previous year’s income for
activities of its choice.
Lombardy commissioners also adopted programmes to ‘nudge’ patient choice to reduce cross-boundary
patient flows, especially for highly specialised services (e.g. neurosurgery), because the Lombardy
commissioners would have to pay the regions receiving these patients. (Cross-boundary flow was also an
issue in Emilia Romagna.) For example, Mantova ASL, on the border of the Emilia Romagna and Veneto
regions, introduced training schemes to encourage GPs to meet their patients’ diagnostic and specialised
ambulatory care needs within the region, and created an incentive for hospitals to hire specialists to treat
such patients.
In the fact that commissioners in Lombardy independently invented something similar, NHS commissioners
may find some endorsement of their own ‘cap-and-collar’ modifications to the HRG system. The
experience of commissioning in Lombardy suggests further modifications: retention of pre-DRG payment
systems and the application of non-DRG payments to stimulate provider compliance with clinical quality
standards, the development of interorganisational care pathways, and provision of specialist treatments
within the region.
Provider competition
Until the banking crisis, the system of paying providers for up to 106% of last year’s case load was largely
used to foster provider competition. One consequence was that the proportion of small providers fell,
partly through mergers. Private providers’ market share increased, partly because of public–private
partnership schemes which involved contracting out the operational management, and temporarily the
property, of nine AO hospitals, and a network of specialised services and departments, especially for
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diagnostics and rehabilitation. Private providers concentrated mainly on long-term care, less clinically risky
and more lucrative than acute care,276 although provider competition impeded the construction of stroke
networks.282 Since 2002, competition has decreased. Because new provider entry had saturated the supply
of hospital beds, both regionally and nationally, a regional decree closed the publicly funded health system
to new providers. Fixed tariffs limited the scope for price competition, production ceilings the scope for
competition on quality. Consequently the competitive incentives for hospitals, and after 2007 also for
diagnostic and laboratory services, to improve services weakened. However, patients’ choice of provider
could still slightly change a provider’s share of the INHS quasi-market, and still played a role in rewarding
provider quality and the providers’ reputation. Domiciliary care provision was more competitive, but, since
the reform of assistenza domiciliare integrata (integrated home care) services was still in a pilot phase, it
remains to be seen if that situation will continue. In general, though, provider competition was sacrificed
and tariffs ‘bundled’ in the interests of cost control, and to a lesser extent planning.283,284 This experience
and the consequent trade-off decisions appear relevant to NHS commissioning too.
Juridical controls
Through regional law, regulations and decrees, juridical control was pervasive, extending to defining the
roles of different types of manager,285 the annually planned workloads and the overall lines of health
system development. A major challenge for the Lombardy regional health system was the permanent
conflict of competencies and roles between the regional health general directorates and the ASLs, which in
practice had only a limited role in actively programming, purchasing and controlling the health services
allotted to them. There was no regulatory authority for competition comparable with the UK Office of Fair
Trading. Nevertheless, tight financial and juridical regulation left commissioners and providers little margin
for autonomy and discretion on either side, defined a clear division of labour between them, and created a
joint commitment to avoiding conflicts. Conflicts between providers and commissioners were usually
settled informally, either by direct negotiation, or, if still unresolved, by the regional DG, but without any
mediation. Doctors in management roles in some providers maintained direct relationships with regional
DGs, going over the heads of their ASL. Exceptionally, disputes were taken to the ordinary courts, but the
costs were high and procedures time-consuming and, from the commissioners’ standpoint, of little
consequence because any remedy or sanction imposed on the provider was usually administrative. The
courts seldom withdrew a provider’s accreditation. At most, decrees supplied part of the normative
framework through which commissioners might exercise discursive influence over providers.
Although comprehensive juridical powers were available to commissioners, they were used sparingly,
commissioners being costly, unpredictable instruments of last resort. The same lesson for NHS
commissioners emerges as from the German case.
Factors influencing commissioning practice
Comparing the case studies of Germany and Italy with those in England, certain patterns recur, suggesting
that these patterns reflect not local peculiarities of commissioning practice but common characteristics of
the different media of governance across the three health systems and, on the basis of that evidence,
corresponding lessons for NHS commissioning.
To overcome the information asymmetry between providers and commissioners requires both suitable
resources (as the German case suggests) and (as the Lombardy case suggests) political will on the part of
the commissioners and of the higher-level bodies to which commissioners are accountable. In all cases the
negotiated order between commissioners and providers was coloured at local level by the micro-political
relationships between organisations and among individuals, and by the history of past commissioning
practice. Negotiations between commissioners and providers required a common discourse. Evidence
about clinical practices and models (etic discourse) was one such discourse, although the extent of its use,
which organisations most used it, and how, varied considerably across the three health systems. The
content of shared emic discourses also varied considerably, reflecting the wider political cultures in which
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the three health systems were embedded: obedience to ‘policy’ dominated emic discourse in the English
NHS; a solidaristic consensus on health policy and regulations generated by the ‘Rhineland’-style political
institutions in Germany; and an ideology of subsidiarity in Lombardy. What the three situations had in
common, though, was that the shared discourse enabled commissioners to appeal during negotiations to
normative assumptions that the providers shared and that moderated the expression and pursuit of the
particular interests of an organisation or profession.
In all three countries, DRG tariff payments gave providers strong incentives to gain income by expanding
their activity. Whether or not they expanded competitively, at other providers’ expense, seemed to be
a secondary question (especially in England and Italy; less so in Germany). This incentive, however,
conflicted with cost-control pressures, already present in England and Italy, and emerging in Germany.
Commissioners in all three systems – and Poland286 and the USA287 – reacted similarly by bundling tariff
payments to weaken tariffs’ expansionary incentive effects on providers and to place an eventual cash limit
on commissioner spending. Insofar as tariff payment systems are equated (simplistically, to be sure) with
‘competition’, commissioning practice in all three countries has involved sacrificing ‘competition’ to cost
control.276 In all three systems, a ‘pure’ tariff system tended to weaken commissioners’ control over
providers, especially (but not only) by weakening commissioners’ power to select providers. Commissioners
in all three health systems also supplemented tariff payments with separate incentives for maintaining
clinical quality standards. To promote the ‘integration’ of care for complex and/or chronic conditions
across multiple providers, commissioners in all three systems tried to introduce some form of
micro-commissioning, although there was less scope for it in Germany and Italy than in England. In all
three countries, public- and third-sector providers participated in micro-commissioning but corporate
providers hardly at all in England (with the important exception of the US HMO in Livewell).
All three systems had organisationally diverse health-care providers. Irrespective of different modes
of commissioning, state-owned tertiary providers tended to concentrate on complex and hard-to-treat
(e.g. multiple) conditions. The third sector also provided especially for hard-to-treat conditions, but mostly
in community settings (primary and social care). Corporate providers specialised in profitable care, typically
high-volume non-urgent acute care, but also some more complex, high-cost acute care (e.g. heart surgery
in Germany; complex diagnostics in Italy). However, because for-profit providers preferred lucrative,
unproblematic services, they were less likely than public or third-sector providers to be providing services
exposed to the causes of conflict noted above, despite their in-built motivation to expand their profits,
hence market share, and despite their objectives differing most from commissioners’ objectives.
Commissioning practice always combined different media of commissioner power over providers.
That reflects a certain hybridisation of the three systems studied, where Bismarckian elements (above all,
tariff systems) coexisted with more Beveridge-like elements (attempts to maintain public accountability
and implement regional or national health policy). Managerial performance and negotiated order were
important everywhere, but thereafter the relative importance of ideology, financial incentives and
competition varied. An elaborated negotiated order was an important, and for commissioners a helpful,
part of commissioning practice, but it was not always easily reconciled with provider competition. Similarly,
the transparency of providers’ activities and costs helped commissioners exercise control, but was not
always reconcilable with provider profit seeking and competition. The dominant mode of commissioning
reflected certain quasi-market structures: who owned the commissioners; what kinds of provider (in terms
of ownership) were present; the rules for provider entry and exit; and how much discretion the legal and
regulatory framework gave commissioners.
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Chapter 13 Conclusions
Summary empirical findings
Next we summarise our empirical findings, answering each research question in turn and stating the
evidential basis of our answer. Briefly, three parallel strategies to governance coexisted in commissioning
practice: a strategy based on trust and relationality; a more incisive, less trustful strategy (willingness to
challenge, even replace, providers); and making ad hoc workarounds and modifications to quasi-market
structures. After stating what limitations and qualifications apply to the findings, we draw some more
enduring, general conclusions.
How do English health policy-makers and NHS commissioners understand
the policy aims of commissioning, and how can governance over providers
be exercised through commissioning?
Policy-makers’ and managers’ accounts, and the discourse analysis of policy documents (Chapter 5),
suggested that the explicit aims in pursuit of which commissioners exercise governance over providers
were generally agreed, few and broad. They were to:
l raise the quality of both primary and secondary care
l integrate primary health and social care services more fully, especially before and after
hospital episodes
l remove ineffective activities
l replace secondary with primary care, insofar as is feasible
l enable patient choice of providers
l improve clinical outcomes
l reduce costs of care
l make GPs (as providers) responsible for the financial consequences of their referral and other treatment
decisions (what is called responsibilisation288)
l increase NHS organisations’ accountability to the public.
Policy-makers assumed that commissioners would exercise governance over providers mainly through the
media of managerial performance (rewriting service specifications and service contracts; exploiting new
IT to monitor providers’ performance); selecting (or deselecting) providers; discursive control (research
and evidence dissemination, disciplinary control over primary care); negotiated orders between NHS
commissioners, local and service providers; and financial incentives and competition among and between
GPs, other primary care providers and hospitals.
Although they agreed on the broad principles, different informants foresaw a different balance between
practice-level and whole-CCG-scale commissioning. They placed different weights on patient choice,
including choice of GP (emphasised by parliamentarians) and the AQP policy. National policy-makers,
especially parliamentarians, emphasised making GPs financially responsible for their own referral and
other treatment decisions. NHS informants paid this, and provider bail-outs, less attention. Some NHS
commissioners gave themselves wide interpretive latitude, especially about provider competition and the
division of commissioning labour between GPs, NHS managers and local authorities.
From mainly interview-based data at four sites and cross-sectional data analysis, our emerging findings
suggested the levels of support or challenge shown in Table 12 for the prior policy assumptions about
commissioning. Appendix 10 explains the right-hand column entries more fully.
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TABLE 12 Programme theory vs. evidence for 2010–12
Programme theory assumption Evidence
PT1: Central government’s decisions and actions lead NHS
Commissioning Board, NICE, etc. to set regulations and
guidelines which reflect ministers’ priorities
Beyond remit of this study
PT2: Through joint commissioning with local government,
commissioners will understand care group and population
health needs
Some public health input into service specifications, though
limited, but this input was especially in Shire
PT3: NHS England’s management and GPs’ knowledge of
patient needs together allow and stimulate GP
commissioners to link clinical and financial decisions
Existing commissioners tend to deal separately with financial
and clinical aspects of services
PT4: General practitioners’ commissioning role will lead
CCGs to review primary care quality
Weak corroboration
PT5: General practitioners’ commissioning role and joint
commissioning with local government will lead to stronger
integration of primary health and social care services (before
and after hospital episodes)
Weak corroboration
PT6: General practitioners’ commissioning decisions, reviews
of primary care quality and stronger partnership working
with social care will bring about reconfiguration of primary
care pathways, removing ineffective activities
Micro-commissioning focused more on care pathway
redesign than removing ineffective activity
PT7: The reshaping of primary care pathways and the
development of new IT (online consultations etc.) together
result in primary replacing secondary care to some extent
Being attempted through micro-commissioning but IT is
marginal. The main reported obstacles are lack of services
and of GP clinical skills
PT8: General practitioners’ commissioning decisions, the
outcomes framework, the presence of alternative providers
and patients’ choice of providers (in particular of GPs)
together stimulate and enable GPs to exercise greater
influence over other providers
GP influence exercised more through a negotiated order
than competitive (choice) mechanism. Threat of loss of
resources (e.g. to alternative providers) did make providers
negotiate more constructively
PT9: Increased GP influence over other providers and the
substitution of primary for secondary care together improve
clinical outcomes
Too early to say yet
PT10: Increased GP influence over other providers, GPs’
focus on quality and the substitution of primary for
secondary care together improve quality of care
Too early to say yet
PT11: Increased GP influence over other providers and the
substitution of primary for secondary care together reduce
costs of care
Commissioners were containing care costs, but by creating
DRG/HRG ‘bundles’ and negotiation rather than substitution
PT12: Ministerial decisions lead NICE to produce the specific
outcomes framework
Corroborated
PT13: The outcomes framework and IT developments
result in patients, commissioners and providers themselves
having information by which to compare providers’
performance, and in patients and commissioners selecting
(and deselecting) providers
Comparison occurred, but commissioners seldom deselected
providers. Little evidence yet that patients’ choice much
influenced provider performance or sustainability
PT14: The outcomes framework, information for patients,
provider plurality and (later) personal budgets lead patients
and commissioners to choose between (and deselect)
providers
As above
PT15: Commissioners and patients choosing between
health-care providers causes the latter to improve clinical
outcomes
As above
PT16: Commissioners and patients choosing between
health-care providers causes the latter to improve quality
of care
As above
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Since CCG commissioning was still being established during this study (2010–12), NHS commissioning
practice may yet converge more closely upon the programme theory underlying NHS commissioning policy.
That said, insofar as the programme theory rests on invalid assumptions, it will be hard to implement and
not necessarily have the intended results. The assumptions least consistent with the available evidence are
those likely to have the most challenging practical implications for commissioning practice, considered
below (section Emerging and adaptive commissioning: practical implications).
In our four case studies we found evidence that the financial and the ‘real’ side (service volume, quality,
case mix and outcome) were often decoupled in hospital contract negotiations. Senior managers tended to
conduct financial negotiations with little medical participation, under pressure to meet financial targets
stemming from national policy, in advance of discussions of care group or population needs. It remains to
be seen if matters change as CCGs become more established, but during 2010–12 we found little
evidence in our four case studies to support the assumption that management by NHS England and GPs’
knowledge of patient needs will together stimulate GP commissioners to link clinical and financial
decisions. Regarding provider competition, a minority of their service outcomes (including some proxy
clinical outcomes) improved where multiple hospitals coexisted, although more did not. Our case study
commissioners (and other providers) did indeed compare providers against national and regional
benchmarks for clinical outcomes and quality, but seldom deselected providers for that (or any other)
reason. Our interview evidence suggested that provider competition appeared not to be a strong
explanation of those patterns. Insofar as patient choice affected provider performance or sustainability,
it was through the medium of tariff payments. Insofar as the overall costs of care are concerned,
the evidence from all three countries suggests that this form of patient choice raises, not reduces, the cost
of health care. Qualitative evidence from the three countries also suggested that patient choice based on
tariff payments undermines commissioners’ capacity to choose providers, whether to improve clinical
TABLE 12 Programme theory vs. evidence for 2010–12 (continued )
Programme theory assumption Evidence
PT17: Patients choosing between health-care providers
causes the latter to reduce the cost of care
Not patient choice but commissioners’ de facto reintroduction
of cash-limited block contracts and referral screening were
the cost-reduction mechanisms
PT18: Research and evidence production causes health-care
providers to improve clinical outcomes
Too soon to say. Evidence production continues, but the
mechanism for its impact on providers may be as much
through NICE, CLAHRCs and professional networks as
through commissioning
PT19: Patient involvement in care decisions causes
health-care providers to improve clinical outcomes
Beyond remit of this study
PT20: Public health activity causes health-care providers to
improve clinical outcomes
No commissioning linkages between public health activity
and provider clinical activities found (except public health
input into contract specifications). Commissioning system
partly irrelevant to primary prevention
PT21: Refusing ‘bail-outs’ causes health-care providers to
reduce costs
This event not observed
PT22: General practitioner and local government joint
commissioning causes health-care providers to reduce costs
Micro-commissioning led to service reconfigurations, cost
implications not known
PT23: Patient involvement in care decisions causes
health-care providers to reduce costs
Beyond remit of this study
PT24: Research and evidence cause health-care providers to
reduce costs
Beyond remit of this project
PT25: The availability of information by which to compare
providers’ – and by implication commissioners’ – performance
increases NHS organisations’ accountability to the public
Appeared more true of providers (about whose activities
more information is available) than commissioners
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outcomes or for any other reason. In the four English case study sites, commissioners influenced providers
(including fellow GPs) more through a negotiated order and discussions about evidence than through
competitive mechanisms, including patient choice. A threat to remove resources (e.g. to alternative
providers) made providers more inclined to negotiate constructively with commissioners, but providers
were not always willing and/or able to respond to GP (or other) commissioners’ demands.
We consider the practical implications in section Emerging and adaptive commissioning: practical
implications below.
How did the reconfiguration of commissioning structures occur in practice
and what shapes this reconfiguration?
The four case studies suggested that the factors most shaping CCG formation were GPs’ willingness to
participate and the availability of those GPs who were willing. Staff turnover due to restructuring
exacerbated overload among commissioners. Where GPs had previously participated in commissioning,
CCGs were formed by recycling former PCT and PEC structures and memberships. Elsewhere, individual
GP enthusiasts were more relied upon: in our London site, from the polysystem especially. The balance
between ‘usual suspect’ and ‘new enthusiast’ GPs in the emerging CCG leaderships depended on which
of these two tendencies predominated, and on the quality of earlier relationships between the former
PCT or PEC and other GPs. Continuity in GP leadership tended to promote continuity in commissioning
activities and priorities. Other GPs were drawn into commissioning incrementally as opportunities
arose. The more slowly GP participation grew, the more work and influence remained with non-GP
commissioning staff, who were more likely than GPs to favour forming a large CCG; make cost saving
a commissioning priority; and not necessarily focus attention on the care groups that most concerned GPs.
The more often PCTs had been restructured, the weaker the relationality between commissioners and
doctors (both GPs and consultants). The extent and tenor of commissioning discussions between GPs
and consultants depended on how far consultants were willing to participate constructively, which varied
according to accidents of personality and local NHS history. The more diverse the organisations that were
combined (or, for dispersed commissioning, that collaborated), the harder it was for coherent priorities and
activities to emerge, the slower they did so and the harder the organisation of commissioning was to
reconfigure. Analogous factors applied to the development of joint commissioning with local authorities. In
the short term these factors seemed to promote continuity rather than radical breaks in commissioning
activities and priorities. Paradoxically, stable commissioning organisation structures (both staffing and learnt
commissioning practices) and stable relationships between commissioners and other local organisations
made it easier and quicker, in our four case study sites, to establish CCGs and the negotiated order
through which CCGs would operate.
How far does current (2010–12) commissioning practice allow commissioners
to exercise governance over their local NHS health economies?
Commissioners across our four English case study sites employed all six media of power identified in
Chapter 2 (section Media of power). Appendix 11 shows how the different kinds of commissioner that we
studied used and combined different media of power.
Management performance: NHS commissioners in our case study sites were in a weak position vis-à-vis
providers insofar as they lacked technical expertise for specifying services and interpreting monitoring
information, and depended on providers to supply it. In contrast, the German SHI we studied could analyse
and model extensive collections of tariff data in depth. Italian ASLs were in an intermediate position.
Negotiated order: Our case study NHS commissioners exercised governance through a negotiated order
based partly on contract negotiations, but also heavily dependent on micro-commissioning. Negotiations
were often protracted and inconclusive when commissioner and provider interests differed. Then
especially, commissioning was often a laborious, uncertain process. By dealing directly with each other,
GPs and consultants could sometimes solve practical problems of care co-ordination.
CONCLUSIONS
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
88
Discursive control: Commissioning agendas were dominated by national policy, evidence-based guidance
and a shared culture of loyalty to the local NHS. This pattern emerged both from the local case studies and
the policy-maker interviews.
Incentives: Commissioners could influence NHS trusts, our four case studies suggested, by proposing to
add or remove resources, competition having an effect largely by making the threat of removal more
credible. The cross-country comparison (and published studies) suggested that, despite strengthening
service monitoring, tariff payment systems weakened commissioners’ ability to control the volume or costs
of care. Commissioners in England, Germany and Italy alike responded by bundling tariff payments.
Competition: Mostly our study site commissioners neither promoted nor greatly exploited provider
competition. They were unwilling to destabilise local NHS trusts, whether they depended on one large
provider or (e.g. in Shire) several. The same phenomenon was reported in Italy. Across England, our
cross-sectional analysis never found above a third of the expected associations between measures of
competition and the relevant policy outcomes, and those found were often weaker than the association
with contextual variables. Compared with Germany (but less so with Italy), there was little unused
hospital capacity.
Juridical controls: Juridical controls were used only exceptionally in all three countries studied. In all three,
more complete contracts made it easier both for providers not to provide, and for commissioners not to
pay for, off-contract work.
Nevertheless some media of power were always more frequently reported than others. The commissioners
we studied in all three countries influenced providers mainly through managerial performance
(transparency of provider activity data was important), sustaining a negotiated order (in particular
micro-commissioning, where feasible) whose disciplinary basis was evidence basing and shared emic
assumptions (although the content of these assumptions varied considerably between countries) and
adjusting incentives. Competition gave commissioners power only insofar as they could select providers,
and had at most a mixed impact on the service outcomes studied. Juridical controls were marginal to
day-to-day commissioning practice in all three countries.
This pattern appeared to reflect three main factors. First, commissioners faced trade-offs between the
different media for exercising governance: relationality (and micro-commissioning) versus competition;
complete contracts versus flexible service provision; relationality versus juridical controls; and tariff
incentives versus commissioners selecting providers. Commissioners’ governance over providers was
not necessarily maximised by establishing as many media of power as possible, because some media
obstructed others. Second, our four case studies suggested that, insofar as GPs gained influence on
commissioning, the shift from PCTs to CCGs meant that commissioning practice relied less upon
competition and more upon a negotiated order between GPs and consultants, in which medical discourse
became more prominent. There was a greater propensity for micro-commissioning. These changes
concerned the ‘real side’ of commissioning practice rather than finance. Third, negotiative and discursive
control require trust, the absence of substantial background conflicts of interest between commissioner
and provider. Otherwise, the alternative media of power have to be mobilised more fully. Of these, the
most potent was for commissioners to use providers’ resource dependency upon the commissioner as a
means of influencing the provider: a specific form of financial incentive. The selection of media of power
partly reflected factors in the commissioners’ environment (what kinds of provider there were, how they
reacted to commissioners’ activity, the structure of the quasi-market itself, regulatory and policy constraints
on commissioners) and partly the commissioning organisations’ own activity (who controlled it, what they
decided, what adaptive commissioning practices they developed).
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How much room for manoeuvre do NHS commissioners have?
The answer to this research question specifies more concretely how the commissioners’ environment and
the structure of the internal market limited commissioners’ powers of governance over service providers.
In our four English case study sites the commissioners’ environment and the structure of the NHS
quasi-market meant that NHS commissioning practice during 2010–12 did not always enable
commissioners to exercise governance over providers in respect of:
l providers unilaterally closing or altering services
l provider case load (volume), case mix and willingness to treat patients off-tariff
l ensuring that providers internally implement service changes agreed with commissioners
l promoting GP and consultant engagement in commissioning activity
l promoting user involvement in service changes of little interest to them
l achieving transparency of provider activity and costs
l monitoring the service and health outcomes of most services
l stimulating ‘lifestyle change’ activity to address causes of ill health outside the health system
l user influence on service design, which is feasible only for services that users are interested
in changing.
However, the same factors meant that NHS commissioners in the four case study sites could exercise
governance over:
l referral rates, through GP involvement in referral screening and reviewing providers’ clinical activity
l care pathways, through direct GP–consultant negotiations (which commissioners can only initiate,
not control)
l service specifications, by:
¢ micro-commissioning or
¢ defining clear outcome indicators and measures for well-defined episodes of care (e.g. IAPT-style
contracts); however, the scope for commodifying technically complex, mental health and long-term
care involving multiple conditions and/or multiple care providers is limited
l service co-ordination at individual patient or small care group level, through promoting direct
GP–consultant contacts for problem solving
l service models, by appeal to evidence supplemented as necessary with guarantees that changes will
have no adverse consequences for patients
l costs, through block contracts (with safeguards for obtaining sufficient monitoring data) and bundling
tariff payments, with below-tariff marginal adjustments to payments
l service profile, by using block contracts to guarantee certain services financially
l target compliance, partly through monitoring and, where feasible, provider competition.
In these matters the commissioners could develop adaptive commissioning practices, in the light of
how providers responded (see subsection How do provider managers respond to commissioning
activity? below).
Our four case studies also suggested that certain limits on NHS commissioners’ manoeuvrability were
practically irremovable within any credible scenario for the near future: the content of evidence-based
guidance; patients’ mobility between providers; the physical infrastructure of large hospitals; national
policy; the tariff system; and medical scepticism or disengagement. Nevertheless, the commissioners we
studied did have room for manoeuvre concerning:
l which care groups to prioritise for commissioning attention and for developing new models of care
l how to allocate any additional income or savings that did become available
l what commissioning support to use
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l which GPs, consultants and others to involve in negotiations
l how to redesign or respecify services through micro-commissioning
l collecting local evidence about services
l bundling tariff payments
l using the discretionary elements of QIPP, QOF and other payments
l latitude within the DH national contract framework
l how far beyond the legal requirements they took competitive procurement.
Here too commissioners had scope for decision-making and developing adaptive commissioning practices.
What are the consequences, and how do commissioners try to manage
them, when commissioning is distributed across different organisations and
when it shifts to being client based?
In our four case study sites, the consequences of the lead commissioner model of distributed
commissioning depended on how convergent the different commissioners’ interests were. When they
differed substantially, commissioners managed the situation by reverting to separate commissioning
arrangements. Otherwise, the main consequence (managerial response) was a move towards more
standardised service specifications and contracts, and an increased capacity to countervail the power of
large, even merged, providers. In Germany, distributed commissioning took the form of several SHIs
negotiating jointly with each provider, although without a ‘lead commissioner’ arrangement. That situation
also presupposed that patients subscribed to different SHIs will receive essentially similar care, conforming
to national quality standards, Deutsche DRG specifications, and any other requirements that the SHIs could
jointly negotiate. In Lombardy, commissioning roles were distributed vertically between regional and local
governments, with the result that many commissioning decisions were centralised to regional level.
Because of the different accountabilities, governance structures and working practices in the NHS and local
government, joint commissioning in England was ‘joined at the top’ (p. 21)257 rather than at the levels of
more concrete commissioning, service design and monitoring, especially in public health. Managers tried to
manage these circumstances by setting up ad hoc, informal cross-organisational network arrangements
to co-ordinate services. These networking arrangements only partly relied on commissioning mechanisms.
They were also found in Italy and Germany.
Combining findings from England, Germany and Italy suggests which consequences of per-patient,
tariff-based commissioning may be intrinsic to that form of client-based commissioning. These three tariff
systems weakened commissioners’ control over provider activity, case mix and costs but better monitoring
information enabled commissioners to devise more sophisticated monitoring and modelling systems.
Nevertheless, providers’ activity and cost data were still not sufficiently transparent for commissioners’
purposes. They still left a certain amount of privacy for provider management practices about which
commissioners might have wished to have known when negotiating. [Research in this field is currently
(2014) in progress.]
Commissioning managers’ main responses to these circumstances were to:
l retrieve control over costs (and case mix) by bundling tariff payments into blocks with discounts and/or
variable payments at the margin
l devise new forms of capitation payment and block contracts at the margins of, and as agreed
exemptions to, the tariff system in England, Italy and Germany
l supplement tariff payments with additional incentive payment schemes to reward higher-quality
services, better outcomes and/or continuity of care. Such were QIPP and QOF payments in England;
case management, the Istituti di Ricovero e Cura a Carattere Scientifico (IRCCS) and voucher schemes
in Italy; and disease-management programmes in Germany.
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In these ways commissioners adapted to, indeed worked around, some of the environmental constraints of
commissioning imposed by quasi-market structures, national policy and regulations.
Personal health budgets were still being piloted (and separately evaluated) in England during the study
period. They had not yet had much reported impact on NHS commissioning or services in our four main
study sites, or the mini-case study site. Our cross-sectional analysis found only 1 of 48 possible correlations
between the three measures of the extent of individualised commissioning and the 16 service outcomes
studied. The presence of a personal budget pilot scheme was associated with an increase in patients being
treated within the 18-week target, but the association was weak. Otherwise, the associations had the
wrong sign, or were negligible or absent. Personal health budgets were not yet an important influence on
commissioners’ governance over providers.
How do provider managers respond to commissioning activity?
English NHS providers’ responsiveness to the commissioners in our four case study sites reflected the
presence or absence, and depth, of any conflicts of interests between the two. On perceiving such a
conflict, providers most often responded passively. Negotiations, including micro-commissioning, became
protracted and inconclusive. Providers often proposed what services should be commissioned, sometimes
as counterproposals to the commissioners’ ideas but also for reasons of their own. They sometimes altered
services unilaterally, independently of commissioners’ demands. Providers’ willingness and ability to
respond to commissioners’ demands were also conditioned by their internal management, especially
consultants’ attitudes to commissioners’ proposals. The internal management of German and Italian
hospitals did not appear to involve such sometimes troublesome relationships with their
consultant equivalents.
The English commissioners that we studied, however, could sometimes rouse providers into helpfulness by
threatening a loss of resources (possibly to a competitor) or an unfavourable intervention from a third
party, above all higher-level NHS management. Such powers were not available to German SHIs, but in
Italy the ASLs, and still more regional governments, could use discretionary payments for this purpose,
although the threat of removing tariff-funded work from providers was not credible.
Provider diversification appeared to generate a similar division of labour in all three health systems.
State-owned tertiary providers increasingly concentrated on high-complexity and hard-to-treat
(e.g. multiple) conditions. The third sector also provided especially for hard-to-treat conditions. German
and Italian corporate providers specialised in profitable care, typically high-volume, non-urgent acute care,
but also some more complex, expensive acute care (e.g. heart surgery and diagnostics respectively).
Providers’ responses stimulated commissioners to adapt their selection and use of media of power.
Many of these adaptive responses were more sophisticated forms of existing managerial practices
(e.g. better data collection and interpretation, greater medical participation in negotiations) but some
(e.g. appeal to regional NHS management) used non-market structures.
Commissioning for different care groups
The distinctive patterns of commissioning for our four tracer groups were:
1. Mental health: Evidence-based service specification and monitoring were limited and problematic,
although IAPT prototyped an alternative approach. In all three countries studied, micro-commissioning
of care pathways often occurred, in our four English case study sites involving multiple providers and
commissioners. NHS and social work professionals often had conflicting emic discourses. Mainly block
payments were used, although tariffs were being introduced. Many providers were small, specialised
third-sector organisations, but commissioners made little use of provider competition.
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2. Planned orthopaedic surgery: Outcome measures and care processes were often standardised, based on
relatively well-developed evidence-based practice and outcome measures, which facilitated the use of
provider competition. There was little micro-commissioning and what there was focused on
post-discharge care. Payments were by tariff, which providers found lucrative.
3. Coronary heart disease/diabetes prevention: The commissioning of services was largely irrelevant to
the primary prevention of these diseases through intersectoral activities (promoting lifestyle and
consumption changes, etc.). To the extent that clinical prevention was possible, it was commissioned
much as for primary care generally; that is, by harnessing QOF or LES payments and commissioning
community health services projects. For these projects, evidence-based practice and outcome measures
were relatively well developed, but as experimental projects they were vulnerable to budget cuts.
Commissioners made little use of provider competition.
4. Older people with recurrent unplanned admissions: The causes of these referral patterns were
poorly understood, making contract specification difficult. Commissioning relied heavily on
micro-commissioning, even case management. As persuasive devices in negotiating with providers,
commissioners emphasised the targets and cost-control imperatives that they and the providers shared.
Commissioners made little use of provider competition.
Across the three health systems studied, these differences in commissioning practices between care groups
appeared to reflect:
1. the extent to which the commissioning of service providers was relevant at all (cf. primary prevention)
2. the extent of the available evidence base
3. case mix homogeneity
4. how well defined the duration and outcomes of episodes of care were
5. the number of providers and commissioners likely to be involved simultaneously with each patient.
Together these factors reflected technical characteristics of the service concerned, not (as we had expected
when writing the research protocol) at the level of detailed clinical (or, for intersectoral health promotion,
anti-marketing) techniques, but at the level of complexity of the model of care required for each care
group. That is, complexity in terms of the variety and range of inputs required and the uncertainties of
outcome. The more strongly services showed these characteristics, especially characteristics (2) to (4), the
more susceptible they were to ‘commodification’, that is designing, paying for and monitoring services on
the basis of standardised, discrete packages of care.
Aspects of service provision on which different commissioning organisations
tended to focus
Looking across the three health systems, each variant of each medium of power helped commissioners to
influence some, and impeded influencing other, aspects of providers’ services. (Classic tariff systems
prevent commissioners from selecting providers; a negotiated order involving clinicians facilitates care
pathway design; and so on.) The commissioning organisations that we studied concentrated on managing
the aspects of service provision shown in Table 13. The row headings are service characteristics that the
programme theory of NHS commissioning, our case study informants (in all three countries) and published
managerial data all emphasised.
During a transitional period, the contrasts between PCT and CCG represented ends of a continuum rather
than categorical differences. Table 13 shows what the commissioners tried to control. How far they
succeeded partly depended on the providers’ responses (see subsection How do provider managers
respond to commissioning activity? above) and the local health system context. These differences lead
naturally to the following research question.
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What factors, including the local health system context, appear to influence
commissioning practice and the relationships between commissioners
and providers?
Taking the English, German and Italian case studies with the cross-sectional data from England, the
commissioning practices and modes of commissioning that we studied appeared to reflect three main
groups of factors:
1. the commissioners’ environment, in particular:
i. whom the commissioners were accountable to, and for achieving what ends
ii. local histories and existing relationships among commissioners, providers and local government, and
between GPs and hospital doctors
iii. providers’ resource dependencies on the commissioners
iv. socioeconomic characteristics of the population served
TABLE 13 Commissioning organisations: foci for control of provision (2010–12)
Service
characteristic PCT CCG LA SHI ASL
Predominant
objectives
Implement national
policies
Primary–secondary
care co-ordination
Elected
councillors’
priorities
Remain solvent,
recruit
subscribers
Implement
regional
government
policy
Referrals Referral volumes,
referral criteria,
unplanned referrals
Referral criteria,
clinical management
problems
Redefining
eligibility criteria
(social care)
Referral volumes,
case mix
Cross-boundary
patient flows,
case load
(volume)
Finance Overall costs, prevention of ‘over-activity’ Overall costs,
per diem costs
Overall costs,
prevention of
‘overactivity’, risk
pooling
Overall costs,
prevention of
‘over-activity’
Care groups Care groups of interest
to secondary providers
Large care groups
for whom GPs are
responsible
Groups whose
care LA funds
Large care
groups
Large care
groups
Provider
development
Implement national
initiatives, stabilise
main providers
Substitute primary
for secondary care
Sustain
sufficient
affordable
providers
Within Land plan
(hospitals),
selective
contracts
Develop existing
providers
through pilot
schemes
Care-pathway
development
Reducing hospital
admissions,
multiprovider pathways,
co-ordinating health
and social care
Co-ordinating
health and social
care
Coordinating
health and
social care
Disease
management,
mental health-
care networks
Reduce
cross-boundary
flows, integrate
primary and
social care
Service quality Care pathway
redesign, national
guidance and targets
Care pathway
redesign,
evidence-based
practice
Conformity
to registration
standards
Conformity to
national quality
standards
Presence of
peer-review-
based audit
systems
Provider
selection
Main local providers Main local providers In-authority
providers
Not permitted Existing
providers only
LA, local authority.
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2. two sets of technical factors:
i. the service technologies (at model of care level) for each care group
ii. the inherited physical infrastructure of services: whether they had more or less capacity than
commissioners needed, the specialities available, their location, and the availability of alternatives
3. commissioners’ own selection of the media of power noted above, and how commissioners developed
their commissioning practices, learning from how providers responded.
Relationships between commissioners and providers both influenced commissioning practice and were
recreated by it. Through the feedback mechanism of provider responses to commissioning, adaptive
commissioning practices emerged from the commissioners. The absence or presence of conflicts of
interests between commissioners and providers, attenuated or exacerbated by the local micro-political
history of relationships between the organisations and among the individuals involved in commissioning,
influenced which media of power commissioners needed to use in their commissioning practice.
In England, deprivation, PCT mergers and PCT income (per capita of population) appeared no less, and in
many cases more, strongly associated with service use289 and the outcomes we studied than did HHI
(a putative measure of competition), independent-sector provision or client-based commissioning.
Relationships between commissioners and providers were defined by the relative importance and operation
of, or the absence of, each medium of power discussed in Chapter 2. Each specific combination of these
media, and the corresponding commissioning practices, constituted a specific mode of commissioning.
Abstracting general patterns from our comparisons of commissioning practice across study sites, countries
and tracer groups, three main modes of commissioning were most evident. Concentrating on the
commissioner–provider interface, Table 14 contrasts them.
TABLE 14 Three modes of commissioning
Medium of
power Case mix commissioning Surrogate planning Micro-commissioning
Managerial
performance
Case mix modelling+ audit+
subscriber marketing
Service planning for geographical
population
Clinical experience+ knowledge of
evidence bases
Negotiated
order
Consensus: multiple
commissioners – one provider
Principal–agent Multiple stakeholder providers,
commissioners, patients
(and optionally others)
Discursive
control
Solidarity+ juridical
rights+ case mix data
Policy compliance+ EBM+ local
political culture
EBM+ local knowledge+ culture of
supporting local health system
Financial
incentives
Tariffs (bundled) Block payments+ ad hoc pay for
performance+ tariffs (bundled)
Continuity of provider contract
Provider
competition
None: referral ‘framing’ at
most
Provider competition or bilateral
monopoly
None: coproduction of care
pathways and service specifications
instead
Juridical Comprehensive regulation+
administrative law
Unwritten constitution+ common
law
No direct application
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Thus the population-based commissioning structures in England and across the Italian regions sustained
a mode of commissioning that we have called ‘surrogate planning’. Client-based commissioning
sustained a case mix mode of commissioning, more developed in Germany but having a secondary role in
England and Italy too. Micro-commissioning focused more upon service quality; the case mix and surrogate
planning modes of commissioning focused more upon finance and performance. To the more limited
extent that we could study general practice-based commissioning structures, they especially sustained
the micro-commissioning mode. (What we have called general practice-based commissioning is, more
precisely, the commissioning structure in which the patient’s primary-care gatekeeper commissions the
other health services to which the patient is referred.) The concept of a ‘mode of commissioning’
makes explicit the mechanisms (media of power) by which commissioners attempt to control providers,
the requisite contexts (environment) and how the mechanisms interact. Surrogate planning is one specific,
concrete instance of a mode of commissioning. Case mix commissioning and micro-commissioning are
two more. Each commissioning organisation that we studied combined elements of several modes of
commissioning, but one predominated, so that in practice the health systems we studied had hybrid
commissioning structures. Under case mix commissioning, managerial performance, negotiated order
and juridical controls appeared the dominant media of power. In surrogate planning, a different
kind of negotiated order, provider competition and financial incentives and penalties dominated.
Micro-commissioning relied on the negotiative use of discursive controls. Other media of power were
marginal or absent. Even where the same medium (e.g. negotiated order) was used in different health
systems, it took a different form in each, depending on what other media of power coexisted and of
course on the national political culture.
Empirical patterns
Our empirical findings – whose limitations we reiterate in the next section – suggest that commissioners
depended on three complementary (not alternative) parallel strategies for exercising governance over
health-care providers. A strategy of trust, developed through stable working relationships between the
individuals representing either side, rested upon a negotiated order and shared normative assumptions.
In the CCGs we studied, those relationships were increasingly negotiated between GPs and hospital
consultants, and framed in predominantly medical terms. Financial and clinical discussions were kept
largely separate. A more distrustful, incisive strategy harnessed the provider’s resource dependency and
the commissioner’s capacity (where it existed) to reduce or increase the provider’s income. Both strategies
required transparent data about provider activity; commissioners needed to be not only able to access
provider data, but also able to analyse the data and willing to confront whatever provider performance
issues were exposed. Provider competition and juridical controls had a more ancillary role. Provider
competition was one way to make commissioners’ threats to withdraw resources credible. (Another, in
Italy, was to allow commissioners a ‘make or buy’ option for procuring services.) In themselves juridical and
regulatory controls were a clumsy medium of power, but also a source of shared normative assumptions
(e.g. about commissioners’ rights and duties).
The first two strategies took quasi-market structures as given. A third strategy was to modify or work
around those structures. If the providers co-operated, a commissioner could in effect modify the separation
of competing providers by encouraging them to collaborate, whether by forming care networks or by
making one provider the subcontractor of another, ‘lead’, provider. The same can be done among
separate, potentially competing commissioners. Commissioners could also modify the incentive structures
by adjusting the unit of payment to providers, for instance by bundling tariff payments. These workarounds
modified quasi-market structures in the interests, as commissioners saw it, of governance over health-care
providers, especially when commissioners had to pursue such aims as cost control, which would have been
harder without these market modifications.
These patterns point towards a contingency theory of health-care commissioning (see section
Commissioning contingencies). Before outlining it, though, we report the qualifications that attend our
empirical findings.
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Limitations and qualifications
Specific caveats about the above findings are already stated in the methods and findings chapters. Here
we add only more general limitations and qualifications to our conclusions. Beginning with theoretical
limitations, other theories, such as sociolegal theory and institutional economics, might also be applied to
and tested against our data. It may also still be early to expect a commissioning system undergoing
reorganisation during the study period to realise commissioning outcomes first formulated in policy
documents during 2010–12, although as Chapter 1 indicates these policies have substantial continuities
with longer-established policies.
We did not take our cognitive frame analysis of the programme theory of NHS commissioning as far as a
full discourse-historical analysis, or examine how the programme theory is embedded in wider genres
and ideologies.
Our findings have, we repeat, a limited empirical basis: a systematic comparison of commissioners in
three countries, a specific selection of England-wide data sets, a policy and discourse analysis, and four
(for some issues, five) interview-centred case studies in England. We focused on health services, mainly
secondary care at that, excluding intersectoral public health, research, training, capital allocation and,
above all, long-term care, which in England, Germany and Italy is mostly financed separately. At the time
of this study CCGs were still developing. Many details and practicalities of their eventual work remained
unknown. The same applied to psychiatric commissioning in Germany. Our cross-sectional analysis was
limited to published data, which made only two media of power susceptible to quantitative analysis and
left it an open question if other measures of policy outcomes might show greater effects of competition,
and if a longitudinal study would. We analysed the WCC competencies only in the aggregate, not how far
each competence was separately associated with the health policy outcomes that we studied.
The cross-sectional analysis of managerial data used pre-CCG data for a period 2 years before the case
study fieldwork, raising the question of what implications the differences in period for the cross-sectional
and the case study data have for the present findings. Obviously no such implications arise from the
free-standing conclusions of the cross-sectional study. On balance our findings suggest that commissioning
practice in 2010–11 was not so different from 2008–9 that the cross-sectional and the case study data
report substantially different commissioning regimes and therefore cannot be combined. Managerial staff
turnover was high in our four case study sites but we found little evidence that commissioning practice
changed substantially because of that. Indeed services there were reviewed and recommissioned
less frequently. There was considerable continuity of GP involvement during 2008–11. If anything, GPs
were in those sites less inclined than managers to use competition as a means of influencing providers,
but, against that, the government became more inclined to after 2010. Formally, PCTs, not CCGs, were
responsible for commissioning throughout. Nevertheless, the ideal solution to this time difference would
be to extend both analyses into the period after 2010, yielding a longitudinal study, should the data
become available.
Our mixed methods contributed unequally to the findings. The core research was case study findings
at four English sites, with some in-depth work on exemplar tracer conditions and some comparative
international case studies. Case studies are inherently open to recall and response bias, but triangulation
between informants and other data sources reduced the risk. Comparing a variety of commissioners had
the methodological advantage of enabling us to contrast varied organisational structures, but at the price
of having to rely on the qualitative generalisation of our findings, a step to be taken cautiously. Our case
studies covered four of the (then) 152 English PCTs, plus a fifth (Livewell) in part. Fewer case study data,
in particular from providers, were available from one site (Milltown) than the other three. In Milltown the
three main negotiative orders (GPs with commissioners; commissioner with hospitals; micro-commissioning)
were long established and, despite other hospitals being available near its borders, the commissioners
made little use of provider competition. If anything, the lower representation of Milltown might have led
us to understate the importance of negotiated order versus provider competition as a medium of power.
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Another empirical limitation is that we did not observe formal commissioning meetings. However, this is
less of a limitation than might appear. We found that formal commissioning meetings were not the only
venue for commissioning work. Information and ‘intelligence’ sharing, not to mention ‘backroom’ dealing
(p. 253),102 mostly occurred elsewhere. In one-to-one interviews, informants were freer to speak candidly
and critically than in meetings. Discourses, ideologies and evidence are the same in meetings as elsewhere.
In two sites, some of the pivotal meetings were so heated that it is doubtful outsider observers would have
been admitted, and if they had been their presence would probably have had Hawthorne effects289 on
how the meetings were conducted. From the case studies we have abstracted qualitative generalisations,
which will apply more widely only to the extent that the commissioning methods we reported have
counterparts elsewhere. However, because NHS commissioning is quite centrally controlled, pursues largely
nationally defined objectives and has essentially similar organisational structures across England, our
findings may be generalisable with caution. Table 15 shows that for the variables most relevant to
commissioning practice and its service outcomes, our study sites (2010–12 data) covered most of the range
of variation for England while avoiding outliers, except perhaps for PCT surplus/deficit, where our sites fell
within a narrow range (small surpluses).
Most but not all of our study sites used private-sector commissioning support, also matching the
England-wide pattern.290
Nevertheless, comparisons with the rest of England, and of the UK, might yield different findings. At
cross-country level, we compared just two other countries, although again selecting countries whose
health systems have parallels elsewhere. Our selection of study sites meant that this study reported
three main generic modes of commissioning, but others exist, including:
l general practice-based commissioning, under which a general practice, or other primary-care
gatekeeper, holds the budget for their use of those services
l commissioning of health care for occupational groups
l corporate health insurers’ commissioning of health services
l commissioning of intersectoral health promotion (smoking-control campaigns, etc.).
TABLE 15 Study sites: Comparison with all England (2010–12)
Variable Study site range England range England mean
Listed GP patients 239,641–399,807 93,218–1,298,398 357,307
% budget spent on largest provider 36–93 24–97 66
Independent-sector spending (%) 0.75–14.5 0.01–17.3 3.47
HHI 0.21–0.67 0.14–0.93 0.51
Average deprivation score 14.62–36.97 8.81–45.0 23.64
PCT surplus/deficit (% of allocation) 0.02–1.7 –5.23–5.11 0.46
PCT income per capita £799.97–£1947.67 £343.34–£4907.28 £1392.33
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Commissioning contingencies: environment, technology and ‘fit’
Empirical findings about CCGs and PCTs have a transient local interest, but taken with the cross-country
comparisons they can make a more enduring contribution to explanations of which modes of commissioning
and which commissioning practices emerge in different settings, and therefore how governance occurs
through commissioning. Our empirical findings suggest a contingency account of how governance is
exercised through different modes of commissioning. This study contributes to the study of governance by
suggesting outlines of such a theory of commissioning, something which barely exists yet. Pending fuller
discussion elsewhere, we note two main sets of external constraints on the modes of commissioning that a
commissioning organisation can use: environmental constraints and technical constraints.
The media of power available to commissioners depended on the policy, legal and economic settings
and the quasi-market structures within which commissioners worked i.e. the commissioners’ organisational
environment. Combining our English (see Chapter 7), German and Italian evidence (see Chapter 12), we
distinguished three generic modes of commissioning. Instances of all three were found in each health
system, but one tended to predominate. Each mode of commissioning involved a specific configuration of
media of power. Certain media of power, in specific forms, were available to commissioners while others
were weak or absent (see Tables 9, 11, 13, 14 and 31). In the case of England, our four case studies and
the cross-sectional analysis together suggested that only in quite specific circumstances did each medium
of power appear to help commissioners exercise governance over providers. Governments’ willingness
to face the electoral consequences of confronting providers (see Chapter 5, section Policy-makers’ and
top managers’ programme theory) constrained commissioners’ negotiating position; German SHIs were
constrained by providers’ legal rights to payment; and so on.
A second set of constraints arose from the technical character of health care for different care groups.
Our evidence, mainly from five English case studies (including Livewell) and Germany, suggested distinct
patterns of commissioning for different care groups. For each care group, commissioners had selected
and developed configurations of the media of power which they considered to be adapted and
practically relevant for maintaining commissioners’ governance over the corresponding health services.
The technological character of different health services (e.g. for different care groups) had influenced the
selection and impact of different media of power – not, as we had expected when writing the study
protocol, technology at the level of differences in clinical or therapeutic practice, but at two other levels.
One level was that of the characteristics of the model of care typical of that care group. Relevant
characteristics were the extent of the available evidence base, case mix homogeneity, whether or not
care outcomes were well defined, whether patients usually required a discrete episode of treatment or
longer-term care involving multiple providers simultaneously, and whether or not health services or health
promotion campaigns were relevant. The other level was that of the providers: minimum size compared
with the scale of population health-care needs, which determines whether many providers were required,
giving scope for provider competition, or just one; specialities; and geographical dispersal.
Contingency theory291 assumes that an organisation’s structures and managerial practices adapt to ‘fit’ its
productive technologies and environment. Typically this adaptation occurs by trial and error. Observation
of what adaptations develop, and under which circumstances, suggests which modes of healthcare
commissioning appear adapted to which contexts and care groups.
We compared the media of power relevant to commissioning services for each tracer group (see Table 8) with
those available to commissioners under each of the three modes of commissioning we studied (see Table 14).
The comparison (Table 16) suggests that each mode of commissioning is a better ‘fit’ for some care groups
than others. Some modes of commissioning make it easy, and others make it harder, for commissioners
to exercise governance over the providers of services which use a particular kind of care ‘technology’.
In Table 16, ‘Origin’ means the type of quasi-market setting292 which each mode of commissioning
characteristically originated from and was adapted to. ‘Favoured providers’ indicates which type of provider
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organisations have tended to predominate and which, therefore, commissioners focus upon in that
environment. ‘Care networks’ typically consist of public providers, small firms and third-sector
organisations, who collectively provide and co-ordinate care for a group of patients.293 Under ‘technology’,
the ‘care groups’ row shows the care groups for whom the fit is closest between the technically relevant
configuration of media of power and the mode of commissioning.
Episodic and chronic health problems are of course ends of a continuum. Developments in clinical and
therapeutic technologies shift care groups along it, when for instance previously chronic conditions
become more effectively treatable. The surrogate planning mode of commissioning appears applicable
across most of this continuum for several reasons. Service planning at population level does not require
the detailed patient-level service specifications or classifications that case mix commissioning and
micro-commissioning do. Population-level norms of provision can be used instead, including norms based
on epidemiological and other evidence that explains service utilisation patterns. The surrogate planning
mode of commissioning can also accommodate flexible incentives (e.g. DRGs, target-based payments) at
the margins of block contracts (though if the marginal incentives became predominant it collapses into
case mix commissioning). Of the three modes of commissioning we examined in detail, only surrogate
planning could readily accommodate the ‘technology’ of intersectoral health promotion campaigns outside
the health sector (e.g. to promote exercise).
TABLE 16 ‘Fit’ between health system environments, modes of commissioning and care technologies
Broad
contingency
Specific
contingency Case mix commissioning Surrogate planning Micro-commissioning
Health system
environment
Origin Compulsory private
insurance; social insurance
Managed/planned
competition
Primary doctor-based
purchasing
Provider
selection by
commissioner
None Managed systematically Assembled ad hoc
Favoured
providers
Corporate; ‘public firms’;
professional partnerships
Public; third sector Care networks
Care ‘technology’ Type of
episode
Discrete Almost all Prolonged and/or
recurrent health problems,
including those prone to
exacerbations or crises
Care groups
with closest
fit
Planned acute care, low to
medium complexity
(e.g. planned orthopaedic
surgery; episodic mild
mental health problems;
clinical prevention)
Large groups with
predictable, understood
utilisation patterns
(e.g. planned orthopaedic
surgery); target populations
for intersectoral prevention
(e.g. smokers)
Chronic conditions,
including degenerative
conditions; multiple
health problems
(e.g. older people having
repeated unplanned
hospital admissions;
chronic and/or complex
mental health problems)
Care
‘technology’
Acute treatment of discrete,
independent episodes of
ill-health; clinical prevention
Acute care, long-term care,
intersectoral prevention
Co-ordinated multiprovider
treatment of multiple,
recurrent or chronic health
problems
Supplementary governance
structures
Juridical, planning hierarchy Hidden hierarchy, networks
with other commissioners
and small providers
Network
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Emerging and adaptive commissioning: practical implications
A contingency theory of commissioning identifies factors, some beyond commissioners’ control, which
constrain commissioners’ governance over providers. Yet any empirically credible theory must also
accommodate our evidence (see Chapter 8) that commissioners nevertheless normally have some room
for manoeuvre.
Commissioning practice was made to ‘fit’ the health system environment and/or health care technologies
in various ways. Most obviously, commissioners selected or developed a mode of commissioning to fit the
care group, their own aims and the health system context. Conversely, governments sometimes mandated
a mode of commissioning in order to accommodate certain types of provider and/or care technology.
However, care technologies, the demographic and epidemiological patterns which necessitate them, and
the science which produces them are not very amenable to manipulation by policy-makers. Our findings
suggest that, when there is no close ‘fit’ between organisational environment, care technology and their
own aims, commissioners respond with one or more of the following:
1. Workarounds within an existing mode of commissioning. For instance, they tried to modify,
amalgamate or invent DRGs for commissioning care for patients with multiple, complex long-term
health-care needs.
2. Combining or hybridising several modes of commissioning (e.g. tariff payments with
micro-commissioning in CCGs).
3. Supplementing commissioning with non-market governance structures (‘supplementary governance
structures’ in Table 16). Thus, difficult contract negotiations in two of our English study sites became
occasions when regional NHS bodies exercised hierarchical power (‘hidden hierarchy’). Commissioners
in England, Germany and Italy tried to set up care networks to co-ordinate (‘integrate’) care across
separate providers. Indeed, under micro-commissioning, contract-based commissioning was an adjunct
to care networks rather than vice versa.
4. Neglecting certain care technologies (e.g. before 1990 many east European health systems had few
means of commissioning community health services).
The emerging commissioning practices that we have reported were adaptive practical responses to the
constraints facing commissioners. CCGs are also likely to have to develop adaptive responses insofar as
commissioning policy rests on empirically questionable assumptions (see first section of Chapter 13).
These emergent adaptations and their counterparts in Germany and Italy suggest some practical
implications.
Our cross-sectional and English case study evidence suggested that provider competition had limited
usefulness for governance. It was associated with commissioners achieving a minority, but only a minority,
of the policy outcomes we studied, and it remained unclear what primary care providers had also
contributed to these outcomes. Sometimes differently owned providers reacted differently to the same
commissioning initiatives (see Chapter 7, section Provider competition). An obvious practical implication is
that commissioner managers sensitise themselves to the differences in organisational goals, cultures and
working practices between public, corporate and third-sector providers. For the ‘integration’ (co-ordination)
of multiple providers, provider competition was of little practical relevance. As German SHIs had also
concluded, micro-commissioning was also required, which depended on involving the relevant providers
and then building long-term working relationships with and among them. Insofar as more diverse providers
tended to have more divergent interests, it appeared a lesser evil to recognise the divergent interests rather
than try to argue them away. As Williamson’s theory82 implies, these circumstances of asset specificity
(of clinical skills), frequent contracts and complex, variegated products (uncertain outcomes) tended to
impel commissioners and providers away from market-like relationships towards relationships more like
those within a single organisation, although contracting mediated and masked them in quasi-markets.
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In any case, when provider competition did occur (e.g. in Germany) providers’ resource dependency was
what motivated it. Commissioners could harness that resource dependency directly, even when negotiating
with a monopoly provider (see Chapter 10, section Making providers more helpful). Commissioners’
likelihood of success in doing so depended, though, on both sides believing that the commissioner could
reduce the resources it allocated to non-compliant providers. However, the very fact that commissioners
were exercising governance, that is acting as agents of the government’s, undermined this belief insofar as
governments avoided publicly accepting responsibility for such acts (see Chapter 5, section Policy-makers’
and top managers’ programme theory) or when corporate providers were guaranteed NHS contracts.246
In either event, commissioners ‘go naked into the conference chamber’294 to negotiate with providers.
It is often noted (see Chapter 2, section Negotiated order) that contractual relationships between
commissioners and providers require a negotiated order – ‘relationality’ – alongside formal tendering,
contract awarding and monitoring. We add that this is not only to compensate for contracts’
incompleteness. Neither is it a complete alternative to the more incisive commissioning strategies
mentioned in the section Empirical patterns above. A negotiated order involving influential professionals
on the provider side, evidence from our four English case studies (see Chapter 10) suggested, helps to
promote understanding, hence willing implementation, of the commissioners’ aims in parts of the provider
organisation which are not involved in formal contract or budget negotiations. Post-2010 NHS structures
and rules also instituted broader, more systematic collaboration between consultants and GPs, placing
GPs (as commissioners) on a more equal footing with consultants. This development, that of
micro-commissioning and the strengthening of joint commissioning, attenuated the tripartite structural
division which has inconvenienced interorganisational collaboration for the NHS since 1948. All these
developments have the practical implication of commissioners adopting a long-term approach to
maintaining trust between the parties involved, a task which involves both personal negotiating styles and
the stability not just of the organisations but of the personnel involved.
We found in our four English case studies that a stable negotiated order between the ‘lead’ GPs involved
in commissioning and the other GPs could be accumulated piecemeal by commissioners taking a flexible
opportunistic approach to recruiting interested GPs when new policy initiatives or local project ideas arose.
This necessarily happened gradually. Some GPs perceived that hospital interests had ‘captured’ local
commissioners. Many GPs and consultants also wanted to avoid being made responsible for linking clinical
and financial decisions, equated by some with rationing and commissioner scrutiny of clinical practice.
An emergent solution was for commissioners to involve, if not ‘difficult’ GPs and consultants, then at least
the stratum of (respectively) lead GPs and medical directors, in financial negotiations, for their support for
commissioning decisions might be more persuasive to other doctors than non-medical managers’ opinions.
Besides the use of evidence basing, commissioner governance over providers through a negotiated order
required a shared emic discourse. That the discourse is shared was almost as important as its particular
content, provided that it legitimised commissioner governance over providers’ activity. Our English and
German case studies suggested that norms which overemphasise providers’ independence were
counterproductive for governance purposes. Insofar as commissioners can influence providers’
organisational cultures, the practical implications are obvious.
We found two emergent adaptations to client-based commissioning, more extensive in Germany than
England or Italy. Our evidence suggested that unmodified tariff payment systems were likely to be
counterproductive for the purpose of containing service costs. Tariffs were too marktkonform
(market-conforming), that is too similar to prices in conventional markets, which tend to incentivise the
open-ended expansion of production and allow only weak governance.295 Commissioners in all three
countries adapted the tariff system by defining ‘bundles’ of tariff payments and using non-tariff rates of
payment at the margin, to incentivise a more controlled and focused development of case loads and case
mix, and to protect providers that reduced case loads from penalty. Intelligently designed cost-and-volume
contracts can be used similarly (Chapter 7, section Financial incentives). Non-tariff payments are anyway
required for commissioning intersectoral health promotion. A second adaptation was for commissioners to
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try to influence providers indirectly by influencing patients’ choices through marketing methods
(e.g. health advice services) or ‘nudges’ such as discounts for SHI subscribers, or by influencing GPs’ referral
decisions. CCGs in our four study sites and Livewell (and elsewhere, judging by professional press reports)
were increasingly attempting to manage GP referrals during 2010–12.
Monitoring information gathered in one commissioning cycle helps inform commissioners in planning
the next. The new NHS structures and rules made hospital activity more transparent to commissioners
and made commissioners’ plans for service development more explicit, specific and concrete. These are
textbook precepts of good planning and project management. NHS commissioners nevertheless often
depended on providers to collect and interpret monitoring data. A practical implication, especially
observed in Germany, was for commissioners to develop provider activity databases whose data did
not depend so heavily on the providers who were being monitored. This was a strength of DRG-based
systems. If cost-and-volume contracts are used, the commissioners’ problem was then to obtain similar
levels of transparency and information. An obvious practical implication would be to collate, preferably
automatically, activity data that ought to be collected anyway at patient level for clinical management
reasons, for instance referral data per provider by International Classification of Diseases code.
Anonymised data usually suffice. German evidence suggests that it was effort well spent for commissioners
to develop the specialised epidemiological and statistical skills for analysing the data. Yet our evidence,
from both England and Italy, also confirmed the practical value of supplementing IT-based monitoring
with qualitative knowledge of providers’ interests, problems and plans, through a negotiated order with
providers. A striking example was the corporate hospital reporting consultant ‘misbehaviour’ (Chapter 7,
section Provider competition). The acquisition of skills, links and relationships required stable staffing on
both sides, an area in which clinicians’ knowledge and networks especially contributed to commissioning.
In summary, commissioning practice in our four case study sites worked in certain respects differently from
what NHS commissioning policy assumed. Financial and ‘real-side’ contract negotiations were partly
decoupled, with less clinician involvement on the financial side. Commissioners influenced providers
(including fellow GPs) more through a negotiated order and discussions about evidence than through
competitive mechanisms (including patient choice). Commissioners routinely compared providers against
national and regional benchmarks, but seldom deselected providers for that (or any other) reason. Where
multiple hospitals coexisted, analysis of cross-England data suggested that a minority of their service
outcomes (including some proxy clinical outcomes) improved, but more did not. Different combinations
of the media of power – distinct modes of commissioning – appeared to be required for exercising
governance over the providers of services for different care groups, and for different organisational types
and sizes of provider. Depending on these circumstances, governance through commissioning appeared to
require giving different weights to three parallel strategies for exercising governance over health-care
providers: one based on trust and relationality; a more sceptical, challenging strategy; and ad hoc
workarounds when quasi-market structures seemed ill-adapted to commissioners’ purposes. A key
managerial skill in the commissioners we studied appeared to be that of combining these elements
judiciously. In any event, commissioners depended upon the transparency of provider activity data and the
ability to analyse it. When commissioners and providers repeatedly have to work around quasi-market
structures (e.g. by bundling tariffs, micro-commissioning), wider questions arise about how the health
system should be structured.
Further research
Current English health policy assumes that private providers, social enterprises and NHS-owned providers
respond differently from NHS commissioners in terms of ‘efficiency’, cost, propensity to innovate and
willingness to compete. These differences are assumed to reflect the differences in provider ownership.
We found some evidence consistent with this assumption and so, redactions notwithstanding, did the
Competition Commission’s 2013 report.296 It is important for the quality, development, integration and
economical provision of NHS-funded care for NHS commissioners to understand what these differences in
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provider responses are; under what conditions and for which care groups these obtain; and if or how
commissioners might deal with these consequences or indeed exploit them. Our evidence also showed
the importance of micro-commissioning for certain care groups, raising the question of how to sustain
effective micro-commissioning as providers increasingly compete and diversify. As noted, a limitation of the
present study was that CCG commissioning had not yet ‘gone live’, making it too early to judge what
effects CCG commissioning might have on the substitution of primary for secondary care, and upon
cost control.
Our evidence, and its limitations, suggest the following needs, in descending order of importance, for
further research to increase knowledge and understanding of:
1. if differently owned providers (corporate, third sector, public, professional partnership, etc.) respond
differently from health-care commissioners and, if so, what specific implications for commissioning
practice follow
2. the impact of commissioning practices on health system integration when care pathways have to be
constructed across multiple providers that must tender competitively for work, perhaps against
each other
3. the emergent system-wide effects accumulating, over a period of say 3–5 years, from the separate,
competitive commissioning of an assemblage of providers of unequal size and diverse ownership
4. the negotiating practices used within contract negotiations, provider monitoring and problem-solving
negotiations, not only in formal meetings but also in the informal micro-politics of deal making,
tacit trade-offs and the sharing (or concealment) of activity data, cost data and ‘intelligence’
(qualitative, informal knowledge) between providers and commissioners. This is particularly relevant
to monopsony–monopoly negotiations (i.e. a commissioner with its dominant provider).
Additionally:
5. What variants of ways of bundling tariff payments can be found and
i. how do they compare as means of cost control?
ii. to what extent do they retain the monitoring-information advantages of classic tariff systems?
6. Data availability limited our reanalysis of managerial data to a cross-sectional study design. There
remains a need for a longitudinal analysis, as data become available. Our evidence about the difficulty
of interpreting such findings suggests that such a study ought to include qualitative research into the
organisational mechanisms producing any important patterns found in the quantitative
longitudinal study.
7. What commissioning practices and other conditions help CCGs and local government to focus and
collaborate – despite our evidence of the difficulties – on managing certain strategically important
activities (avoidable admission prevention; making planned care more efficient; primary prevention
through intersectoral activity)?
8. Once CCGs have stabilised and matured, what continuities and discontinuities from PCT commissioning
practice will they show?
9. What specific managerial skills, and other personal attributes, commissioning managers might require;
for instance, which of the WCC competencies remain relevant to NHS commissioning.
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Appendix 1 Inputs to the Leximancer analysis
Published and grey documents analysed (excluding transcripts)
Equity and Excellence 2010.195
Liberating the NHS – Allied Health Professionals.301
Liberating the NHS – Analytical Framework.302
Liberating the NHS – Commissioning for Patients consultation paper.303
Liberating the NHS – Equality Impact.304
Liberating the NHS – letter from Sir David Nicolson.305
Liberating the NHS – Local Democratic Legitimacy in Health Consultation Paper.306
Liberating the NHS – Regulating Healthcare Providers Consultation Paper.307
Liberating the NHS – Report of the Arm’s Length Bodies.308
Liberating the NHS – Transition – Nicholson annex.309
Liberating the NHS – Transition – Nicholson letter.310
Liberating the NHS – Transparency in Outcomes: A Framework for the NHS Consultation Paper.311
Liberating the NHS – An Information Revolution Consultation.312
Health and Social Care Act 2012.196
A1. Factsheet – Overview – 24 April 2012.209
A2. Factsheet – Case for Change – 24 April 2012.210
A3. Factsheet – Overview of Health and Care Structures – 24 April 2012.211
A4. Factsheet – Scrutiny and Improvements – 30 May 2012.212
B1. Factsheet – Clinically Led Commissioning – 24 April 2012.213
B2. Factsheet – Provider Regulation to Support Innovative and Efficient Services – 24 April 2012.214
B3. Factsheet – Greater Voice for Patients – 30 May 2012.215
B4. Factsheet – New Focus for Public Health – 25 April 2012.216
B5. Factsheet – Greater Accountabilty Locally and Nationally – 25 April 2012.217
B6. Factsheet – Streamlined Arm’s Length Bodies – 25 April 2012.218
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B7. Factsheet – On Support Worker Regulation – 27 February 2012.219
C1. Factsheet – Improving Quality of Care [undated].220
C2. Factsheet – Tackling Inequalities in Healthcare – 27 April 2012.221
C3. Factsheet – Promoting Better Integration of Health and Care Services – 27 April 2012.222
C4. Factsheet – Choice and Competition – 27 April 2012.223
C5. The Role of the SofS – 30 May 2012.224
C6. Factsheet – Reconfiguration of Services – 27 April 2012.225
C7. Establishing New National Bodies – 27 April 2012.226
C8. Research – 27 April 2012.227
C9. Education and Training – 27 April 2012.228
House of Commons Health Committee. 2010. Commissioning. Fourth Report of Session 2009–10.
London: HMSO.30
Leximancer data tables, documentary and oral material
samples combined
TABLE 17 Context-concept frequencies of occurrence
Concept Count
Social 1589
Clinical 1499
Local 1436
Public 810
National 392
Risk 174
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TABLE 18 Mechanism-concept frequencies of occurrence
Concept Count
Commissioner(s)/commissioning 2292
Provider(s)/provision 2073
Services 1844
Care 1605
NHS 1562
Patients 1470
Foundation/trust(s) 1214
Person/people 1090
GP(s) 1072
Secretary (of State) 887
Consortia 886
Monitor 756
Service 669
Board 667
System 658
Information 625
Act 514
PCT(s) 504
(Local) authority 447
Bodies 425
Organisations 399
Government 382
Health care 341
National Health Service Act 330
Management 275
Money 273
Staff 255
Evidence 192
Treatment 187
Hospital 160
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TABLE 19 Outcome-concept frequencies of occurrence
Concept Count
Health 3190
Quality 839
Outcomes 512
Needs 352
Available 286
Better 273
Important 272
TABLE 20 Co-occurrences of mechanism with outcome concepts
Mechanism concepts
Outcome concepts
Health Quality Outcomes Needs Available Better Important
Service(s) 1627 332 149 149 96 82 63
Care/health care 1367 374 263 125 82 115 58
Provider(s)/provision 666 244 101 83 59 37 42
Commissioner(s)/commissioning 649 261 175 137 67 58 78
NHS 539 216 176 75 50 69 52
Patient(s) 441 323 234 153 54 103 54
National Health Service Act 413 20 5 13 37 3 2
Foundation trust 347 45 6 23 28 14 18
Person/people 316 75 43 39 38 23 24
Consortia 241 108 88 58 26 21 36
GP(s) 268 118 94 74 24 30 39
Secretary (of State) 265 37 31 9 17 6 4
Authority (local) 249 13 5 25 2 7 11
Information 216 66 39 23 48 21 12
Monitor 211 40 4 12 13 4 9
Bodies 184 27 4 15 4 9 9
System 183 112 56 31 15 34 40
Board (NHS commissioning) 148 41 25 4 14 1 7
Organisations 122 46 19 22 13 16 14
Government 118 29 33 20 10 12 23
PCT(s) 88 39 8 21 12 23 29
Treatment 73 25 16 6 6 6 3
Staff 72 17 15 15 12 10 8
Management 51 53 16 7 10 14 11
Evidence 42 21 22 12 15 6 5
Money 40 53 18 14 10 25 19
Hospital 40 14 10 6 4 10 1
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Equity and Excellence: Liberating the NHS and branded supporting documents
In descending order of frequency, the concepts identified concerning contexts were:
1. social
2. local
3. public
4. consultation
5. government
6. transition
7. conditions.
In descending order of frequency, the concepts identified concerning mechanisms were:
1. NHS
2. services
3. patient(s)
4. commissioning
5. consortia
6. GP
7. providers
8. system
9. NHS commissioning board
10. indicators
11. information
12. people
13. organisations
14. health-care
15. provide
16. choice
17. arm’s-length
18. framework
19. White Paper
20. Monitor
21. staff
22. service
23. primary
24. trusts
25. Department (of Health)
26. regulation
27. statutory
28. provider
29. review
30. treatment.
In descending order of frequency, the concepts identified concerning outcomes were:
1. health
2. care
3. well-being
4. quality
5. outcomes
6. improvement
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7. available
8. costs
9. appropriate.
In descending order of frequency, the top five mechanisms co-occurring with each context-concept were:
l social: services, patient(s), NHS, patients, commissioning
l local: services, patient(s), commissioning, NHS, GP
l public: patient(s), services, NHS, commissioning, consortia
l government: NHS, patient(s), services, providers, system
l transition: system, NHS, commissioning, consortia, GP
l consultation: patient(s), DH, NHS, indicators, information
l conditions: people, services, patient(s), providers, indicators.
In descending order of frequency, the top five contexts co-occurring with each outcome were:
l health: local, public, government, conditions, consultation
l care: local, public, conditions, government, transition
l well-being: local, public, government, transition, consultation
l quality: local, public, government, transition, conditions
l outcomes: social, public, local, conditions, government
l improvement: social, local, public, consultation, government
l available: social, public, consultation, conditions, local
l costs: social, public, government, consultation+ local (joint fourth)
l appropriate: social, local+ public (joint second), government, transition+ consultation+ conditions
(joint fifth).
These patterns are rather consistent. ‘Local’ and ‘public’ co-occurred over 100 times with the first three
outcome-concepts; the other contexts co-occurred with them no more than 38 times. With smaller
numbers, the same pattern recurred for the other outcome-concepts.
In descending order of frequency, the mechanisms most frequently co-occurring with each outcome were:
l health: services, NHS, patients, commissioning, consortia
l care: services, NHS, patients, commissioning, consortia
l well-being: services, commissioning, NHS, patients, consortia
l quality: NHS, patient(s), services, commissioning, consortia
l outcomes: patient(s), NHS, services, commissioning, consortia
l improvement: patient(s), services, NHS, commissioning, consortia
l appropriate: NHS, patient(s), system, arm’s-length
l costs: NHS, services, arm’s-length, organisations, information+ system (joint fifth)
l available: patient(s), NHS, health care, information, indicators.
Again the repetitive pattern is striking, as is the appearance of ‘indicators’ and ‘information’ in relation
only to service availability and cost.
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Oral material
Concepts concerning contexts were:
1. Local.
2. Clinical.
3. Public.
Concepts concerning mechanisms were:
1. Commiss*.
2. People.
3. Patients.
4. Service(s).
5. System.
6. NHS.
7. Provider(s).
8. Money.
9. Patient.
10. GP(s).
11. Hospital.
12. Primary.
13. PCT.
14. Management.
15. Organisations.
16. Sir David Nicholson.
17. Policy.
18. Competition.
Concepts concerning outcomes were:
1. Care.
2. Quality.
3. Health.
4. Better/best/improve.
In descending order of frequency, the top five mechanisms co-occurring with the three context concepts
were now:
l Local: commiss*, service(s), provider(s), PCT, people.
l Clinical: commiss*, service(s), people, GP(s), system.
l Public: service(s), patients, NHS, commiss*+ provider(s) (jointly).
The three contexts co-occurred with the four outcomes in the following descending order:
l Care: local, clinical, public.
l Quality: local, public, clinical.
l Health: local, public, clinical.
l Better/best/improve: local, clinical, public.
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In descending order of frequency, the top five mechanisms co-occurring with each of the four outcome-
concepts were:
l Care: primary, service(s), commiss*, people, provider(s).
l Quality: service(s), commiss*, patients, provider(s), NHS+ system (jointly).
l Health: service(s), commiss*, people, provider(s), system.
l Better/best/improve: service(s), commiss*, patients, NHS, provider(s).
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Appendix 2 Supplementary information
on methods
This appendix supplements the corresponding sections in Chapter 4, Methods, of the main body ofthe report.
Leximancer analysis
Leximancer software, which automates quantified content analysis, proceeds unless otherwise reconfigured
as follows.
1. The software divides the study text into two-sentence blocks.
2. It eliminates stop-words (proper names, ‘and’, ‘the’, interviewer name and other terms that are known
a priori to be uninformative).
3. Frequent words and frequently associated words are selected as ‘seed words’ (‘concepts’).
4. The software codes the two-sentence blocks according to what concepts are present.
5. It counts the occurrences of codes.
6. The most frequently associated concepts are defined as themes (which can be traced back to their
textual sources).
7. By default, Leximancer surfaces the main concepts inductively. The researcher can also rerun Leximancer
further times, selecting those inductively found concepts that are relevant to her research questions for
grouping into themes. In the present case, we selected the concepts and themes relevant to the power
mechanisms discussed in Chapter 2.
The term ‘concept’ has in Leximancer analysis a narrower than usual meaning, denoting ‘co-occurring
words’ (as opposed to the more usual use, in research, of a theoretically informed essential definition).
The study ‘text’ can be a combination of documents (including transcripts, laws), spreadsheets, audio and
video material. We therefore ran three analyses:
1. Equity and Excellence: Liberating the NHS195 and the official support documents branded as explaining
and elaborating it, except for the Assignment for Transition and human resources management
documents,297,298 which were irrelevant to a CMO analysis
2. oral material: speeches and interviews
3. the 2012 Act196 with the official explanatory ‘factsheets’, including one on service quality.209–228
First, we used Leximancer’s default setting to find inductively what themes (and component concepts)
were present in the sample. We coded the concepts found as relating to the context, mechanism or
outcome of NHS commissioning policy or as ‘stop-words’ (e.g. ‘change’, ‘future’, ‘things’, ‘and’, ‘the’, etc.)
for being uninformative, ambiguous (e.g. ‘substitute’), trivial or irrelevant. Approbations, however vague
(e.g. ‘best’, ‘improve’), were also coded as outcomes, that is policy or service outcomes. We collapsed
duplicate concepts (e.g. ‘patient’+ ‘patients’, ‘GP’+ ‘GPs’, ‘better’+ ‘best’+ ‘improve’). We assumed that
the conjunction of concepts or themes denoting a mechanism and/or a context and/or an outcome
denoted an existing or proposed CMO relationship. A count of these conjunctions showed which CMO
relationships received most coverage in the texts. Because some of these conjunctions (textual proximities)
may reflect nothing more than drafting accidents, this method may bias towards overestimating the
number of CMO relationships stated in the texts, but if any such overcounting is more or less evenly
distributed across the texts, as we have assumed, it will not bias the relative frequencies of the different
CMO assertions. From the blocks of texts where Leximancer had found these conjunctions, we extracted
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any descriptions of CMO relationships and classified the mechanisms according to which media of power
they used.
Cognitive frame analysis
Although the quantitative (Leximancer) analysis located which CMO relationships the texts most often
mentioned, they were too broad, ambiguous or brief in saying how these mechanisms worked or would
work. We therefore made a cognitive frame analysis of data from our interviews with parliamentarians and
top-level health managers to elaborate and supplement the accounts of CMO relationships found in the
policy texts. In doing so, we again sought to relate the accounts and explanations (frames) that our
informants used to the categories (CMO; media of power) required for the present study. Mostly the
informants’ accounts were consistent, but where they differed (in emphasis rather than contradicting each
other) we took the more often expressed view as the one more likely to guide commissioning in practice.
When policies are controversial, a simple précis of policy documents and transcripts is likely to oversimplify
the programme theory by omitting relevant aims, mechanisms and implicit background assumptions.
It might also overemphasise spurious rationalisations and the polemics. A more sophisticated discourse
analysis is required. We adopted a ‘rhetorical’ variant.293 This is ‘critical’ in the sense of not necessarily
taking all managerial and political rhetoric at face value or as entirely coherent, valid and normatively
persuasive. We therefore dispute the suggestion that such critiques are impossible;294 its realist character is
just what gives realistic evaluation its critical facet, because a programme theory can be evaluated
empirically. Therefore, to the extent that they rely on these empirical assumptions, so can the policies that
through the medium of political discourse express a programme theory. Nevertheless, taking policy
statements at face value is a necessary starting point and our default assumption until we find reasons to
suspend it.
We took the following signs as calling into question if policy documents should be taken only at
face value:
1. silences or obviously ambiguous policy positions about important mechanisms or outcomes
2. statements contradicting the balance of evidence available when the policy was formulated
3. apparent contradictions among policy statements that (all supporting the policy) ought to be consistent.
Then a realistic evaluator has to infer and impute the missing assumptions in order to reconstitute the
programme theory as completely and explicitly as possible and (to avoid evaluating a ‘straw man’ theory
later on) in the most credible form consistent with the explicitly stated elements. We did so by inviting
policy-makers themselves to elaborate the missing material at interview.
We collated the descriptions of CMO relationships found by these methods and paraphrased them as
statements of the form ‘Doing X in circumstances M will cause agent A to do Y’ (or a logically equivalent
statement, e.g. ‘If A does X, B will do Y’), the form required for empirically testing CMO assumptions.
In this way we identified the CMO relationships by which policy-makers and top managers assumed NHS
commissioning would achieve its intended service outcomes.
Cross-sectional analysis of published managerial data
Before making the regression analyses, we checked for multicolinearity by measuring VIF among the
potential independent and control variables in the regression analyses, retaining only variables whose VIF
was below the conservative threshold of VIF= 2.5 (hence also the conventional threshold VIF= 5.0).
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All analyses were at PCT level. To show effects of, say, provider competition, it is necessary (but not
sufficient) to find non-trivial correlations, with coefficients of the correct sign, between the commissioner
characteristics and the service outcome variables. Since there are a number of such variables, there would
be multiple potential correlations for each commissioner characteristic for which we had data. The higher
the proportion of such correlations found having the sign that the relevant element of programme
theory predicts, and the stronger those correlations, the stronger would be the evidence supporting the
assumption that provider competition has an impact on the policy-relevant service outcomes. Such findings
would support the inference that, if PCTs could stimulate (continuing the example) provider competition,
the PCTs would thereby help to realise those outcomes. Conversely, the absence of any such correlation,
or the presence of correlations with the opposite sign from what the programme theories outlined above
assume, would be prima facie evidence against those assumptions.
In the event (see Chapter 7, subsection Provider competition) we found few of the correlations that the
programme theory assumed, in particular regarding competition. We therefore tested the robustness and
sensitivity of our findings by rerunning the analyses for only the PCTs with the highest levels of
competition, that is those in the top quartile for:
1. spend on independent (i.e. for-profit) sector
2. spend on local government sector and voluntary sector combined (not separated in the published data)
3. Herfindahl index.
The top quartile was selected because it contained 38 sites; a smaller selection would allow test results
only of dubious validity.
Evidence synthesis
Across the case studies, data were synthesised by framework analysis. Conceptually this was equivalent to
constructing, for each research question, a data grid in which each row contained data about a specific
aspect of that research question, and each column represented a site, and then populating the cells with
the relevant data from the case study collections of ‘pithy sentences’, findings from the cross-sectional
analysis, action learning set findings, international comparisons and other published studies. We noted
what common or divergent patterns there were across cells and then ‘read off’ the patterns as answers to
our research questions. This method also revealed where it was necessary to add new categories or
concepts to accommodate unforeseen empirical findings. By combining primary and secondary sources,
we were able to compare (indeed check) our own findings against those from other studies.
As necessary, we derived the (equivalent to) row headings for each such systematic comparison from
the analytical framework in Chapter 2, the programme theory assumptions found by discourse analysis
(see Chapter 5) and by deduction from the research question itself. In this way we nuanced the framework
analysis for each research question. Analysing the reconfiguration of commissioning structures (RQ2)
required a comparison of longitudinal accounts of the formation and development of commissioning
structures in each study site during the study period. Once these histories had been elicited, they too could
be systematically compared in the above way. Regarding RQ3(a), the ways in which commissioners
changed their commissioning practice in an attempt to influence their providers demonstrated that the
commissioners had at least that much freedom of manoeuvre in practice. The limits to this freedom were
found by discovering what practical, resource and policy restrictions there were on their freedom to
exercise the media of power listed in Chapter 2 over their providers. We identified these limits from our
case study materials, policy and regulatory statements. To examine some of the effects of client-based
commissioning [RQ3(b)], we relied more on the cross-sectional than the case study data. Analysing the
similarities and differences in commissioning practice for different care groups provided the basis for
testing some of the theories discussed in Chapter 2 (RQ4).204
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Appendix 3 Measures used in cross-sectional
analysis
To select measures we started from internationally recognised generic health service and health policyoutcomes indicators that the OECD201 and WHO200 have used for international comparisons of health
systems, and Greaves et al.’s list,90 which so far as we were aware was at the time the only published
study similar to this one.
The OECD indicator groupings are:
Quality of care:
l Care for chronic conditions: avoidable admissions: respiratory diseases; uncontrolled diabetes.
l Care for acute exacerbation of chronic conditions: in-hospital mortality following acute myocardial
infarction, stroke.
l Patient safety: obstetric trauma; procedural or postoperative complications.
l Care for mental disorders: unplanned hospital re-admissions for mental disorders.
l Cancer care: screening, survival and mortality for cervical cancer and breast cancer; survival and
mortality for colorectal cancer.
l Care for communicable diseases: childhood vaccination programmes; influenza vaccination for
older people.
Access to care:
l Unmet health care needs.
l Coverage for health care.
l Burden of out-of-pocket health expenditure.
l Geographic distribution of doctors.
l Inequalities in doctor consultations.
l Inequalities in dentist consultations.
l Inequalities in cancer screening.
l Waiting times.
Health expenditure and financing [no sub-national indicators].
Long-term care
l Life expectancy and healthy life expectancy at age 65 years.
l Self-reported health and disability at age 65 years.
l Prevalence and economic burden of dementia.
l Recipients of long-term care.
l Informal carers.
l Long-term care workers.
l Long-term care beds in institutions and hospitals.
l Long-term care expenditure.
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The corresponding WHO indicator groups, from the World Health Report 2000,313 are:
l Health: level (DALY, disability-adjusted life-year), distribution.
l Attainment of goals: responsiveness (level, distribution), fairness in financial contribution, health
expenditure per capita in international dollars.
l Population estimates: dependency, life expectancy at birth, probability of dying.
l Deaths by cause, age, sex, mortality stratum.
l Burden of diseases: DALY, equality of child survival.
l Responsiveness: index of responsiveness.
l Fairness of financial contribution.
l Health expenditure:
¢ total health expenditure as percentage of GDP
¢ public, private, out-of-pocket, tax-funded, social security, other
¢ public expenditure on health as percentage of total public expenditure
¢ per capita health expenditure (total, out-of-pocket, total in international dollars, public in
international dollars, out-of-pocket in international dollars).
l Overall health attainment.
The measures Greaves used were:90
l clinical effectiveness
l controlled blood pressure in hypertension
l controlled blood glucose levels in diabetes
l emergency admissions: acute conditions
l emergency admissions: chronic conditions
l premature mortality from all circulatory diseases
l mortality from causes amenable to health care
l non-elective readmission rate
l emergency admissions: acute conditions usually managed in primary care
l 1-year survival index for all cancers
l breast screening coverage
l cervical screening coverage
l uptake of influenza vaccinations by over-65s
l smoking quitters
l measles, mumps and rubella vaccination
l satisfaction with care received [at GP]
l GP recommendation [whether patient would recommend her GP]
l staff noticed [patient’s] views
l agreed with staff about managing problem
l enough support [in managing long-term condition]
l tonsillectomy rate
l did not attend rate
l excess bed-days per non-elective admission
l length of stay for fractured neck of femur
l low-cost statin prescribing
l see doctor quickly
l book appointment ahead
l satisfaction with opening hours
l 2-week cancer wait
l 18-week wait 2008
l WCC financial governance score
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l Health Care Commission annual health check [score]
l efficiency and effectiveness
l work collaboratively with community
l engagement with clinicians
l work with providers.
Of all the above indicators, those reporting whole-system characteristics were irrelevant for present
purposes, as were indicators related to non-hospital services, that is primary and community care. From
what remained, we selected relevant measures, which were:
1. known or could reasonably be assumed to be amenable to health-care provider activity; hence,
indirectly amenable to commissioner intervention insofar as it influences provider activity
2. reported at PCT level (found by checking NHS Information Centre website), which requirement ruled
out WHO Health Report 2000 indicators, which are all at national level, and many NHS indicators
(e.g. electronic patient-reported outcome measures, meticillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus control,
patient complaints), which were published only at provider level; no data were available for community
health services
3. reported for the same period as the independent variables (2008–9)
4. relevant to main NHS policy priorities during the last decade
5. closest to the OECD and/or WHO indicator definitions, where there was a choice of indicator.
Because the co-ordination of primary and secondary care was one of the PCTs’ roles as commissioners,
we did include indicators/measures of that.
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Appendix 4 Cross-sectional data analysis
findings tables
TABLE 22 Correlations among policy outcome measures (2008–9)
Dependent variable Dependent variable r p
X.19 Amenable mortality all causes
under 75 yo annual directly standardised
X.27 Emergency admissions not usually requiring hospital
admission observed/expected indirectly standardised
0.269 < 0.001
X.33 Mean time waited 0.308 < 0.001
X.34 Median time waited 0.339 < 0.001
X.37 Non-admitted patients referral to treatment
Dec 2008–Dec 2009 all patients < 18 weeks, % change
0.184 0.02
X.39 Monthly mean waiting list, IP & day case,
per weighted population
0.249 0.002
X.20 Emergency re-admissions, above
16 yo, indirectly standardised
X.21 Emergency admissions phc-preventable-chronic
conditions indirectly standardised
0.199 0.012
X.22 Emergency admissions phc-preventable-acute
conditions indirectly standardised
0.218 0.006
X.23 Emergency admissions for PHC-preventable
chronic conditions, per cent improvement from 2007/08
to 2008/09
0.344 0.002
X.25 Emergency re-admissions within 28 days of
discharge from hospital, adults > 16 yo, indirectly age,
method of admission of discharge spell, diagnosis
(ICD-10 chapter/selected sub-chapters within medical
specialities) and procedure (OPCS 4 chapter/selected
sub-chapters within surgical specialities) standardised %
0.768 < 0.001
X.33 Mean time waited 0.171 0.02
TABLE 21 Correlations among independent and control variables (2008–9)
Independent variable Independent or control variable r p
X.4 Choose and book % X.10 Herfindahl index 0.258 0.001
X.7 Spend on local authority and
voluntary sector
X.8 Independent sector spend –0.639 < 0.001
X.10 Herfindahl index X.12 Spend on main provider 0.305 < 0.001
X.13 PCT mergers [C] –0.249 0.002
X.16 PCT weighted population [C] –0.291 < 0.001
X.12 Spend on main provider X.15 PCT income % [C] –0.179 0.027
l [C] indicates a control variable.
l Bold indicates negative correlation.
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TABLE 22 Correlations among policy outcome measures (2008–9) (continued )
Dependent variable Dependent variable r p
X.21 Emergency admissions
phc-preventable-chronic conditions
indirectly standardised
X.22 Emergency admissions phc-preventable-acute
conditions indirectly standardised
0.238 0.002
X.33 Mean time waited 0.28 0.006
X.34 Median time waited 0.164 0.039
X.38 Average number of patients waiting more than
4 weeks for a 1st out-patient appointment following a
GP referral/PER 2008–09 weighted population
0.23 0.004
X.39 Monthly mean waiting list, IP & day case,
per weighted population
0.226 0.004
X.22 Emergency admissions
phc-preventable-acute conditions
indirectly standardised
X.23 Emergency admissions for PHC-preventable
chronic conditions, per cent improvement from 2007/08
to 2008/09
0.2 0.01
X.25 Emergency re-admissions within 28 days of
discharge from hospital, adults > 16 yo, indirectly age,
method of admission of discharge spell, diagnosis
(ICD-10 chapter/selected sub-chapters within medical
specialties) and procedure (OPCS 4 chapter/selected
sub-chapters within surgical specialities) standardised %
0.196 < 0.001
X.27 Emergency admissions not usually requiring hospital
admission observed/expected indirectly standardised
0.23 0.004
X.33 Mean time waited 0.28 < 0.001
X.34 Median time waited 0.286 < 0.001
X.38 Average number of patients waiting more than
4 weeks for a 1st outpatient appointment following a
GP referral/PER 2008–09 weighted population
0.206 0.009
X.23 Emergency admissions for PHC-
preventable chronic conditions, per cent
improvement from 2007/08 to 2008/09
X.25 Emergency re-admissions within 28 days of
discharge from hospital, adults > 16 yo, indirectly age,
method of admission of discharge spell, diagnosis
(ICD-10 chapter/selected sub-chapters within medical
specialities) and procedure (OPCS 4 chapter/selected
sub-chapters within surgical specialities) standardised %
0.298 < 0.001
X.38 Average number of patients waiting more than
4 weeks for a 1st outpatient appointment following a
GP referral/PER 2008–09 weighted population
0.206 0.009
X.25 Emergency re-admissions within
28 days of discharge from hospital, adults
>16 yo, indirectly age, method of
admission of discharge spell, diagnosis
(ICD-10 chapter/selected sub-chapters
within medical specialties) and procedure
(OPCS 4 chapter/selected sub-chapters
within surgical specialities) standardised %
X.33 Mean time waited 0.221 0.005
X.34 Median time waited 0.207 0.009
X.37 Non-admitted patients referral to treatment
Dec 2008–Dec 2009 all patients < 18 weeks, % change
0.217 0.006
X.38 Average number of patients waiting more than
4 weeks for a 1st outpatient appointment following a
GP referral/PER 2008–09 weighted population
0.17 0.036
X.27 Emergency admissions not usually
requiring hospital admission observed/
expected indirectly standardised
X.33 Mean time waited 0.195 0.014
X.34 Median time waited 0.269 < 0.001
X.39 Monthly mean waiting list, IP & day case,
per weighted population
0.234 0.003
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TABLE 22 Correlations among policy outcome measures (2008–9) (continued )
Dependent variable Dependent variable r p
X.33 Mean time waited X.36 Admitted patients referral to treatment
Dec 2008–Dec 2009 all patients < 18 weeks, % change
0.32 < 0.001
X.37 Non-admitted patients referral to treatment
Dec 2008–Dec 2009 all patients < 18 weeks, % change
0.33 < 0.001
X.39 Monthly mean waiting list, IP & day case,
per weighted population
0.32 < 0.001
X.34 Median time waited X.36 Admitted patients referral to treatment
Dec 2008–Dec 2009 all patients < 18 weeks, % change
0.265 < 0.001
X.37 Non-admitted patients referral to treatment
Dec 2008–Dec 2009 all patients < 18 weeks, % change
0.202 0.018
X.39 Monthly mean waiting list, IP & day case,
per weighted population
0.414 < 0.001
X.36 Admitted patients referral to
treatment December 2008–December
2009 all patients < 18 weeks, % change
X.37 Non-admitted patients referral to treatment
Dec 2008–Dec 2009 all patients < 18 weeks, % change
0.295 < 0.001
X.38 Average number of patients waiting more than
4 weeks for a 1st outpatient appointment following a
GP referral/PER 2008–09 weighted population
0.174 0.028
OPCS, Office of Population Censuses and Surveys.
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TABLE 23 Regression analysis: WCC scores and controls onto policy outcomes (2008–9)
Policy variable Adjusted r2
WCC and/or control
variable(s)
Estimated
standardised
coefficient β p
PT
predictsa
X.19 Amenable mortality 0.529 X.17 Deprivation index [C] 0.017 < 0.001 N.A.
X.21 Emergency admissions
phc-preventable-chronic
conditions indirectly
standardised, % improvement
from 2007/8 to 2008/9
0.374 X.17 Deprivation index [C] 2.44 < 0.001 N.A.
X.22 Emergency admissions
phc-preventable-acute conditions
% improvement 2007/8
to 2008/9
0.023 X.14 PCT Mergers [C] –0.012 0.035 N.A.
X.23 Emergency admissions for
PHC-preventable chronic
conditions, per cent
improvement from 2007/8
to 2008/09
0.02 X.17 Deprivation index [C] 0.003 0.04 N.A.
X.27 Emergency admissions not
usually requiring hospital
admission observed/expected
0.1 X.17 Deprivation index [C] 1.027 < 0.001 N.A.
X.37 Non-admitted patients
referral to treatment December
2008–December 2009 all
patients < 18 weeks, % change
2007/8 to 2008/9
0.11 X.14 PCT Mergers [C] –0.002 0.011 N.A.
X.39 Monthly mean waiting list,
IP and day case, per weighted
population
0.36 X.14 PCT Mergers [C] 0.001 < 0.001 N.A.
X.15 PCT income % –0.002 < 0.001 N.A.
X.49 PCT surplus/deficit 0.33 X.13 WCC scores –0.005 0.021 +ve
X.15 PCT income % 0.545 < 0.001 N.A.
X.53 Ratio of day cases to
admissions
0.125 X.17 Deprivation index [C] –0.002 < 0.001 N.A.
X.55 FCE/weighted population 0.31 X.14 PCT Mergers [C] 0.035 < 0.001 N.A.
X.15 PCT income % [C] –0.048 0.004 N.A.
[C] indicates a control variable.
a Sign the beta coefficient would have if the programme theory assumptions were valid.
Bold indicates negative correlation.
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TABLE 24 Regression analysis: significant non-trivial controlled associations between generic competition measure
(HHI) and policy outcomes (2008–9)
Policy variable Adjusted r2
Competition and control
variable(s)
Estimated
standardised
coefficient β p
Predicted
signa
X.18 Amenable mortality 0.549 X.10 HHI 0.154 0.008 +ve
X.17 Deprivation index [C] 0.016 < 0.001 N.A.
X.21 Emergency admissions
phc-preventable-chronic
conditions, improvement
2007/8 to 2008/09
0.374 X.17 Deprivation index [C] 2.44 < 0.001 N.A.
X.22 Emergency admissions
phc-preventable-acute conditions
% improvement 2007/8
to 2008/9
0.081 X.10 HHI –0.158 0.05 –ve
X.14 PCT mergers [C] –0.012 0.41 N.A.
X.17 Deprivation index [C] 0.306 0.027 N.A.
X.23 Emergency admissions for
PHC-preventable chronic
conditions, per cent
improvement from 2007/8
to 2008/9
0.022 X.17 Deprivation index [C] 0.003 0.04 N.A.
X.27 Emergency admissions not
usually requiring hospital
admission observed/expected
0.101 X.17 Deprivation index [C] 1.027 < 0.001 N.A.
X.33 Mean time waited 0.028 X.17 Deprivation index [C] 0.16 0.023 N.A.
X.37 Non-admitted patients
referral to treatment
< 18 weeks, % change
2007/8 to 2008/9
0.135 X.10 HHI –0.01 0.024 +ve
X.14 PCT mergers [C] –0.002 0.01 N.A.
X.39 Monthly mean waiting list,
IP and day case, per weighted
population
0.394 X.10 HHI 0.005 0.002 +ve
X.15 PCT income % [C] –0.003 < 0.001 N.A.
X.49 PCT surplus/deficit 0.283 X.15 PCT income % [C] 0.533 < 0.001 N.A.
X.53 Ratio of day cases to
admissions (non-standardised)
0.125 X.17 Deprivation index [C] 0.002 < 0.001 N.A.
X.54 Mean ALoS
non-standardised
0.023 X.17 Deprivation index [C] 0.017 0.035 N.A.
X.55 Ratio: FCEs/weighted
population
0.33 X.10 HHI –0.1 0.017 –ve
X.14 PCT mergers [C] –0.03 < 0.001 N.A.
X.15 PCT income % [C] –0.04 0.008 N.A
[C] indicates a control variable.
a Sign the beta coefficient would have if the programme theory assumptions were valid.
Bold indicates negative correlation.
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TABLE 25 Regression of population-based commissioning and control variables onto service outcomes (2008–9)
Policy variable Adjusted r2 Competition variable(s)
Estimated
standardised
coefficient β p
PT
predictsa
X.19 Amenable mortality 0.53 X.17 Deprivation index [C] 0.173 < 0.001 N.A.
X.21 Emergency admissions
phc-preventable-chronic
conditions indirectly
standardised, % improvement
from 2007/08 to 2008/09
0.374 X.17 Deprivation index [C] 2.4351 < 0.001 N.A.
X.22 Emergency admissions
phc-preventable-acute
conditions % improvement
2007/08 to 2008/09
0.063 X.11 Number of provider
contracts
0.012 0.008 –ve
X.14 PCT mergers [C] –0.015 0.01 N.A.
X.23 Emergency admissions
for PHC-preventable chronic
conditions, per cent
improvement from 2007/08
to 2008/09
0.062 X.11 Number of provider
contracts
0.015 0.007 –ve
X.17 Deprivation index [C] 0.004 0.005 N.A.
X.25 Emergency readmissions
within 28 days of discharge from
hospital, adults > 16 yo, %
improvement from 2007/08 to
2008/09
0.027 X.17 Deprivation index [C] 0.001 0.023 N.A.
X.27 Emergency admissions not
usually requiring hospital
admission observed/expected
0.101 X.17 Deprivation index [C] 1.027 < 0.001 N.A.
X.33 Mean time waited 0.028 X.17 Deprivation index [C] –0.16 0.023 N.A.
X.39 Monthly mean waiting list,
IP & day case, per weighted
population
0.374 X.14 PCT mergers [C] 0.001 < 0.001 N.A.
X.15 PCT income % [C] –0.002 0.001 N.A.
X.49 PCT surplus 0.329 X.7 Spend on LA &
voluntary sector
–2.94 0.002 +ve
X.8 Independent sector
spend
–2.77 0.008 +ve
X.15 PCT income % [C] 0.519 < 0.001 N.A.
X.53 Ratio of day cases to
admissions (non-standardised)
0.173 X.11 Number of provider
contracts
–0.004 0.005 +ve
X.12 Spend on main
provider
–0.024 0.03 +ve
X.17 Deprivation index [C] –0.002 < 0.001 N.A.
X.54 Mean ALoS
non-standardised
0.023 X.17 Deprivation index [C] –0.02 0.035 N.A.
X.55 (FCE/Weighted population) 0.27 X.14 PCT mergers [C] 0.04 < 0.001 N.A.
[C] indicates a control variable.
a Sign the beta coefficient would have if the programme theory assumptions were valid.
Bold indicates negative correlation.
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TABLE 26 Regression of policy outcomes onto client-based commissioning measures and controls (2008–9)
Policy variable Adjusted r2 Competition variable(s)
Estimated
standardised
coefficient β p
PT
predictsa
X.19 Amenable mortality 0.529 X.17 Deprivation index [C] 0.017 < 0.001 N.A.
X.21 Emergency admissions
phc-preventable-chronic
conditions indirectly
standardised, % improvement
from 2007/08 to 2008/09
0.374 X.17 Deprivation index [C] 2.44 < 0.001 N.A.
X.22 Emergency admissions
phc-preventable-acute conditions
% improvement 2007/08
to 2008/09
0.023 X.14 PCT mergers [C] –0.012 0.035 N.A.
X.23 Emergency admissions
for PHC-preventable chronic
conditions, per cent
improvement from 2007/08
to 2008/09
0.022 X.17 Deprivation index [C] 0.003 0.039 N.A.
X.25 Emergency re-admissions
within 28 days of discharge
from hospital, adults > 16 yo,
improvement from 2007/08
to 2008/09
0.027 X.6 PBC projects GP
participation
–0.029 0.023 +ve
X.27 Emergency admissions
not usually requiring hospital
admission observed/expected
0.101 X.17 Deprivation index [C] 1.027 < 0.001 N.A.
X.33 Mean time waited 0.024 X.6 PBC projects GP
participation
4.31 0.03 –ve
X.37 Non-admitted patients
referral to treatment < 18 weeks,
% change 2007/08 to 2008/09
0.147 X.5 Personal health budget
pilot
0.006 0.001 +ve
X.15 PCT income % [C] 0.005 0.008 N.A.
X.39 Monthly mean waiting list,
IP & day case, per weighted
population
0.356 X.15 PCT income % [C] –0.002 < 0.001 N.A.
X.49 PCT surplus/deficit 0.283 X.15 PCT income % [C] 0.533 < 0.001 N.A.
X.53 Ratio of day cases to
admissions (non-standardised)
0.125 X.17 Deprivation index [C] –0.002 < 0.001 N.A.
X.54 Mean ALoS
non-standardised
0.023 X.17 Deprivation index [C] –0.017 0.035 N.A.
X.55 (FCE/weighted population) 0.309 X.14 PCT mergers [C] 0.04 < 0.001 N.A.
X.15 PCT income % [C] –0.05 0.004 N.A.
[C] indicates a control variable.
a Sign the beta coefficient would have if the programme theory assumptions were valid.
Bold indicates negative correlation.
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TABLE 27 Regression analysis, lowest-quartile HHI sites: controlled associations between generic competition
measure (HHI) and policy outcomes (2008–9)
Policy variable Adjusted r2 Competition variable(s)
Estimated
standardised
coefficient β p
PT
predictsa
X.19 Amenable mortality 0.76 X.10 HHI 0.308 < 0.001 +ve
X.14 PCT mergers [C] 1.96 < 0.001 N.A.
X.16 PCT weighted
population [C]
–0.138 0.023 N.A.
X.17 Deprivation index [C] 0.498 < 0.001 N.A.
X.21 Unplanned hospitalisation
for chronic ambulatory care
sensitive conditions (adults)
directly age-sex standardised,
% improvement since 2007/08)
0.77 X.10 HHI 0.61 < 0.001 –ve
X.14 PCT mergers [C] 4.71 < 0.001 N.A.
X.15 PCT income % [C] 0.161 0.027 N.A.
X.16 PCT weighted
population [C]
–0.3 < 0.001 N.A.
X.17 Deprivation index [C] –0.16 0.006 N.A.
X.22 Emergency admissions
phc-preventable-acute conditions
% improvement 2007/08
to 2008/09
0.73 X.10 HHI 0.319 < 0.001 –ve
X.14 PCT mergers [C] 1.6 < 0.001 N.A.
X.15 PCT income % [C] 0.204 0.003 N.A.
X.16 PCT weighted
population [C]
0.249 < 0.001 N.A.
X.23 Emergency admissions
for PHC-preventable chronic
conditions, per cent
improvement from 2007/08
to 2008/09
0.69 X.10 HHI 0.389 < 0.001 –ve
X.14 PCT mergers [C] 0.969 0.011 N.A.
X.15 PCT income % [C] 0.215 < 0.001 N.A.
X.16 PCT weighted
population [C]
0.237 0.005 N.A.
X.25 Emergency re-admissions
within 28 days of discharge from
hospital, adults > 16 yo,
% improvement from 2007/08
to 2008/09
0.68 X.10 HHI 0.196 0.002 –ve
X.14 PCT mergers [C] 0.815 0.042 N.A.
X.15 PCT income % [C] 0.5 < 0.001 N.A.
X.16 PCT weighted
population [C]
0.211 0.002 N.A.
X.27 Emergency admissions
not usually requiring hospital
admission observed/expected
0.645 X.14 PCT mergers [C] 2.08 < 0.001 N.A.
X.15 PCT income % [C] 0.4 < 0.001 N.A.
X.16 PCT weighted
population [C]
0.283 < 0.001 N.A.
X.33 Mean time waited 0.697 X.10 HHI 0.187 < 0.001 +ve
X.14 PCT mergers [C] 1.52 < 0.001 N.A.
X.17 Deprivation index [C] 0.086 0.003 N.A.
X.35 Referral to treatment
2008/09 trauma & orthopaedics
% change Dec 2008–Dec 2009
0.798 X.10 HHI 0.37 < 0.001 –ve
X.14 PCT mergers [C] 2.42 < 0.001 N.A.
X.15 PCT income % [C] 0.28 < 0.001 N.A.
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TABLE 27 Regression analysis, lowest-quartile HHI sites: controlled associations between generic competition
measure (HHI) and policy outcomes (2008–9) (continued )
Policy variable Adjusted r2 Competition variable(s)
Estimated
standardised
coefficient β p
PT
predictsa
X.36 Admitted patients referral to
treatment Dec 2008–Dec 2009
% change 2007/08 to 2008/09
0.666 X.10 HHI 0.13 0.027 –ve
X.15 PCT income % [C] 0.257 0.001 N.A.
X.16 PCT weighted
population [C]
0.222 < 0.001 N.A.
X.17 Deprivation index [C] 0.222 < 0.001 N.A.
X.37 Non-admitted patients
referral to treatment < 18 weeks,
% change 2007/08 to 2008/09
0.716 X.15 PCT income % [C] 0.267 < 0.001 N.A.
X.16 PCT weighted
population [C]
0.086 < 0.001 N.A.
X.17 Deprivation index [C] 0.138 < 0.001 N.A.
X.38 Average number of
patients waiting more than
4 weeks for a 1st outpatient
appointment following a GP
referral/PER 2008/09 weighted
population
0.74 X.10 HHI 0.53 < 0.001 +ve
X.14 PCT mergers [C] 2.26 < 0.001 N.A.
X.16 PCT weighted
population [C]
–0.29 < 0.001 N.A.
X.17 Deprivation index [C] 0.4 < 0.001 N.A.
X.39 Monthly mean waiting list,
IP & day case, per weighted
population
0.665 X.10 HHI 0.23 < 0.001 +ve
X.14 PCT mergers [C] 4.65 < 0.001 N.A.
X.49 PCT surplus 0.652 X.10 HHI 0.1 0.006 –ve
X.14 PCT mergers [C] 2.01 < 0.001 N.A.
X.17 Deprivation index [C] 0.18 < 0.001 N.A.
X.55 FCE/weighted population 0.36 X.15 PCT income % [C] –0.012 < 0.001 N.A.
X.16 PCT weighted
population [C]
–0.006 < 0.009 N.A.
[C] indicates a control variable.
a Sign the beta coefficient would have if the programme theory assumptions were valid.
Bold indicates negative correlation.
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TABLE 28 Regression analyses: spending on independent-sector providers in bottom HHI quartile PCTs, with
controls, regressed onto policy outcomes (2008–9)
Policy variable Adjusted r2 Competition variable(s)
Estimated
standardised
coefficient β p
PT
predictsa
X.19 Amenable mortality 0.73 X.14 PCT mergers [C] 1.66 < 0.001 N.A.
X.15 PCT income % [C] 0.144 0.047 N.A.
X.17 Deprivation index [C] 0.571 < 0.001 N.A.
X.21 Unplanned hospitalisation
for chronic ambulatory care
sensitive conditions (adults)
directly age–sex standardised,
% improvement since 2007/08
0.7 X.8 % spent on
independent sector
healthcare
0.298 < 0.001 +ve
X.14 PCT mergers [C] 2.75 < 0.001 N.A.
X.15 PCT income % [C] 0.306 < 0.001 N.A.
X.22 Emergency admissions
phc-preventable-acute conditions
% improvement 2007/08
to 2008/09
0.746 X.8 % spent on
independent-sector
healthcare
0.375 < 0.001 +ve
X.15 PCT income % [C] 0.293 < 0.001 N.A.
X.16 PCT weighted
population [C]
0.371 < 0.001 N.A.
X.23 Emergency admissions
for PHC-preventable chronic
conditions, per cent
improvement from 2007/08
to 2008/09
0.672 X.15 PCT income % [C] 0.479 < 0.001 N.A.
X.16 PCT weighted
population [C]
0.494 < 0.001 N.A.
X.25 Emergency readmissions
within 28 days of discharge
from hospital, adults > 16 yo,
% improvement from 2007/08
to 2008/09
0.689 X.8 % spent on
independent-sector
healthcare
0.22 0.003 +ve
X.15 PCT income % [C] 0.56 < 0.001 N.A.
X.17 Deprivation index [C] 0.27 < 0.001 N.A.
X.27 Emergency admissions
not usually requiring hospital
admission observed/expected
0.74 X.8 % spent on
independent-sector
healthcare
0.583 < 0.001 –ve
X.15 PCT income % [C] 0.425 < 0.001 N.A.
X.16 PCT weighted
population [C]
0.312 < 0.001 N.A.
X.17 Deprivation index [C] –0.267 < 0.001 N.A.
X.33 Mean time waited 0.68 X.8 % spent on
independent-sector
healthcare
0.15 < 0.001 –ve
X.14 PCT mergers [C] 0.69 0.006 N.A.
X.16 PCT weighted
population [C]
0.109 0.002 N.A.
X.17 Deprivation index [C] 0.122 < 0.001 N.A.
X.35 Referral to treatment
2008–09 trauma & orthopaedics
% change Dec 2008–Dec 2009
0.635 X.14 PCT mergers [C] 1.9 < 0.001 +ve
X.15 PCT income % [C] 0.521 < 0.001 N.A.
X.16 PCT weighted
population [C]
0.212 0.002 N.A.
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TABLE 28 Regression analyses: spending on independent-sector providers in bottom HHI quartile PCTs, with
controls, regressed onto policy outcomes (2008–9) (continued )
Policy variable Adjusted r2 Competition variable(s)
Estimated
standardised
coefficient β p
PT
predictsa
X.36 Admitted patients referral to
treatment Dec 2008–Dec 2009
all patients <18 weeks,
% change 2007/08 to 2008/09
0.69 X.8 % spent on
independent-sector
healthcare
0.316 0.01 +ve
X.14 PCT mergers [C] –1.46 < 0.001 N.A.
X.15 PCT income % [C] 0.292 < 0.001 N.A.
X.16 PCT weighted
population [C]
0.303 < 0.001 N.A.
X.17 Deprivation index [C] 0.156 0.013 N.A.
X.37 Non-admitted patients
referral to treatment < 18 weeks,
% change 2007/08 to 2008/09
0.74 X.8 % spent on
independent-sector
healthcare
0.146 < 0.001 +ve
X.14 PCT mergers [C] –0.853 < 0.001 N.A.
X.15 PCT income % [C] 0.26 < 0.001 N.A.
X.16 PCT weighted
population [C]
0.126 < 0.001 N.A.
X.17 Deprivation index [C] 0.084 0.007 N.A.
X.38 Average number of
patients waiting more than
4 weeks for a 1st outpatient
appointment following a GP
referral/PER 2008/09 weighted
population
0.68 X.8 % spent on
independent-sector
healthcare
0.299 < 0.001 –ve
X.15 PCT income % [C] 0.259 0.002 N.A.
X.17 Deprivation index [C] 0.427 < 0.001 N.A.
X.39 Monthly mean waiting list,
IP & day case, per weighted
population
0.74 X.8 % spent on
independent-sector
healthcare
0.57 < 0.001 –ve
X.14 PCT mergers [C] 2.578 < 0.001 N.A.
X.49 PCT surplus 0.72 X.8 % spent on
independent-sector
healthcare
0.45 < 0.001 –ve
X.17 Deprivation index [C] 0.135 < 0.001 N.A.
X.55 FCE/weighted population 0.36 X.15 PCT income % [C] –0.012 < 0.001 N.A.
X.16 PCT weighted
population [C]
–0.006 0.009 N.A.
[C] indicates a control variable.
a Sign the beta coefficient would have if the programme theory assumptions were valid.
Bold indicates negative correlation.
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Appendix 5 Case study site vignettes
Metroland
Metroland is a borough in the London NHS region with a population of about 270,000. It had been served
by a PCT whose boundaries corresponded to those of the borough. Before fieldwork started, the PCT had
clustered with three neighbouring PCTs, each of which was part of the same conurbation. During
fieldwork this cluster had merged with a similarly sized neighbouring cluster.
The population served by the former PCT is in the second quartile of measures of deprivation. The main
Public Health England average measures of health in Metroland are mixed compared with the English
average. Life expectancy and healthy eating are higher than the English average, but smoking-related
deaths and levels of children in poverty are higher than average. Premature mortality caused by CHD is the
same as the English average.
There are about 50 GP practices in the borough. The former PCT largely dealt with two acute providers.
During the course of fieldwork, one of these providers merged with two other acute providers in other
parts of the conurbation. Given the PCT’s proximity to many other acute providers in the city, it also dealt
with some of these. About 55% of its allocation was spent on one of the main acute providers and
around 33% was spent on two others. Acute services were also offered by two private providers.
The original four clustered PCTs shared services with one NHS community and mental health service
provider. Some mental health services were also provided by the voluntary sector. The local authority
boundaries corresponded to those of the original PCT, which also commissioned adult social and mental
health-care services, some jointly with the clustered PCTs.
Subsequent to the clustering of the PCTs, demerging has in effect taken place with the creation of a CCG
whose boundaries correspond to that of the original PCT.
Porttown
Porttown is a city with a population of about 260,000. The population served by the former PCT is in the
top quartile of measures of deprivation, as measured by income and employment scores.299 The city has
above average poor health for most of the main measures published by Public Health England. For
example, life expectancy in the city is lower than the English average and it also ranks below the average
for measures of healthy eating and above the average for smoking and premature mortality caused by
CHD. The proportion of children living in poverty is about the same as the English average.300 The Network
of Public Health Observatories produces health profiles for each local authority in the UK. These use Office
for National Statistics data from the Index of Multiple Deprivation for 2010 for each Lower Super Output
Area to describe the sociodemographic characteristics of these authorities (www.apho.org.uk/default.
aspx?QN=P_HEALTH_PROFILES).
There are around 40 GP practices in the city. Secondary acute care is provided by one large district general
hospital (DGH) and two private hospitals. The DGH accounted for over 90% of the PCT’s spend on its
main acute provider. At the time of fieldwork, the PCT retained its public health provider arm, but the
commissioning function was in the process of being transferred to the local authority. There is one main
NHS provider of community and mental health services, including inpatient provision. There are
also out-of-area inpatient services commissioned from the private sector. Mental health services are also
provided by a small number of voluntary-sector organisations, some commissioned jointly with the
local authority. The PCT boundary was coterminous with the city local authority. The local authority
is a commissioner of adult social and mental health-care services.
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As with all our study sites, the clinical commissioning group was in the process of being established during
the course of fieldwork and in April 2013 it assumed commissioning responsibilities from the former PCT
and that of a neighbouring one. The resulting CCG boundaries covered the city and most of the county in
which the PCT was located, including another large city. The CCG is divided into three localities. One of
these localities covered the former PCT’s catchment area, but also extended into the surrounding rural
hinterland to serve a population of about 350,000.
Shire
Shire is a predominantly rural county with a population of about 400,000. Two former PCTs served this
population, and had clustered before fieldwork. One covered a largely rural population and the other the
main urban centre of the county, consisting of two neighbouring large towns with a combined population
of over 300,000. The population served by the former PCTs was in the third quartile of measures of
deprivation. The county population has generally better health than the English average. Life expectancy
and healthy eating are above the average for England. It also has lower than average rates of smoking,
premature mortality caused by CHD and children living in poverty.
There are over 100 GP practices in the county, with nearly half of these in the two main urban centres.
There are three DGHs in the county, two of which were in the process of merging during fieldwork.
The preclustered PCT that served the urban centre spent around 40% of its allocation on one of the main
acute providers and around 90% on all three of the providers in the county. The PCT that had covered the
mainly rural areas of the county spent around 36% and 70% respectively on these acute providers. Acute
services were also offered by four private providers. There was one provider of community and mental
health NHS services in the county, with some provision by the voluntary sector, some of which was jointly
commissioned with local authorities. We were unable to gain access to the public health service provider.
There were three local authority commissioners of adult social care and mental health-care services. The
rural PCT boundaries broadly corresponded to those of the county local authority, and the urban PCT
boundaries broadly corresponded to those of the local authorities for the two neighbouring towns.
The clinical commissioning group that was being formed during fieldwork now spans the boundaries
of the clustered PCTs; that is, it covers the entirety of the rural and urban areas of the county. The PCT
that had covered the mainly rural areas of the county had created a locality structure. This has been
retained and adapted to cover the CCG, which is subdivided into 13 localities, each with their own
commissioning responsibilities.
Milltown
Milltown has a population of 229,000 and is a city that is part of a large conurbation.
The population within the boundaries of the former PCT is in the top quartile of measures for deprivation.
The health of the population is worse than the English average on nearly all of Public Health England’s
main measures. Life expectancy in the city is lower than the English average and the proportion of children
living in poverty is above the average. It has especially higher than average rates of adult smoking,
smoking-related deaths and premature mortality caused by CHD and cancer.
There are just over 50 GP practices in Milltown. Most services are commissioned from two main providers:
the acute provider and the mental health provider. About 68% of the PCT’s allocation was spent on the
main acute provider and 19% on two others in neighbouring cities. Other services are commissioned from
a range of voluntary, community and private-sector providers. Public health commissioning has been
transferred to the local authority, which is coterminous with the former PCT patch.
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The CCG had been working in shadow form for some time in advance of its legal status. It has assumed
the commissioning responsibilities previously held by the Milltown PCT.
Livewell
Livewell was selected as a stand-alone single in-depth case study of a public–private partnership because
of government policy to encourage private-sector involvement in commissioning. In this context it involves
partnering with a private-sector organisation, as a cocommissioner and provider, to aid whole-system
redesign in primary care and to support the commissioning of services for people with long-term
conditions at risk of unplanned hospital admissions.
Livewell is an area of the West Midlands characterised by high levels of deprivation, communities with a
high proportion of people from diverse minority ethnic backgrounds, poor levels of general health and
high levels of chronic disease prevalence. In common with other areas, the health economy is challenged
by high and increasing levels of ED attendances and urgent care admissions. Thirty-two different first
languages are spoken in the community.
Across the five practices in the Livewell programme, 32% of urgently admitted patients stay in hospital for
less than 24 hours; 60% of ED attendances result in patients being discharged, of whom 40% go home
without treatment; and there is a large degree of variation in urgent admissions, ED attendances and
outpatient referrals between the five practices. In one of the practices, where a more in-depth analysis has
been undertaken, 54% of spend has been estimated to be on urgent care, in contrast with inpatient
elective (16%), day cases (20%) and maternity (10%).
Driven by the doctors, there was also a series of events held with staff to shape the programme strategy
and redesign. Patient participation groups were actively involved on an ongoing basis in design and in
offering detailed feedback. Users and care-givers took up structured opportunities for engagement.
Phase 1 of the programme started in 2008 and covered one practice, of 9500 patients. Programme
management support was secured from a private-sector health-care commissioning support provider,
which also delivered the telephone care-management service. Phase 2 of the initiative, which was
conceived in 2010 and sponsored by the local PCT as a fund-to-save initiative (approximately £500,000),
comprised five practices covering 50,000 patients and was supported by the same private-sector firm.
Redesign of care included an initiative to run group consultations, a think-tank and a telephone
care-management service. It is this last, in phase 2 of the project, that is the principal focus of this
case study.
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Appendix 6 Specimen interview schedule
 
Universities of Plymouth, Manchester, London and Birmingham 
PCT Commissioning Practice and Health System Governance 
Interview Schedule: Commissioning Organisation 
 
Instructions to interviewer 
 
Instructions to interviewers are in italics 
Before starting interview:  
1.  Check interviewee has seen PIS.  
2.  Invite interviewee to ask any questions about the research and what is expected 
of him/her.  
3.  Ask interviewee to sign consent form (two copies: one for interviewee, one for 
researchers).  
4.  Ask permission to audio-record.  
5.  Offer interviewee opportunity to see and correct transcript.  
 
Checklist of topics  
Interviewer to select ad hoc which of these to pursue with particular individual 
informants, according to what appears relevant to the informant’s role, the nature of 
the particular study organisation and what data are already available to the 
researchers.  
 
 
Informant’s role 
1. What are the main health services which [organisation name] provides, and 
who commissions each of them?  
 
2. What is the division of labour for commissioning in [organisation name]? Who 
does what, and why is the work allocated that way?  
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3. How does [organisation name] make decisions about priorities in 
commissioning? Can you give some examples of how this has worked in 
practice in the past year?  
 
4. In respect of its commissioning work, how would you describe the 
organisational culture or climate of [organisation name]? 
 
5. During the last year, what have been the main changes in the way these services 
have been commissioned? 
 Prompts:  
New tariffs or pricing?  
New forms of contract?  
New services or technologies now being commissioned?  
Different uses of evidence?  
Changed way of selecting provider(s)?  
Changed ways of monitoring provider performance? 
Practice-based commissioning (or equivalent)?  
Client-based commissioning (e.g. personal care budgets)?  
Others?  
 
6. Specifically, has [organisation name] made any innovations in the way it 
commissions providers?  
If so:  
What innovations?  
 
7. What do you think has caused these changes?  
Prompts:  
New policies, laws or regulations?  
Changed epidemiology in the population served?  
New bodies of evidence?  
Provider activity or performance?  
Financial retrenchment?  
Other causes?  
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8. What part do clinicians play in commissioning at [organisation name]? 
 Prompts:  
Contributing epidemiological or scientific evidence?  
Suggesting priorities, models of care or new healthcare 
technologies?  
Proposing outcome, safety or quality indicators or standards?  
Liaison with providers?  
Representing professional bodies or interests?  
Other roles?  
 
9. Does the clinicians’ role differ according to their occupation (e.g. for doctors, 
nurses, AHPs etc.)?  
 
10. In the last year, have there been any occasions on which clinicians took a 
different view on commissioning decisions than other members of 
[organisation name] did?  
If so:  
How was that difference resolved?  
 
11. What roles do patients and the general public play in the commissioning 
activities of [organisation name]? 
Prompts:  
Representation in decision-making (at what levels? Through what 
mechanisms?)?  
Through consumer (‘market’) research?  
Through the political system or campaigns?  
Through their choice of providers?  
Complaints system (or ombudsman or similar)?  
Other ways?  
 
12. In the last year, have there been any occasions on which patients (or their 
representatives) took a different view on commissioning decisions than other 
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members of [organisation name] did?  
If so:  
How was that difference resolved?  
 
13. Does [organisation name] directly manage any health services, i.e. does it 
employ clinicians or other staff of its own who provide care for patients?  
If so: 
In what ways (if at all) are these directly-managed services 
commissioned (in the sense that external providers are 
commissioned, as opposed to funded by budget)?  
How are directly managed services and commissioned services 
coordinated, when that is necessary?  
How does [organisation name] undertake its commissioning of 
(other) providers so as to accomplish this coordination?  
 
14. How does the [organisation name] obtain advice and support for contract 
tendering and for assessing business cases? Does [organisation name] have 
in-house expertise in developing service specifications, meeting current legal, 
competition and regulatory requirements etc., or does it buy in that expertise?  
 
 
Provider diversification: Selection  
15. Which service providers do you have dealings with, as part of the 
commissioning process?  
Prompts 
Existing commissioned/contracted healthcare providers (which 
ones?)? 
Potential new providers of healthcare (which ones?)? 
Providers of services that are not healthcare but health related, 
e.g. social services/education/housing, others? 
  
16. By what process does [organisation name] select new providers of health 
services?  
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Prompts  
Open competition (e.g. advertise for bids)? 
Closed competition (invite potential providers to bid)? 
Respond to provider enquiries?  
Registration of legally licensed providers?  
Other process (what?)?  
 
17. By what criteria does [organisation name] select new providers of health 
services?  
Prompts  
To provide new services not previously available in this 
territory?  
Quality of care (how defined?)? 
Cost (what unit(s) of pricing?)?  
Legal entitlement to be commissioned/reimbursed?  
Other criteria (what?)?  
 
18. Can you describe an example of how a new provider has been selected 
recently (e.g. in the past year)?  
 
 
Managing providers 
19. What do the providers contribute to the service specifications that 
commissioners adopt? How is that done?  
 
20. Through what processes does [organisation name] keep track of (monitor) its 
providers’ activities, services and costs?  
Prompts: 
By regular meetings/financial returns/written 
communications/site visits/asking patients/seeing patient 
records/electronic data exchange/informal contacts and 
networkings/through intermediaries (why? Which 
intermediaries?)/other ways?  
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How often?  
Where?  
Who are the main points of contact on either side?  
 
21. What aspects of provider activities does [organisation name] keep track of 
(monitor)?  
Prompts: 
Health or clinical care outcomes (which ones?)?  
Quality of care (how defined?) and safety? 
Costs to the commissioner?  
Case mix, volume and timing of case loads? 
Referrals to other providers?  
Access (waiting times, availability of services or technologies)? 
Feedback from patients and carers?  
Quality of information and information flows to referrers and 
commissioners? 
Other aspects (what?)?  
 
22. What sources of information about provider services does [organisation 
name] mainly rely on?  
Prompts: 
Materials that the providers provide?  
‘Soft’ sources, for instance what clinicians and managers tell 
you informally?  
Databases such as Dr Foster, DH databases?  
Data from official bodies such as NICE, the Care Quality 
Commission, Audit Commission?  
Other sources?  
 
23. Are there any activities or services that [organisation name] finds hard to 
commission or to monitor?  
Prompts: 
New services?  
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High-technology or otherwise complex services?  
Services with unpredictable (e.g. very low) levels of use?  
Open-access services (e.g. A&E)?  
Others?  
 
24. How would you describe the relationship between [organisation name] and 
the providers it commissions?  
Prompts: 
Collaborative or adversarial?/Open or guarded?/Purely formal 
or with informal links and contacts also?/Other descriptions?  
 
25. Have there been any disagreements or disputes between [organisation name] 
and any of its providers in the last year?  
If so:  
What were the disagreements or disputes about?  
How were they resolved?  
 
26. In such a disagreement or dispute, what means does [organisation name] have 
for resolving the matter in its favour?  
Prompts: 
Persuasion – appeal to policy? Appeal to evidence bases? 
Technical solutions – e.g. better management information 
systems, billing systems or patient records?  
Arbitrating disagreements within or between providers or 
professions?  
Offering (or withdrawing) payments or other incentives?  
Option of changing to a different provider? 
Referring to the contract (and if necessary legal action)?  
Other methods?  
 
27. How do the providers respond to these activities? Can you describe any 
examples during the past year?  
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28. Do providers’ responses differ in this respect?  
If so:  
Do public, commercial and voluntary organisations respond 
differently?  
Do primary care, health promotion and secondary care 
organisations respond differently?  
 
29. In your experience, do any of these activities appear more effective than the 
others in influencing the providers? Are any of these activities ineffective or 
counter-productive? Can you give an example of (in)effective procurement?  
 
 
Specific care groups 
 
According to the informant’s role, apply the following questions to one of the 
following services and their providers: unplanned hospital admissions for people with 
chronic health problems OR mental health care OR prevention of diabetes and 
coronary heart disease.  
30. Are there any specific characteristics of [unplanned hospital admissions for 
people with chronic health problems OR mental health care OR prevention of 
diabetes and coronary heart disease] that require a specially tailored approach 
to service commissioning?  
 
31. What adaptations does [organisation name] make to the way it commissions 
services for [unplanned hospital admissions for people with chronic health 
problems OR mental health care OR prevention of diabetes and coronary 
heart disease]?  
 
32. What specific activities or resources do you think would do most to improve 
the commissioning of services for [unplanned hospital admissions for people 
with chronic health problems OR mental health care OR prevention of 
diabetes and coronary heart disease]?  
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Provider contestability 
33. On what criteria would [organisation name] decide to stop commissioning a 
healthcare provider?  
Prompts  
Quality of care (how defined?) or safety? 
Patient or public complaints or objections?  
Cost (price level? Over-provision (in what sense?)?  
Outmoded technology or models of care?  
Loss of legal entitlement to be commissioned/reimbursed?  
Other criteria (what?)?  
 
34. By what process would [organisation name] stop commissioning a provider 
of health services?  
Prompts  
Non-renewal of contract?  
Commissioner ends the contract unilaterally?  
New round of competitive bidding?  
Try to recruit alternative provider and route patients there?  
Other process (what?)?  
 
35. Can you describe an example of how your organisation has stopped 
commissioning a provider recently (e.g. in the past year)?  
 
Distributed commissioning  
36. Apart from service providers, which external organisations do you have 
dealings with, for commissioning purposes?  
Prompts:  
Other organisations involved in commissioning healthcare for 
the same population as your organisation serves?  
Non-healthcare organisations that commission health-related 
services (e.g. social services, local government, charities)?  
Regulatory or inspection bodies (e.g. NICE)?  
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Government (including local/Land/province/regional 
government [depending on country])?  
 
 
37. How is the work of commissioning divided between these organisations (who 
does what?)? 
 
38. How is commissioning activity coordinated between them?  
Prompts: 
By committee/regular meetings/planning system/financial 
systems/written communications/electronic data 
exchange/informal contacts/local networks/through 
intermediaries (why? Which intermediaries?)/other ways?  
 
39. How would you describe the relationship between [organisation name] and 
these other commissioners?  
Prompts: 
Collaborative or adversarial?/Open or guarded?/Purely formal 
or with informal links and contacts also?/Other descriptions?  
 
40. Have there been any disagreements or disputes between [organisation name] 
and any of these other commissioners in the last year?  
If so:  
What were the disagreements or disputes about?  
How were they resolved?  
 
41. In such a disagreement or dispute, what means does [organisation name] have 
for resolving the matter in its favour?  
Prompts: 
Persuasion – appeal to policy? Appeal to evidence bases? 
Technical solutions – e.g. better management information 
systems, better planning data, common working procedures?  
Arbitrating disagreements within or between organisations or 
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professions?  
Offering (or withdrawing) payments or other incentives?  
Other methods?  
 
42. How do the other commissioners respond to these activities? Can you describe 
any examples during the past year?  
 
43. What activities, resources or other changes do you think would make it easier 
for commissioners to collaborate and coordinate their activities, or make 
collaboration more productive?  
 
Commissioning outcomes 
44. How would you define or characterise ‘effective’ or ‘successful’ 
commissioning?  
 
45. Can you describe any examples you have seen over the past year?  
 
46. What conditions do you think produced those successes?  
 
47. Can you describe any examples of ineffective commissioning, or 
commissioning failures, that you have seen over the past year?  
 
48. What caused them?  
 
Other aspects of commissioning 
Finally, is there any other important aspect of commissioning in [organisation name] 
that we have not yet asked about?  
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Appendix 7 Coding frame for case study
interview transcripts
TABLE 29 Coding frame, interview transcripts
Media of power coding frame v7
All columns
Providers can be primary, secondary and public health carers and can be located in the NHS, local authorities, the voluntary
sector and private-sector organisations, GPs. Where organisations (e.g. general practices) have both a commissioning and a
providing role, we treat those roles separately.
Column B sub-codes
(B1–B5, in ascending strength of commissioner’s role):
B1: Provider force majeure
B2: Provider initiated proposal(s)
B3: Commissioner deliberately left this issue alone (Klein’s ‘sleeping dogs’ decision)
B4: Commissioner initiated proposal(s)
B5: Commissioner force majeure
Column C sub-codes (annotate descriptions onto transcript)
Circumstances which:
C1. Limit use of a medium power (e.g. no alternative provider locally, commissioning driven by historical spending patterns)
C2. Potentiate the medium (e.g. Secretary of State is local MP)
C3. Make the medium of power work unexpectedly (e.g. competition raises not reduces costs)
C4. Have other mediating/moderating effects
Medium of power A B
Negotiated order (relationality)
NB Only negotiations between commissioner
and provider, not other negotiations
M1 Explicit or tacit mutually agreed arrangements between
commissioners and providers about their involvement in
and responsibilities for commissioning concerning:
information sharing 1
division of labour 2
collaboration/participation 3
other 4
Provider competition/contestability M2 Commissioners’ attempts to manage competition
between providers by deciding (insofar as they are
permitted to):
Criteria for selecting providers
package of care 1a
price 1b
quality 1c
Range of providers:
inviting new bidders 2a
helping establish new providers 2b
providing services themselves (the ‘make or buy’ decision) 2c
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TABLE 29 Coding frame, interview transcripts (continued )
Media of power coding frame v7
refusing to use particular provider(s) 2d
Monopsonisation (number of commissioning-side
organisations)
3
Other 4
Financial incentives M3 The range of financial incentives to motivate providers:
unit of payment 1
time of payment 2
conditions for payment 3
bonuses/penalties 4
exemptions from payment 5
other 6
Ideological and disciplinary control
(evidence-based medicine, professional ethos,
political ideologies)
M4 Technical or scientific knowledge (evidence-based
practice, aetiology, epidemiology, models of care . . .);
evaluation and pilot results
Occupational ethos, norms of conduct towards peers,
superiors, clients and others
Wider social ideologies (New Public Management,
religion, economics, political belief systems etc.)
Appeal to/use of higher managerial or political
authority, e.g. top NHS managers’ wishes, ‘target’,
‘policy’, CQC, SHA, DH, Secretary of State, etc
Other
1
2
3
4
5
Juridical governance (contracts, law,
regulation)
M5 The extent to which and the means by which
commissioners are involved in:
the specification of contract terms 1
use or threat of coercive enforcement of contracts or
legal rights
2
the use of arbitration through the SHA or other third
party
3
other 4
Managerial performance of commissioning
(managerial performance repertoires)
M6 Managerial resources for commissioning work:
Which individuals and occupations (patients,
professions, organisations, researchers, mgt. consultants
etc.) actively participate and their means of participation
1
Which external bodies (e.g. referral screening bodies,
commissioning support, consultancies etc.) support
commissioning and how
2
Knowledge of provider’s performance and internal
management
3
Transaction costs – economies of scale and scope 4
Understanding of commissioning (principles, rationales,
methods) and skills
5
Delegation of commissioning work 6
Other 7
Other M7
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Appendix 8 Action learning
Action learning set findings are presented following the three aims stated in the methods section:
l sharing preliminary findings and enhancing the research process (aims 1 and 2)
l sharing commissioning experiences: international perspectives (aim 3)
l findings relating to the action learning set process: opportunities for personal and organisational
learning and development (aim 4).
Sharing preliminary findings and enhancing the research process
When the first action learning set met (2010), analysis of the first phase of case study site interviews was
largely complete. From the analysis we constructed scenarios (Table 30) instantiating answers to the
question ‘How does power manifest itself in commissioner–provider relationships?’ and presented them to
the learning set. The ensuing facilitated discussion endorsed the face and content validity of the scenarios
as instances of uses of the media of power. The scenarios served participants as a framework with which
to explore notions of power and how they are enacted in commissioning practice. Participants found
scenarios from sites other than their own both familiar and comforting, in that they recognised they were
experiencing comparable instances of different media of power.
Further data analysis had taken place by action learning set 4, to which we fed back the emerging
findings. The fifth meeting made a critique of a Nuffield Trust research report on commissioning.
The learning set:
l endorsed the face and content validity of our research findings so far
l suggested adding ‘class hegemony’ and bullying into the media-of-power schema
l considered that the research provided a common framework for learning set members to explore their
experiences, an opportunity for a more sophisticated discussion of experiences, problems and possible
ways forward in the workplace.
Sharing commissioning experiences: international perspectives
and those from other sectors
At the ‘mini-conference’, contributors from Techniker Krankenkasse (Germany) and Emilia Romagna health
region (Italy) described their own commissioning practice and its impact on health care, offering ‘expert
outsider’ insights into the focus, processes and expected effects of their commissioning efforts. We
presented more of our research findings and there was a facilitated discussion about the applicability to
health-care commissioning of supply-chain management models derived from manufacturing procurement.
The learning set concluded that health-care systems can learn from exploring commissioning and
procurement practices in countries with different approaches to funding, structuring and delivering care.
Health-care systems can also apply – with adaptations – private-sector procurement processes to
state-funded and insurance-based health-care systems. The Cousins Supply Wheel62 depicts the different
pressures related to effective supply-chain management (organisational structure, portfolio of relationships,
cost–benefit analysis, skills and competencies and performance measures) in other economic sectors. The
learning set members found it relevant to NHS providers and commissioners because, with adaptations, it
could be used to aid in the development of a ‘contingency’ version of the commissioning repertoire,
expressly adapted to different commissioning circumstances. This adapted version includes engagement
with users (patients, public and populations), explicit concern about the quality of provision, and
management–external factors such as political ‘interference’ and the media.
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Personal and organisational learning and development
The action learning helped to resolve real health management problems in health-care commissioning, and
through learning at a distance from work and its day-to-day pressures helped to support commissioning
staff as they ‘ride the storm’. It involved reframing their management issues or problems, which opened up
potential solutions not previously considered – an instance of ‘double-loop’ learning.314 Box 1 summarises
the local contexts and pressures in which the set members were operating.
We took care to distinguish the research from the action learning process. The action learning facilitator’s
role was to facilitate learning, not to act as expert. Participants were encouraged to bring their own
problems and identify actions to enact in the workplace. On behalf of the others, one participant
summarised some of the issues they faced in their work and addressed in the learning set meetings
(expressed in general terms to protect confidentiality; Box 2).
Action learning involves key interpersonal skills. The learning set supported the development of
interpersonal and intrapersonal processes through encouraging and modelling active listening, careful
questioning and commitment to action. Although it was self-selected, the group functioned well with high
levels of engagement, trust, constructive challenge and questioning. After the final action learning set, a
member who is a commissioning manager wrote a reflective piece commenting:
It has been interesting to start to apply theory to our commissioning pursuits more. Our issues are
common/universal . . . It was really interesting to get an understanding of [large urban area]
initiatives, where scale can be a real help . . . On the whole I think it has consolidated my view
about the options open to us within commissioning, levers and incentives, service redesign versus
contract and performance. I still think we need to know more about the different contractual models
open to us . . . I have been struck by our continued recognition that the determinants of health are
many but we are constrained in a system that is mainly health focused or works in silos for the most
part. This is very much resonant with how we wish to develop an approach in [site] around using
community assets and mixing health and social care interventions together.
Commissioning manager, action learning set
BOX 1 Local contexts and pressures for learning set participants
l Knitting contracting, strategic commissioning/service redesign and quality and safety together in the
right way.
l Need to align interests in primary, secondary and social care.
l Short-termism in projects.
l Newness of clinically led commissioning.
l Structural transition in general.
l Workload and quality variability in primary care.
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Also:
Reflecting on the [Livewell] partnership with a private organisation, the blurring of commissioning/
providing was great and I know some people do question the split and other areas in the world have
not gone in this direction. It is significantly easier to develop a pathway yourself if you have received
the funding to do so and there is much untapped potential in primary care. This doesn’t translate into
a strategy for how all primary care may change the way they are operating though, but does give a
couple of examples of how things could be done differently.
Commissioning manager, action learning set
BOX 2 Selected themes tackled in set meetings
l Importance of alignment of interests and transparency in commissioning.
l Clear aims in contracting, underpinned by sound legal framework.
l Weaknesses of the quasi-market system.
l Lack of transparency and poor accreditation/monitoring of performance.
l Achievements not rewarded and contracts awarded by historical rather than current performance.
l Lack of information for patients and public to make truly informed choices.
l Need to balance competing/conflicting interests of organisations/different patient groups.
l Need to manage conflicting stated aims of the government: competition versus cooperation.
l Different modes of commissioning: contractual versus negotiated.
l Different levels of co-operation and trust between providers and commissioners.
l Improved quality and reduced cost where integrated care has worked.
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Appendix 9 Précis of programme theory
assumptions from Leximancer analysis
Policy texts associate commissioner managerial capacity with the three main mechanisms and withcorresponding service outcomes (italicisation indicates assumption imputed by researchers):
1. Specifying service needs:
i. By understanding care group and population health needs of a local population, good
communication and engagement with the public, patients and health and social care professionals,
commissioners will design service specifications as the basis for contracts with providers.
ii. External commissioning support functions will assist the above, and hence will improve the quality of
service that CCGs can buy.
iii. Commissioners will form groupings of commissioning at different scales for different care groups.
For rare diseases, specialised lead commissioners will propose ‘more effective ways of working’ that
improve outcomes without more cost.
2. Procurement is equated with complying with regulations intended to maintain fair competition;
see below.
3. Monitoring: by using measurement (case mix-adjusted NHS Outcomes Framework targets; systems that
track expenditure and reconcile activity and expenditure) and the transparency of commissioned
providers and general practices, health outcomes commissioners will:
i. improve those health outcomes
ii. stimulate the CCG ‘to work with individual practices to address any “concerns” that a practice is
causing ineffective or wasteful use of NHS resources’ (p. 29)303
iii. help prevent such failures as at Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust
iv. make commissioners more accountable to ‘patients and the public’ for the health outcomes and
quality of care that consortia achieve by proxy of their commissioned providers and member
practices (p. 3)195
v. benchmark what improvements there have been in service and quality, and pay
providers accordingly
vi. feed back into the management of procurement and contracting, in a circular annual process.
Two main negotiated orders, and their consequences, are described. Only the first is a medium for direct
commissioner power over providers.
1. Commissioner–provider. GPs’ involvement in commissioning, that is giving GPs a financial incentive and
tighter financial control to design care packages will:
i. result in pathway redesign, removing ineffective activities, and hence may
ii. improve clinical outcomes
iii. tighten financial control
iv. increase service efficiency
v. give general practices more influence over other providers
vi. make commissioning organisations focus on hence influence provider quality
vii. make GPs take responsibility for the practical (including financial) consequences of their
individual patient spending decisions, and hence align macro population and micro
patient-level commissioning
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viii. get the engagement of the people (fellow GPs) on the demand side (for hospital care)
ix. involve general practices in partnership working with social care
x. enable GPs to create and lead change (type of change unspecified).
2. NHS–local government. By commissioning jointly (e.g. by using pooled budgets, by lead commissioning
arrangements and by involving health and social care professionals from all sectors in designing care
pathways or care packages), CCGs and local government will:
i. obtain services for older people or children and families that are ‘joined up’ or integrated
ii. obtain higher-quality services in terms of patient experience;
iii. make more efficient use of NHS resources
iv. drive up the quality of general practice
v. give commissioning plans a local (i.e. local authority) perspective.
Etic discursive mechanisms for commissioner control over providers are:
1. national commissioning frameworks that help frame the local negotiations
2. research showing new ways of preventing, diagnosing and treating disease, which will increase NHS
quality and productivity and support growth in the economy
3. publishing risk-adjusted NHS Outcomes Framework data, which will lead providers to change their
working practices as an emic response to etic evidence.
If statements about providers’ obligations are more than exhortations, they imply emic discursive controls
over providers. The implied psychological mechanisms are that feelings of obligation among, ultimately,
provider managers and clinicians will make them actively fulfil the obligations. Four associations of
concepts involving such obligations were:
1. The government guarantees that real-terms health spending will increase in every year of this
Parliament, which oblige ‘the NHS’ to cut waste and transform productivity.
2. In return for becoming more empowered, professionals and providers are obliged to be more
accountable for the results they achieve.
3. Endorsement by elected members of local authorities gives democratic legitimacy to
commissioning plans.
4. General practitioner involvement will make commissioning decisions reflect the needs and wishes of
patients and the public; hence they will be a legitimate guide to provider action.
5. In return for their commissioning powers, GPs will be obliged to be responsible and critically compare
referrals with others GPs.
Two groups of mechanisms based on financial incentives to providers were found. Commissioners will
have some say over local financial incentives on providers and these incentives will increase efficiency in
the system, by means of:
1. Incentive mechanisms based on per-patient payments to providers:
i. Per-patient payments will make people opt for that provider.
ii. Personal health budgets will lead providers to improve outcomes, transform NHS culture, put
patients in control and integrate care across health and social services.
iii. Per-patient payments will enable patients to choose which hospital or GP they want to go to.
iv. Hospitals will make savings (for them to spend) if they can do a procedure more efficiently
than tariff.
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2. Other financial incentives to providers:
i. Pathway and other new tariffs for community services will stimulate providers to reduce avoidable
readmissions and to establish more joined-up working between hospitals and social care following
patient discharge from hospital.
ii. Payments linked to quality measures in national clinical audits will stimulate providers to improve
service quality. Specifically, QOF incentives will stimulate general practices to make continuous
improvements in quality of care.
iii. Payment for performance will make pharmacies provide high-quality and efficient services, as well as
better value in the use of medicines.
iv. An incentive structure based partly on balance of need, NICE guidance, etc. will stimulate providers
to achieve a limited number of outcomes set by the Secretary of State and commissioning board.
Concepts of provider competition (besides ‘competition’, the terms ‘ social market’, ‘patient choice’ and
‘contestable’ provision) were associated with the following effects and mechanisms:
1. Unsatisfactory services will be terminated. In the event of provider underperformance, a local authority
should intervene and ultimately retender the contract where that is in the best interests of its
local population.
2. Good providers will thrive and poor providers fail. That is, providers will:
i. improve clinical outcomes, adding years to life and life to years
ii. increase quality
iii. reduce costs, especially on less efficient care
iv. innovate
v. increase productivity
vi. have a stronger focus on satisfying patient choice
vii. read (on the internet) what patients expect and offer it
viii. increase efficiency of service provision
ix. simplify access, reducing waiting times
x. incur redundancy costs for unsuccessful providers
xi. come forward to respond to what commissioners want.
By reshaping markets, commissioners will develop providers to better meet the needs of
the population.
3. When GP commissioners decide to attain given outcomes, they will decide either to provide the
necessary services themselves or to ask secondary providers to change the services accordingly.
Regulation that makes competition occur is directed at commissioners’ behaviour; it is not intended as a
mechanism for commissioner control over providers. Juridical concepts concerning regulation, inspection
and contracts were associated with certain concepts of their effects:
1. Regulation will remedy problems – including lack of commissioner control over providers – arising from
the absence of competition. Then, joint licensing of providers by Monitor and CQC, including imposing
special licensing conditions on providers, will:
i. increase (provider) efficiency in the system
ii. maintain essential levels of safety and quality
iii. ensure continuity of essential services
iv. ensure services are financially sustainable
v. maintain a balance of innovation versus standardisation
vi. assess clinicians against protocols, which will reduce clinicians’ discretion not to comply with
high-quality protocols.
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2. New forms of contract will:
i. improve the quality of and access to NHS dentistry, especially for schoolchildren
ii. improve community pharmacy services’ quality, efficiency and value in the use of medicines
iii. give CCGs more influence over providers than PCTs had.
3. Inspectorates will have the following effects:
i. The CQC will take enforcement action against health or social care providers not meeting essential
levels of safety and quality.
ii. Local HealthWatch will investigate and recommend remedies for poor services.
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Appendix 10 Evidential status of programme
theory assumptions
Comparing our evidence with the 24 main assumptions that, according to our analysis in Chapter 5,underlie current commissioning policy for the English NHS, we found that four (PT4, PT5, PT12, PT22)
were consistent with our findings. Whether or not another seven (PT1, PT9, PT10, PT18, PT19, PT21, PT24)
also were valid remained unknown because the antecedent event (e.g. refusing provider bail-outs) either
had not occurred yet or was beyond our remit (e.g. patient participation in care decisions). Another four
(PT3, PT17, PT20, PT23) appeared inconsistent with our evidence. Our findings give the remaining ten
assumptions (PT2, PT6, PT7, PT8, PT11, PT13, PT14, PT15, PT16, PT25) qualified support because parts of
them were corroborated, parts not. The following evidence called programme theory assumptions PT2,
PT3, PT6, PT7, PT8, PT11, PT13, PT14, PT15, PT16, PT17, PT20, PT23 and PT25 into question.
PT2: Through joint commissioning with local government, commissioners will understand care group
and population health needs of their local population at a macro level.
The above evidence indicated some public health input into the identification of population and
care-group health needs, albeit unevenly. Public health input sometimes did find its way into service
specifications, but often did not, for two reasons: lack of short-term cost savings made commissioners give
preventative interventions low priority; and the intersectoral health-promotion activities (e.g. for smoking
control, changing food-consumption patterns) that have the biggest health impacts are effected more by
campaigning, economic regulation and legislation than by service commissioning.
PT3: NHS England’s management and GPs’ knowledge of patient needs together allow and stimulate
GP commissioners to link clinical and financial decisions.
Our evidence suggests a decoupling, in contract negotiations, of financial from ‘real-side’ discussions, with
a tendency under current commissioning practice for senior managers to conduct financial negotiations
with little participation by GPs or consultants. The financial discussions were motivated by pressures to
meet financial targets set in consequence of national policy, in advance of discussions of care group or
population needs. It remains an open question whether that position will change as CCGs become
more established.
PT6: GP commissioning decisions reviews of primary care quality and stronger partnership working
with social care will bring about a reconfiguration of primary care pathways, removing
ineffective activities.
We found evidence suggesting that micro-commissioning (reviews of primary care quality and stronger
partnership working with social care) was indeed focused on reconfiguring care pathways, often in primary
care. The evidence also suggested that participants were seeking positive benefits (more effective care,
better care coordination, demonstrating the value of existing services) rather than activities to stop,
although the removal of ineffective activities was occasionally a by-product.
PT7: The reshaping of primary care pathways and the development of new IT (on-line consultations
etc.) together result in primary replacing secondary care to some extent.
When a reallocation of income and/or desirable work was implied, GPs and hospitals had competing
interests in obtaining (or retaining) the work, which impeded proposals to substitute primary for secondary
care. The evidence also suggests that, so far, information technology did not play much of a role in
such discussions.
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PT8: GPs’ commissioning decisions, the outcomes framework, the presence of alternative providers
and patients’ choice of providers (in particular of GPs) together stimulate and enable GPs to exercise
greater influence over other providers.
The foregoing evidence indicates that commissioners influenced providers (including fellow GPs) more
through a negotiated order and discussions about evidence than through competitive (including patient
choice) mechanisms. A threat to remove resources (e.g. to alternative providers) made providers more
inclined to negotiate constructively with commissioners, but providers were not always willing and/or able
to respond to GP (or other) commissioners’ demands.
PT11: Increased GP influence over other providers and the substitution of primary for secondary care
together reduce costs of care.
As noted, we found evidence of certain limitations of GP influence over other providers, and of
competitive pressures impeding the substitution of primary for secondary care. There was no evidence that
substantial reductions in the cost of care had so far been achieved by these means, but at so early a stage
it would be premature to draw firm conclusions on that point.
PT13: The outcomes framework and IT developments result in patients, commissioners and providers
themselves having information by which to compare providers’ performance and to allow patients and
commissioners to select (and de-select) providers.
And
PT14: The outcomes framework, information for patients, provider plurality and (later) personal
budgets lead patients and commissioners to choose between (and deselect) providers.
The evidence confirms that commissioners (and indeed other providers) compared providers against
national and regional benchmarks, but that commissioners seldom deselected providers for that (or any
other) reason. Insofar as patient choice affected provider performance or sustainability, it was through the
medium of tariff payments, which evidence from all three countries showed to increase providers’ activity
and commissioners’ costs. IT played little role.
PT15: Commissioners and patients choosing between health-care providers causes the latter to
improve clinical outcomes.
And
PT16: Commissioners and patients choosing between health-care providers causes the latter to
improve the quality of care.
Evidence from the three countries suggested that, insofar as patient choice involves the tariff system, it
reduces or removes commissioners’ capacity to choose providers, whether to improve clinical outcomes
or for any other reason. Where multiple hospitals co-existed, a minority of their service outcomes
(including some proxy clinical outcomes) improved, although more did not. Our evidence suggests that
provider competition appeared not to be a strong explanation of those patterns.
PT17: Patients choosing between health-care providers cause the latter to reduce the cost of care.
Insofar as patient choice involves tariff payments, and insofar as the overall costs of care are concerned,
the evidence from all three countries suggests the opposite.
PT20: Public health activity causes health-care providers to improve clinical outcomes.
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Our evidence suggests that public health input (such as it is; see Chapter 6, subsection Local government)
into contract specifications and provider monitoring is what links public health activity and providers’ clinical
activities. The evidence suggests that at present this links is tenuous, however. The commissioning of
health-care providers is partly irrelevant to primary prevention.
PT25: The availability of information by which to compare providers’ – and by implication
commissioners’ – performance increases NHS organisations’ accountability to the public.
As noted, the evidence suggests that commissioners do compare providers against national and regional
data, some of which are publicly available. To that extent, providers became more accountable to
commissioners. Existing commissioners were held managerially accountable to central government by the
use of similar information (targets, financial out-turns, etc.), but it is still too early to know whether ‘live’
CCGs will be held accountable through similar mechanisms.
In summary, commissioners influenced providers through managerial performance (transparency of
provider activity was important), sustaining a negotiated order (in particular micro-commissioning) whose
disciplinary basis was evidence basing and shared emic assumptions (although the content of these
assumptions varied considerably between countries) and adjusting incentives. Competition gave
commissioners power only insofar as they could select providers, and had at most a mixed impact on the
service outcomes studied. Juridical controls were marginal to day-to-day commissioning practice.
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Appendix 11 Commissioning organisations and
media of power
TABLE 31 Commissioning organisations and media of power (2010–12)
Medium of
power PCT CCG LA SHI ASL
Management
performance
Formal service specifications;
monitoring mostly through tariff
and target data
Developed
competitive
procurement system
Case mix and
cost monitoring;
service redesign
only at margins
Case mix and cost
monitoring
Negotiated
order
Intense relationality with main provider(s);
micro-commissioning
Contractual
character
Collectively at
national, Land
and provider
levels
Intense relationality
with main providers
Discourse Policy+ EBM+ culture
of local collaboration
EBM+ shared
collegial
norms
Normative; council
policy
Case mix
modelling;
solidarity;
regulation
Evidence-based
protocols+ ideology
of subsidiarity
Financial
incentives for
providers
Bundled tariffs+ target based+ ad hoc Stability of income Bundled
tariffs+ cost-
plus (some
psychiatry)
Bundled tariffs+ ad
hoc
Provider
competition
Limited, some token
competition
GPs
uninterested
in provider
competition
For generic services;
and where PCTs
could influence LA
use of central funds
Not available Closed to all but
existing providers
Juridical
control
Exceptional
LA, local authority.
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